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ALL CHARITIES ARE PROPERTY-TAX 
EXEMPT, BUT SOME CHARITIES ARE 
MORE EXEMPT THAN OTHERS 
EVELYN BRODY* 
Abstract: Attention from the media notwithstanding, the nonprofit sector 
continues to achieve remarkable success in state supreme courts and 
statehouses in defending property-tax exemptions. But budget pressures 
remain. While the intermediate use of “payments in lieu of taxes” has not yet 
become a systematic compromise solution, PILOTs are attracting growing 
interest from local taxing jurisdictions. This Article highlights three issues— 
who decides the parameters of exemption, legislatures or courts; what are the 
specific factors and vulnerable subsectors; and how exemption is granted or 
withheld in practice—and concludes with several PILOT case studies. The 
Appendix sets forth a fifty-one-jurisdiction review of state constitutions, 
statutes, and high-court decisions, and finds that the regimes generally are 
more similar than not. 
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“The term ‘charity’ has become magical gibberish to sanctify 
any socially beneficial use of property that a court deems worthy 
of subsidy.” 
Provena Covenant Medical Center v. Department of Revenue1 
INTRODUCTION 
In 2002, I edited a volume examining the issue of property-tax 
exemption for charities from a variety of perspectives and disciplines.2 My 
Introduction predicted that “the issues covered in this study will only 
accelerate in importance in the coming years.” In 2007, I published an 
update that concluded: 
State exemption requirements generally reflect more of a quid-
pro-quo rationale [for granting exemption] than does federal 
exemption. [While it can be difficult to categorize the cases,] 
[m]any . . . revolve around four basic issues: demonstrating 
charitable as distinct from private or other nonprofit purposes; 
satisfying multi-factor tests adopted by state supreme courts 
under state constitutions; the relevance of government financing 
and donations; and the relevance of [profit motive,] fee-
charging[,] and competition with for-profits. The many recent 
decisions from state supreme courts—particularly involving 
hospitals, housing and skilled nursing facilities, and day care— 
demonstrate the importance of property-tax exemption [to the 
states]. The solution to many disputes between property-owning 
charities and the municipalities they inhabit is often more likely 
to be “political” than legal, such as the agreement to make 
payments in lieu of taxes.3 
 
 
 1. 894 N.E.2d 452, 481 (Ill. App. 2008), aff’d, 2010 Ill. LEXIS 289 (Ill. 2010). 
 2. PROPERTY-TAX EXEMPTION FOR CHARITIES: MAPPING THE BATTLEFIELD (Evelyn 
Brody ed., 2002). 
 3. Evelyn Brody, The States’ Growing Use of a Quid-Pro-Quo Rationale for the 
Charity Property Tax Exemption, 56 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 269, 288 (2007) [hereinafter 
Quid-Pro-Quo Rationale]. 
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The last two years—with the economic meltdown of state and local 
tax revenues at a time of increasing demand for social services—have 
confirmed my 2002 prediction, along the lines of my 2007 observations. 
The number of state supreme court decisions and legislative proposals put 
to rest any assumption that issues of property-tax exemption concern only 
the narrowly bounded jurisdictions in the Northeast. The current desperate 
financial situation of many local governments might find sympathetic ears 
in equally desperate statehouses. Indeed, in an April 29, 2009 email, Tim 
Delaney, Executive Director of the National Council of Nonprofits, 
warned: 
With legislation that would have taken away nonprofit property 
tax exemptions introduced earlier this year in at least [four] . . . 
states (where fortunately the bills appear to be dead), . . . at least 
[ten percent] of the states have been actively probing the 
viability of taxing nonprofits. 
. . . We may have just hit the tipping point, because these 
latest activities pile onto a growing list of other attempts to add 
new financial burdens on nonprofits . . . . 
. . . . 
. . . My fear is that state and local governments, with their 
constitutional mandates to balance budgets, will suddenly 
attempt to take away the property tax exemptions, sales tax 
exemptions (in states that provide them to nonprofits), and any 
other tax exemptions that nonprofits historically have received, 
thus drastically increasing costs of operating nonprofits at a time 
when demands for our services are up and our ability to get 
funds to pay more in new taxes is zero.4 
Despite frequent pressure from the media,5 however, the nonprofit 
sector continues to show remarkable success in state supreme courts and 
statehouses in defending exemptions against municipal and legislative 
challenge.6 The intermediate use of payments in lieu of taxes (“PILOTs”) 
 
 4. Email from Tim Delaney, Executive Director, National Council of Nonprofits, to 
Evelyn Brody, Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of 
Technology (Apr. 29, 2009, 10:16 EST) (on file with author). 
 5. See, e.g., Sarah Jane Tribble, Local Nonprofit Hospitals Say They Write Off About 2 
Percent of Revenues on Charity Care, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, Apr. 6, 2009, http://blog. 
cleveland.com/medical/2009/04/Local_nonprofit_hospitals_say.html. 
 6. See, e.g., Wisconsin Nonprofits Association, Success – Property Tax Exemptions 
Saved, http://www.wisconsinnonprofits.org/content/property-tax-exemption-nonprofits-risk 
(including a link to AB75 (2009-2010 budget signed by the governor on June 29, 2009), 
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has not yet become a systematic compromise solution, but it is attracting 
growing interest at the local level, met with uneasiness from the targeted 
types of nonprofits and the nonprofit sector in general. 
The Appendix to this paper sets forth a fifty-one-jurisdiction review 
of state constitutions, statutes, and high-court decisions relating to 
property-tax exemption for charities. As the Appendix demonstrates, while 
the details of the charity exemption from property tax vary from state to 
state (and the District of Columbia), the regimes generally are more similar 
than not. A few themes have emerged in those states that struggle with this 
issue. This paper addresses the following three: 
Issue I: Who Decides? 
In about one half of the states, the state constitution mandates 
exemption for charities; in about twenty others, the constitution grants the 
legislature the authority to provide exemption.7 The issue occasionally 
arises as to which branch of government has the authority to define charity. 
Some high courts have declared that they are the guardians of the 
constitution, retaining the authority to strike a legislative exemption regime 
as unconstitutionally broad. (An overly narrow statute rarely arises.8) 
A separate question is the role of the executive branch—specifically, 
whether the state agencies speak with one voice. Of course, an entity can be 
a charity for state registration and reporting purposes without necessarily 
being property-tax exempt, but anecdotal evidence suggests, unfortunately, 
that the state department of revenue rarely (if ever) consults with the state 
attorney general’s office about whether a particular entity is a charity.9 
Issue II: Income-Producing Nonprofit Industries 
The answer to the riddle, “when is a property tax not a property tax?,” 
might be, “when it’s an income tax.” Several subsectors or properties 
repeatedly find themselves in litigation with municipal governments: 
 
which contains language protecting property-tax exemptions for nonprofit rental housing) 
(last visited Apr. 15, 2010); see infra Part III.A (discussing the Madison, Wisconsin 
experience). 
 7. The terminology varies: Notably, some states use the term “purely public charity” 
and some others refer to “public charity.” 
 8. But see Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 25 (1989) (striking down, on 
First Amendment Establishment Clause grounds, exemption from sales tax that was limited 
to religious literature). See also cases cited infra note 55 (striking down statutes that deny 
exemption to charities that do not serve in-state residents or that are incorporated in another 
state). 
 9. See also Part III (discussing the importance of understanding the process for 
granting or challenging exemption). 
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hospitals; low-income or elderly housing and nursing homes; daycare 
centers; and ancillary facilities such as parking structures, dormitories, and 
administrative space. These industries or uses are typified by positive 
income streams that attract attention. Particularly—but not only—those 
states having multifactor tests see litigation concerning property owned by 
charities that charge fees, rely on government funding, report a relatively 
low level or percentage of gifts received or gratuitous services provided, or 
that compete with for-profit providers of similar services. 
Issue III: Exemption Regimes “On the Ground”—and PILOTs 
More than the income tax, the property-tax regime (and exemption 
from it) suffers from a lack of consistency and transparency. While the 
technical apparatus of a state’s property-tax regime is generally beyond the 
scope of this paper, I do highlight a few important points. 
First, decisions by local assessors are key. However, different 
approaches by different assessors and local administrators can lead to 
variable treatment in the same state. These inconsistencies can occur with 
respect to the types of charities receiving particular scrutiny or the types of 
questions asked (e.g., whether government funding is an area of concern). 
The process too cautions that we should interpret case law with care. 
Lower courts within a state can apply various criteria—and are often less 
sympathetic to exemption than are state high courts.  Often, a would-be- 
exempt charity simply failed to meet its burden of proof for the year at 
issue and, presumably, will remedy this deficiency in future years. Thus, a 
legal pronouncement as to exemption of a particular charity might turn out 
not to be a lasting, substantive impediment to the affected subsector. 
In some localities, a percentage of or certain types of charitable 
property owners provide “voluntary” PILOTs (or services in lieu of taxes—
”SILOTs”), at various levels relative to the tax that would otherwise be 
imposed. No systematic data are available on nonprofit PILOTs and 
SILOTs. Note that because they are often initiated by municipal governing 
boards (or mayors or executives), these arrangements also can vary within 
a particular state. 
I.  Who Decides the Parameters of Exemption?10 
A. Courts Versus Legislatures 
While state constitutions and exemption statutes can be quite 
detailed,11 every state recognizes property-tax exemption for those 
 
 10. The discussion in this part draws substantially from Brody, Quid-Pro-Quo 
Rationale, supra note 3. 
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nonprofits that are classified as charities.12 But being a charity is not 
enough—states focus not only on the identity of the owner of the property 
but also the use of the specific property for which exemption is sought. To 
the surprise of many nonprofits, having federal income-tax exemption 
under Internal Revenue Code section 501(c)(3) is not enough.13 Entitlement 
to exemption, as a threshold matter, requires both a charitable owner and a 
charitable use of the subject property. 
State constitutions sometimes limit property-tax exemption to 
“institutions of purely public charity” (or some similar term), defined by 
state legislatures and courts as requiring the applicant to satisfy a variety of 
factors: notably some level of donative support and gratuitous expenditure, 
and a reduction of the government’s burden. However, the ambiguities and 
generalities used in these sometimes-overlapping factors to define charity 
means that resorting to courts is often still required, with differing 
consequences across the states. 
An important aspect of the state-level tax regime flows from the 
existence of property-tax exemptions granted in or authorized by state 
constitutions, and the degree of vigilance with which the courts guard their 
authority over constitutional terminology. Compare, in their construction of 
similar state constitutional language, the more deferential attitude of the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court to the legislature, with the absolutist approach 
of the Illinois Supreme Court—and a 2009 compromise reached in 
Minnesota. 
Pennsylvania’s Constitution provides: “The General Assembly may 
by law exempt from taxation: . . . (v) Institutions of purely public charity, 
but in the case of any real property tax exemptions only that portion of real 
property of such institution which is actually and regularly used for the 
purposes of the institution.”14 In a 1985 case, the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court promulgated a five-part test requiring that an entity claiming 
classification as a “purely public charity” under the Pennsylvania 
Constitution must prove that it: “(a) advances a charitable purpose; (b) 
 
 11. See Appendix. 
 12. See Brody, Quid-Pro-Quo Rationale, supra note 3; see generally PROPERTY-TAX 
EXEMPTION FOR CHARITIES: MAPPING THE BATTLEFIELD, supra note 2, especially Janne 
Gallagher, The Legal Structure of Property-Tax Exemption, in PROPERTY-TAX EXEMPTIONS 
FOR CHARITIES: MAPPING THE BATTLEFIELD, supra note 2, at 3-22.  
 13. State income-tax exemption often piggybacks on federal income-tax exemption 
(including, in some states, the tax on unrelated business income). Accordingly, this Article 
focuses on the more idiosyncratic property-tax regimes. Beyond the scope of this Article are 
considerations of exemption from sales and use tax, often more similar to property-tax 
regimes than to income-tax regimes. 
 14. PA. CONST. art. VIII, § 2(a)(v). 
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donates or renders gratuitously a substantial portion of its services; (c) 
benefits a substantial and indefinite class of persons who are legitimate 
subjects of charity; (d) relieves the government of some of its burden; and 
(e) operates entirely free from private profit motive.”15 Based on the name 
of the applicant, the Hospital Utilization Project, Pennsylvania’s approach 
has become known as the “HUP test.” 
In 1997, the Pennsylvania Legislature passed Act 55, “The 
Institutions of Purely Public Charity Act,” in an effort to: 
eliminate inconsistent application of eligibility standards for 
charitable tax exemptions, reduce confusion and confrontation 
among traditionally tax-exempt institutions and political 
subdivisions and ensure that charitable and public funds are not 
unnecessarily diverted from the public good to litigate eligibility 
for tax-exempt status by providing standards to be applied 
uniformly in all proceedings throughout this commonwealth for 
determining eligibility for exemption from state and local 
taxation which are consistent with the traditional legislative and 
judicial applications of the constitutional term. . . .16 
While the statute is designed around the five-prong HUP test, “it 
greatly expanded those standards well beyond what any appellate court had 
ever decided.”17 Indeed, both before and after the enactment of Act 55, the 
Pennsylvania judiciary differed internally on the definition of “purely 
public charity.” Lower courts tend to construe the test strictly, while the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court is more accepting of an expanded definition.18 
Even though the Pennsylvania Supreme Court is the final arbiter of 
Pennsylvania’s constitution, a challenge to the constitutionality of the 
legislative scheme created by Act 55 has not materialized. Instead, the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court has twice side-stepped the issue, reversing 
decisions of the commonwealth court in 2002 and 2007.19 The more recent 
 
 15. Hosp. Utilization Project v. Commonwealth, 487 A.2d 1306, 1317 (Pa. 1985) 
(paragraph breaks and initial capitalization omitted). 
 16. 10 PA. STAT. ANN. § 372(b) (West 1999). 
 17. David B. Glancey, PILOTs: Philadelphia and Pennsylvania, in PROPERTY-TAX 
EXEMPTION FOR CHARITIES: MAPPING THE BATTLEFIELD, supra note 2, at 211, 211-32. 
 18. See Unionville-Chadds Ford Sch. Dist. v. Chester County Bd. of Assessment 
Appeals, 714 A.2d 397 (Pa. 1998) (upholding the exemption of Longwood Gardens); City 
of Washington v. Bd. of Assessment Appeals, 704 A.2d 120, 122-26 (Pa. 1997) (upholding 
the exemption of Washington and Jefferson College). 
 19. See Alliance Home of Carlisle, Pa. v. Bd. of Assessment Appeals, 919 A.2d 206, 
227 (Pa. 2007); Cmty. Options, Inc. v. Bd. of Prop. Assessment, 813 A.2d 680, 684 (Pa. 
2002). Note that in the two cases cited supra footnote 18, the commonwealth court had 
ruled in favor of exemption, and the years at issue predated Act 55. 
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decision upheld exemption for an independent living apartment facility in a 
licensed continuing care retirement community that also included a skilled 
nursing facility and an assisted living facility. More important than the 
specific holding is the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s observations about 
the problems that would be raised by a conflict between the state 
constitution and the statute: 
If the Act 55 presumption and test would lead to a holding that a 
taxpayer qualified as “an institution of purely public charity,” 
where the HUP test would not, fundamental and foundational 
questions could arise concerning whether: (1) the HUP test, 
which was adopted in the absence of legislation addressing the 
constitutional term, occupied the constitutional field concerning 
the exemption, or instead left room for the General Assembly to 
address the matter; (2) the legislative scheme as adopted 
comported with the constitutional command and displaced the 
HUP test; and/or (3) if HUP were deemed authoritative and 
comprehensive, whether the legislative findings and scheme set 
forth in Act 55 gave reason to reconsider the contours of the test 
thus distilled from judicial experience with individual cases.20 
Thus, while the commonwealth court seems to suggest that in a 
conflict between Act 55 and HUP, HUP wins, the supreme court seems to 
believe that the legislation should be given greater weight.21 
By contrast, consider a 2004 ruling by the Illinois Supreme Court 
involving Eden Retirement Center.22 The Illinois Constitution permits the 
legislature to exempt certain types of property from taxation: “The General 
Assembly by law may exempt from taxation only the property of the State, 
units of local government and school districts and property used 
exclusively for agricultural and horticultural societies, and for school, 
religious, cemetery and charitable purposes.”23 As to the meaning of 
“charitable purposes,” two years before this constitution was adopted, the 
Illinois Supreme Court had set forth its own multi-factor test for charitable 
exemption under the constitution then in effect. Methodist Old Peoples 
Home v. Korzen24 required that: (1) the benefits extend to an indefinite 
number of persons for their general welfare or in some way reduce the 
 
 20. Alliance Home, 919 A.2d at 223. Footnote 9, after this text, begins: “Of course, this 
Court is not obliged to defer to the legislative judgment concerning the proper interpretation 
of constitutional terms.” Id. at 223 n.9. 
 21. See Joseph C. Bright, State Supreme Court Overturns Ruling on Charitable 
Exemptions, STATE TAX NOTES, Apr. 30, 2007, at 320. 
 22. Eden Ret. Ctr., Inc. v. Dep’t of Revenue, 821 N.E.2d 240 (Ill. 2004). 
 23. ILL. CONST. art. IX, § 6. 
 24. 233 N.E.2d 537, 541-42 (Ill. 1968). 
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burdens on government; (2) the organization have no capital, capital stock, 
or shareholders, and does not profit from the enterprise; (3) funds derive 
mainly from private and public charity, and are held in trust for the objects 
and purposes expressed in the organization’s charter; (4) charity is 
dispensed to all who need and apply for it; (5) no obstacles are placed in 
the way of those seeking the benefits; and (6) the exclusive (i.e., primary) 
use of the property is for charitable purposes. 
In 1984, the Illinois legislature enacted a detailed property-tax statute 
that granted exemption to specific categories, including “old people’s 
homes” that are tax-exempt under Internal Revenue Code § 501(c)(3) if 
[E]ither: (i) the bylaws of the home or facility or not-for-profit 
organization provide for a waiver or reduction, based on an 
individual’s ability to pay, of any entrance fee, assignment of 
assets, or fee for services, or (ii) the home or facility is qualified, 
built or financed under Section 202 of the National Housing Act 
of 1959, as amended.25 
In Eden Retirement Center, the lower courts concluded that the home 
qualified for the charitable-use property-tax exemption based solely on: (1) 
its exemption from federal income taxes; and (2) its bylaw provision 
allowing for the reduction or waiver of charges based on residents’ inability 
to pay. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed: 
The appellate court’s analysis is erroneous. The Methodist 
Old Peoples Home criteria are not mere nonstatutory “hurdles” 
intended to apply only to the pre-1984 version of the charitable-
use property tax exemption statute. Rather, this court articulated 
the criteria in Methodist Old Peoples Home to resolve the 
constitutional issue of charitable use. The legislature could not 
declare that property, which satisfied a statutory requirement, 
was ipso facto property used exclusively for a tax-exempt 
purpose specified in section 6 of article IX of the Illinois 
Constitution. It is for the courts, and not for the legislature, to 
determine whether property in a particular case is used for a 
constitutionally specified purpose.26 
The Illinois Supreme Court did not explain why only the courts, and 
not the legislature, may put a gloss on the constitutional term “charitable 
purposes.”27 Unfortunately, the plurality opinion of the Illinois Supreme 
Court reiterated this position in its March 2010 ruling in Provena Covenant 
 
 25. 35 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 200/15-65 (West 2006). 
 26. Eden Ret. Ctr., Inc., 821 N.E.2d at 250 (internal citations omitted). 
 27. See id. 
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Medical Center v. Department of Revenue,28 discussed in Part II.C below. 
While not citing Eden Retirement Center, Inc. v. Department of Revenue as 
to this issue, the plurality declared: “The legislature cannot add to or 
broaden the exemptions specified in section 6 [of the Illinois 
Constitution],” and cited a case that rejected property-tax exemption for the 
Chicago Bar Association.29 In that case, the Illinois Supreme Court ruled: 
“Whether particular property is used ‘exclusively for . . . school . . . 
purposes’ within the meaning of the constitution is a matter for the courts, 
and not the legislature, to ascertain. The legislature cannot, by its 
enactment, make that a school purpose which is not in fact a school 
purpose.”30 The two justices in Provena who concurred only in the result, 
disagreed: “The legislature did not set forth a monetary threshold for 
evaluating charitable use. We may not annex new provisions or add 
conditions to the language of a statute.”31 
At the very end of its legislative session in May 2009, Minnesota 
adopted statutory language to address the concerns of the nonprofit sector 
following a 2007 state supreme court decision denying exemption to a 
daycare center claiming to be an institution of purely public charity. Under 
the state constitution, “institutions of purely public charity” are a separate, 
catchall category rather than an overarching definition—the full list 
includes: “public burying grounds, public school houses, public hospitals, 
academies, colleges, universities, all seminaries of learning, all churches, 
church property, houses of worship, institutions of purely public charity, 
and public property used exclusively for any public purpose.”32 A 1975 
state supreme court decision set forth what has come to be known as the 
North Star six-factor test for classifying an institution of purely public 
charity.33 
In the 2007 decision in Under the Rainbow Child Care Center v. 
County of Goodhue, the Minnesota Supreme Court, applying statutory 
analysis, ruled that the “factor three inquiry”—”the extent to which the 
 
 28. Provena Covenant Med. Ctr. v. Dep’t of Revenue, No. 107328, 2010 Ill. LEXIS 289 
(Ill. Mar. 18, 2010). 
 29. Id. at *28 (citing Chicago Bar Ass’n v. Dep’t of Revenue, 644 N.E.2d 1166, 1171 
(Ill. 1994)). 
 30. Chicago Bar Ass’n, 644 N.E.2d at 1171 (internal citations omitted). 
 31. Provena, 2010 Ill. LEXIS 289, at *65 (Burke, J., concurring and dissenting). Justice 
Burke explained: “Setting a monetary or quantum standard is a complex decision which 
should be left to our legislature, should it so choose. The plurality has set a quantum of care 
requirement and monetary requirement without any guidelines. This can only cause 
confusion, speculation, and uncertainty for everyone: institutions, taxing bodies, and the 
courts.” Id. at *70. 
 32. MINN. CONST. art. X, § 1; see MINN. STAT. § 272.02(7) (2009). 
 33. N. Star Research Inst. v. County of Hennepin, 236 N.W.2d 754, 757 (Minn. 1975). 
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recipients of the charity are required to pay for the assistance received”—is 
not merely to be taken into account, but rather “tests for a value that is 
fundamental to the concept of charity—that is, whether the organization 
gives anything away.”34 The court rejected the argument that it was enough 
to have charitable purposes: “If the legislature had intended all 
organizations exempt from payment of federal income taxes under I.R.C. § 
501(c)(3) also to be exempt from payment of real property taxes, it could 
have so provided, as it did with regard to state income taxation.”35 The 
majority commented: “The second broad consequence of the dissent’s 
interpretation of charity would be that a ‘charitable’ enterprise could charge 
the same for its services as a for-profit competitor and nevertheless enjoy 
exemption from property taxation, as long as no profits inured to the 
benefit of members of the organization.”36 The court cautioned: 
Moreover, it is not sufficient to provide free or reduced-rate 
goods or services on such a small scale that they are merely an 
incidental part of the organization’s operations. Nor will free or 
reduced-rate goods or services that are provided primarily for 
business purposes be adequate. The organization must 
demonstrate that its intended purpose is to provide a substantial 
proportion of its goods or services on a charitable basis. If the 
organization does not operate on these terms, it is indeed not an 
institution of purely public charity and cannot qualify for tax 
exemption on that basis.37 
In 2008 the Minnesota Legislature adopted a moratorium on Under 
the Rainbow, and required the Department of Revenue to analyze the 
applicable standards for determining the tax status of these organizations, 
to survey all county assessors on their practices and policies, and to report 
the findings to the 2009 legislature.38  The moratorium allowed for months 
of deliberations among the Minnesota Council of Nonprofits, the 
Department of Revenue, and the Association of County Assessors. The 
consensus, adopted by the legislature in May 2009, codifies the definition 
of an institution of purely public charity, effective beginning in 2010. 
 
 34. Under the Rainbow Child Care Ctr. v. County of Goodhue, 741 N.W.2d 880, 886 
(Minn. 2007). 
 35. Id. at 889 (emphasis added). 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. at 892. 
 38. The resulting report, MINN. DEP’T OF REVENUE, ASSESSMENT AND CLASSIFICATION 
REPORT: INSTITUTIONS OF PURELY PUBLIC CHARITY (2009), as well as an executive summary 
and survey results by county, are available at http://www.taxes.state.mn.us/property_tax_ 
administrators/other_supporting_content/summary.pdf. See Part III for excerpts from the 
report. 
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While “not contract[ing] or expand[ing] the definition,” Minnesota Statutes 
section  272.02(7)(a), as amended, requires charities to meet all six 
judicially created factors for determining tax exempt status, with factors 
(1), (4), and (6) being mandatory and factors (2), (3), and (5) allowing a 
“reasonable justification” exception (rejecting the Senate’s “compelling 
factual reason”). See the Appendix for guidance issued March 1, 2010 by 
the Minnesota Department of Revenue. 
B.  Intrastate Inconsistency 
In 2001 in Illinois, the Attorney General sought to freeze the assets of 
a white supremacist group, the World Church of the Creator, for failing to 
register with his office as a charity under the Charitable Solicitations Act.39 
(The Illinois statute does not exempt churches.) The organization 
succeeded at the trial level in having the statute voided as 
unconstitutionally vague. On a direct appeal (because a state statute had 
been ruled unconstitutional), the Illinois Supreme Court upheld the 
solicitation statute, in part by invoking property-tax exemption precedent: 
In fact, the terms “charity” and “charitable” have a settled 
meaning in Illinois case law. For example, in Congregational 
Sunday School & Publishing Society v. Board of Review, 290 Ill. 
108, 125 N.E. 7 (1919), the appellant’s claimed exemption from 
personal property taxation for religious books and Sunday school 
supplies was denied . . . . This court, in construing the statutory 
term “beneficent and charitable organizations,” noted that charity 
is a gift to be applied for the benefit of an indefinite number of 
persons, by bringing their “‘minds and hearts under the influence 
of education or religion, . . . by assisting them to establish 
themselves in life . . . or by otherwise lessening the burdens of 
government.’”40 
 
 39. People ex rel. Ryan v. World Church of the Creator, 760 N.E.2d 953, 955 (Ill. 
2001). 
 40. See id. at 960-61 (quoting Congregational Sunday Sch. & Pub. Soc. v. Bd. of 
Review, 125 N.E. 7, 9 (Ill. 1919)); see also id. at 959. As recognized by the court, this 
commonly cited definition actually traces to Jackson v. Phillips; the court quoted an 1893 
Illinois Supreme Court decision that stated: 
A charity, in a legal sense, may be more fully defined as a gift to be 
applied, consistently with existing laws, for the benefit of an indefinite 
number of persons, either by bringing their hearts under the influence of 
education, religion, by relieving their bodies from disease, suffering, or 
constraint, by assisting them to establish themselves for life, or by 
erecting or maintaining public buildings or works, or otherwise 
lessening the burdens of government. 
BRODY_FINAL FOR PDF 6/24/2010  12:36:59 PM 
2010] PROPERTY-TAX EXEMPTION FOR CHARITIES 633 
The Illinois Supreme Court’s opinion in People ex rel. Ryan v. World 
Church of the Creator quoted an appellate decision that had previously 
construed the solicitation statute: 
“The courts in this State are in accord in applying a broad 
legal definition of ‘charity’ to include almost anything that tends 
to promote the improvement, well[-]doing and well[-]being of 
social man. Moreover, charitable organizations may include 
organizations whose primary purpose is not to provide money or 
services for the poor, the needy or other worthy objects of 
charity, but to gather and disseminate information about and to 
advocate positions on matters of public concern.”41 
Because of the different policy goals of the two regimes, it is possible, 
if not likely, that the solicitation statute uses a broader definition than does 
the tax-exemption statute. Indeed, a nonprofit organization might have 
income-tax exemption but not property-tax exemption or sales-tax 
exemption. Reportedly, the World Church of the Creator had applied for 
sales-tax exemption, but the Illinois Department of Revenue (which also 
has the final administrative word on property-tax exemption in Illinois) 
denied it charity status.42 
It seems that, at least as a starting point, the state revenue agency 
might consult with the state attorney general about whether a particular 
organization is a charity. Anecdotally, however, this sort of communication 
rarely occurs.43 The reverse, of course, can be true: As discussed below, a 
charity as such can exist under state law even when the entity is denied (or, 
perhaps, has not satisfied the administrative requirements for) property-tax 
exemption.44  Indeed, some states require the revenue department to notify 
the state attorney general of loss of exemption.45 
 
  Crerar v. Williams, 34 N.E. 467, 470 (Ill. 1893) (quoting Jackson v. Phillips, 96 
Mass. (14 Allen) 539, 556 (1867)). 
 41. World Church of the Creator, 760 N.E.2d at 961 (quoting People ex rel. Hartigan v. 
Nat’l Anti-Drug Coal., 464 N.E.2d 690, 694 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984)) (citation omitted). 
 42. See Kirsten Scharnberg, Smith’s Legacy of Hate and Fear Six Months After 
Benjamin Smith’s Spree, the Pain He Inflicted Is Far from over, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 3, 2000, at 
N1. 
 43. In response to an informal query forwarded to a network of charity regulators in 
state attorneys general offices, one responder told me in a February 13, 2009 email: “If the 
Department of Finance were to do anything like what you are saying, which I doubt, they 
would most likely not even think that they should contact our office.” Another charity 
regulator emailed me, on the same date: “The County property tax assessors have never 
contacted me to ask whether a particular charity is really a charity.” 
 44. See John W. Vinson, The Charity Oversight Authority of the Texas Attorney 
General, 35 ST. MARY’S L.J. 243, 251 n.48 (2004). 
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II.  Specific Factors and Vulnerable Subsectors 
State property-tax regimes require both that the property owner be 
charitable (generally the subject of Part A) and that the charitable owner 
use the property for a charitable purpose (generally the subject of Part B).  
The division between these two requirements is not always clear or useful. 
A. Evolving Definition of Charity 
Charitable organizations are defined under a common law tradition 
that traces back to the Statutes of Elizabeth in the late sixteenth and early 
seventeenth centuries.46 The term “charity” has been fleshed out over 
 
 
One critical point . . . is that tax exemption authority and precedents 
may have little application to the question of whether an entity or 
specific assets are impressed with a charitable obligation. The 
presumptions, burdens of proof, and underlying policy assumptions in 
cases involving a purported charity’s entitlement to exemptions and 
other governmental/legal benefits are often quite distinct. To be so 
entitled, the purported charity must demonstrate not only that it is 
organized as a charity, but that it actually operates as a charity. See N. 
Alamo Water Supply Corp. v. Willacy County Appraisal Dist., 804 
S.W.2d 894, 899 (Tex. 1991) (holding that “exemptions from taxation 
are not favored by the law and will not be favorably construed”); see 
also Circle C Child Dev. v. Travis Cent. Appraisal Dist., 981 S.W.2d 
483, 486 (Tex. App.–Austin 1998, no writ) (announcing that the party 
seeking a tax exemption has the burden to clearly show the exemption 
applies). Also, organizations must affirmatively apply for tax-exempt 
status, whereas common law charity status, and the obligations imposed 
by law because of such status, will be applied as a matter of law. 
  Id. 
 45. See, e.g., N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 8-1.4(o) (Consol. 2009) (“Every 
officer, agency, board or commission of this state or political subdivisions of this state or 
agencies thereof receiving applications for exemption from taxation of any trustee subject to 
this section shall annually file with the attorney general a list of all applications received 
during the year and shall notify the attorney general of any suspension or revocation of a tax 
exempt status previously granted.”). 
 46. In one important sense, however, the definition of charity in the Charities Act 2006 
of England and Wales might be narrower than the traditional common law definition—
depending on how the Charity Commission for England and Wales resolves the debate 
about “public benefit.” The Charity Commission construes Charities Act 2006 to require 
that “[p]eople in poverty must not be excluded from the opportunity to benefit” from the 
activities of a charity. CHAR. COMM’N, FOR ENG. AND WALES, CHARITIES AND PUBLIC 
BENEFIT § F11 (2008), available at http://www.charity-commission.gov.uk/Library/ 
guidance/publicbenefittext.pdf. See generally CHAR. COMM’N, FOR ENG. AND WALES, NEW 
PUBLIC BENEFIT GUIDANCE (2008), available at http://www.charity-commission.gov.uk 
BRODY_FINAL FOR PDF 6/24/2010  12:36:59 PM 
2010] PROPERTY-TAX EXEMPTION FOR CHARITIES 635 
hundreds of years of Anglo-American jurisprudence; the current U.S. 
common law meaning appears in Restatement (Third) of Trusts sections 28 
and 29. Broader than eleemosynary institutions, the common law term 
encompasses, among other categories of nonprofit organizations, hospitals, 
universities, religious organizations, and arts and cultural organizations, as 
well as social service and grant-making organizations. 
The reference in some state constitutions to exemption for 
“institutions of purely public charity” (or some similar phrase) has been 
interpreted by their state supreme courts as requiring the satisfaction of a 
multi-factor test.47 In a few other states, a multi-factor test appears in the 
statute. These tests create problems for compliance and application, 
however. The factors are not quantitative and data—such as level of 
donations—may vary from year to year, raising the possibility of flipping 
in and out of exemption. Nor do the courts weigh the factors, some of 
which overlap. Other uncertainties—such as whether the charity’s receipt 
of government support means the charity is not lessening the burdens of 
government, or whether the presence of for-profit competitors means the 
charity should charge lower prices—lead different courts to reach different 
conclusions. Most importantly, the courts generally describe the factors 
collectively as suggestive, raising the question of whether any one or more 
factor is mandatory. In 2008, an Illinois appellate court singled out the 
“gift” factor as a sine quo non for charity exemption; the case is on appeal 
to the state supreme court.48 In 2009, the Minnesota Legislature identified 
which factors are mandatory and which factors may be excused upon a 
reasonable exception.49 
The courts recognize that the concept of charity evolves over time to 
take into account the changing needs of society, new discoveries, and the 
varying conditions, characters, and needs of different communities. The 
Restatement (Third) of Trusts provides numerous examples of “purposes 
that are beneficial to the community” that fall into the residual category, 
 
/news/pblatest.asp; CHAR. COMM’N, FOR ENG. AND WALES, PUBLIC BENEFIT ASSESSMENT 
RECORDS: INDEPENDENT SCHOOLS (2009), http://www.charity-commission.gov.uk/Charity_ 
requirements_guidance/Charity_essentials/Public_benefit/default.aspx (follow “the public 
assessment reports” hyperlink for each school listed) (finding that two of the five private 
schools examined did not provide enough means-tested tuition abatements to allow poor 
children to benefit from the school’s education). All of the reports are available at 
http://www.charity-commission.gov.uk/Charity_requirements_guidance/Charity_essentials 
/Public_benefit/default.aspx. See generally Debra Morris’s contribution to the NYU 
conference, “Shades of Virtue: Measuring the Comparative Worthiness of Charities,” 
described in note *, above. 
 47. See supra Part I.A. 
 48. See discussion infra Part II.C. 
 49. See supra Part I.A; see generally Appendix for details. 
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including: “[a] trust to prevent or alleviate the suffering of animals”; a trust 
to promote national security; and “a trust to beautify a city or preserve the 
beauties of nature or otherwise add to the aesthetic enjoyment of the 
community.”50 Moreover, charity might include any purpose recognized as 
having public benefit as may be provided by statute and administrative 
guidance. 
For example, tax exemption for land set aside for conservation is a 
hot topic under both federal and state-tax policy. At the federal level, the 
Internal Revenue Code permits a charitable contribution deduction for the 
perpetual protection of land for enumerated conservation purposes through 
a grant of a conservation easement to a government entity or charitable 
organization. For our purposes, consider the concern expressed by a bill 
introduced in New Jersey, whose legislative findings included the 
following statement: 
The Legislature further finds and declares that while the 
dedication of privately-owned open space to public use and 
enjoyment is a significant governmental interest, there needs to 
be a balance between the tax incentives granted to encourage that 
dedication and the burden placed on municipalities that lose that 
tax revenue; and that no municipality, without its prior consent, 
shall be required to grant a tax exemption under this act if the 
land area of the real property for which the exemption would be 
granted, when combined with the land area already owned in fee 
simple for recreation and conservation purposes in the 
municipality by the State, a local government unit, or a 
qualifying tax exempt nonprofit organization, would exceed 
[thirty percent] of the total land area of the municipality.51 
A new frontier might be nonprofit journalism as a means to save the 
newspaper trade.52 
All charitable purposes must be viewed in light of the prohibition on 
private benefit. Thus, commentary to the Third Restatement recognizes 
that: “The common element of charitable purposes is that they are designed 
to accomplish objects that are beneficial to the community—i.e., to the 
 
 50. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 28, cmt. l (2001). 
 51. A.D. 3065, 212th Leg. (N.J. 2006), available at www.njleg.state.nj.us/2006/Bills/ 
A3500/3065_I1.pdf. 
 52. See generally MARION FREMONT-SMITH, JOAN SHORENSTEIN CTR. ON THE PRESS, 
POL. AND PUB. POL’Y, CAN NONPROFITS SAVE JOURNALISM? LEGAL CONSTRAINTS AND 
OPPORTUNITIES, (2009), available at http://www.hks.harvard.edu/presspol/publications/ 
papers/can_nonprofits_save_journalism_fremont-smith.pdf. 
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public or indefinite members thereof—without also serving what amount to 
private trust purposes.”53 
The particular segment of the public being served by the charity is 
one aspect of the charity’s purpose. Importantly, the requirement of a 
public benefit does not imply that all members of the general public or of a 
particular political jurisdiction are necessarily the beneficiaries. Indeed, the 
use of the terms “public” or “community” is not necessarily geographic.54 
Rather, the charity’s founders, and thereafter those governing the charity 
and its members (if any), determine whether the charity’s operations will 
have a particular geographic scope, or target a segment of the public within 
that scope. For example, a charity could provide scholarships for any 
graduate students in philosophy, regardless of where they study, or for 
philosophy graduate students at a particular institution or from a particular 
town or state. The U.S. Supreme Court, and several state supreme courts, 
struck down exemption regimes that limited exemptions only to charities 
(or their property) serving state residents.55 
A focus on the definition of charity risks missing the complexity of 
most state property-tax exemption regimes. “Charity” is often a catchall, 
while the state constitution provides an explicit—and sometimes more 
generous or more limited—exemption for certain types of nonprofit 
organizations. As Woods Bowman and Marion Fremont-Smith found: 
 
 53. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 28 cmt. a (emphasis added); see also id. § 28 
cmt. l. 
 54. In the context of property-tax exemption, however, see the discussion of complex 
corporate structures and transfers to affiliated nonprofits out of the taxing jurisdiction. John 
Colombo, The Provena Tax Exemption Case: The Demise of Community Benefit?, 55 
EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 175 (2007). 
 55. Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, Me., 520 U.S. 564, 586-88 
(1997) (ruling that charitable activity is entitled to protection under the Commerce Clause, 
which prohibits states from discriminating in interstate commerce). As a matter of statutory 
interpretation, the Vermont Supreme Court rejected the argument of a town that argued “that 
implicit in the definition of public use is a requirement that the people served must be 
primarily citizens of Vermont and the Town because the Legislature would have no reason 
to make property exempt to benefit residents of other states.” Inst. of Prof’l Practice, Inc. v. 
Town of Berlin, 811 A.2d 1238, 1240 (Vt. 2002) (holding exempt a building used for the 
administration of a charity operating out-of-state group homes, foster homes, and assisted 
living programs for those with developmental and other disabilities). Compare these 
decisions with the commentary in the Restatement (Third) of Trusts addressing the scope of 
the word “public”: 
The mere fact that a trust is created for the benefit of members of a 
community outside the state . . . does not prevent the trust from being 
charitable. Thus, a trust for the benefit of impoverished residents of 
another state, or to establish a hospital in a foreign country, is charitable. 
  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 28 cmt. l (2001). 
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The most common exemptions are, in descending order, with the 
number of states indicated in parentheses, religious (35, mostly 
limited to houses of worship), charitable or benevolent (33), 
educational (33), and cemeteries (27). Nineteen states exempt all 
four categories. Other exemptions appearing in the constitutions 
of at least two states are libraries (12), literary and scientific 
organizations (8), hospitals (4), cultural organizations and 
museums (4), agricultural and horticultural organizations (3), and 
patriotic and veterans’ organizations (3). . . . 
With or without a constitutional mandate, every state 
exempts charitable property, but only eleven states define charity 
in the tax statutes.56 
Moreover, many state statutes set forth separate provisions for certain 
subsectors of charities within those enumerated in the constitution, 
including, notably, nonprofit health care and fitness facilities (including 
YMCAs), housing (for low-income, elderly, or disabled populations), 
daycare facilities, and conservation property. A state that would prefer a 
more systemic reform of the property-tax treatment of the catchall category 
of charities might need to pursue a state constitutional amendment.57 So far, 
though, charities have succeeded in fighting fundamental change.58 
B. Rationales for Exempting Charitable Property 
The question of why charities are tax-exempt has been framed in 
general theoretical terms of whether the exemption is, on the one hand, a 
subsidy or, on the other, an acknowledgment that charitable activity falls 
outside the proper tax base.59 Uniquely, exemption for charitable activity 
has been justified on both subsidy grounds and base-defining grounds.60 
 
 56. Woods Bowman & Marion R. Fremont-Smith, Nonprofits and State and Local 
Governments, in NONPROFITS AND GOVERNMENT: COLLABORATION AND CONFLICT 181, 203 
(Elizabeth T. Boris & C. Eugene Steuerle eds., 2d ed. 2006) (footnote omitted). 
 57. See proposals for state constitutional amendments in Richard D. Pomp, The 
Collision Between Nonprofits and Cities over the Property Tax: Possible Solutions, in 
PROPERTY-TAX EXEMPTION FOR CHARITIES: MAPPING THE BATTLEFIELD, supra note 2, at 
383, 383-91. 
 58. See, e.g., David Salomone, Property-Tax Exemption for Charities: The Minnesota 
Experience, in PROPERTY-TAX EXEMPTION FOR CHARITIES: MAPPING THE BATTLEFIELD, 
supra note 2, at 353, 353-59. 
 59. For historical studies of tax exemption in the United States, see Stephen Diamond, 
Efficiency and Benevolence: Philanthropic Tax Exemptions in 19th-Century America, in 
PROPERTY-TAX EXEMPTION FOR CHARITIES: MAPPING THE BATTLEFIELD, supra note 2, at 
115; Richard L. Gabbler & John F. Shannon, The Exemption of Religious, Educational, and 
Charitable Institutions from Property Tax Exemption, in IV RESEARCH PAPERS SPONSORED 
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Viewed as subsidies, property-tax exemption and income-tax 
exemption function quite differently. In contrast to income-tax exemption, 
property-tax exemption (like sales tax exemption and the charitable 
contribution deduction) is an input subsidy: The tax treatment makes it 
cheaper to conduct charitable activity. But exemption as a form of subsidy 
has some peculiar features—notably, as described below, the property-tax 
exemption has the most value to the most real-estate-rich charities. 
Moreover, subsidies delivered through exemptions lack the public finance 
virtues of visibility and adjustability. While exemptions do have the 
administrative advantage of providing a subsidy at a minimal transaction 
cost, this virtue is undercut when municipalities (as they occasionally do) 
engage in individualized negotiations with charities for payments in lieu of 
taxes.61 Interestingly, no court following a quid-pro-quo rationale for 
exemption has quantified whether the public gain equaled or exceeded the 
forgone tax revenue.62 
 
BY THE COMMISSION ON PRIVATE PHILANTHROPY AND PUBLIC NEEDS 2535 (1977) 
[hereinafter FILER COMMISSION]; PETER D. HALL, INVENTING THE NONPROFIT SECTOR 
(1992). Evelyn Brody, Of Sovereignty and Subsidy: Conceptualizing the Charity Tax 
Exemption, 23 J. CORP. L. 585 (1998) supplies a perspective over the standard subsidy and 
base-defining theories of exemption that she dubbed the “sovereignty view” of the tax 
treatment of the nonprofit sector. It compares the tax treatment of charities to a clear 
sovereignty set of examples: the tax treatment of governments. Id. at 587-89. Note that the 
largest percentages of untaxed property belongs to federal, state, and local governments, and 
states (and their subdivisions) tax neither federal property nor their own property. Id. at 599. 
 60. The most thorough analysis of the very complicated U.S. tax treatment of charities 
can be found in John Simon, Harvey Dale & Laura Chisolm, The Federal Tax Treatment of 
Charitable Organizations, in THE NONPROFIT SECTOR: A RESEARCH HANDBOOK 267 (Walter 
F. Powell & Richard Steinberg eds., 2d ed. 2006). These authors group a variety of policy 
goals under four headings that they call the support function (subsidy), the equity function 
(notably redistribution), the regulatory function (constraints on managerial behavior), and 
the border-patrol function (that is, between charities and both the business and public 
sectors). See id. 
 61. See infra Part III.B. 
 62. See Walz v. Tax Comm’n of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664, 676 (1970); Regan v. Taxation 
With Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 544 (1983). But see American Ass’n for Lost 
Children, Inc. v. Westmoreland County Board of Assessment Appeals, 977 A.2d 595, 601 
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 2009) (Jubelirer, J., dissenting), in which the dissent criticized such an 
interpretation of the exemption statute: 
The majority and trial court engraft an additional component to the 
factual analysis that is not required by Section 5(f)(2); in particular, 
what tangible financial impact the Association’s efforts have on the 
government. Section 5(f)(2) contains no references to finances, but 
looks only at whether the government has a legal duty to do a particular 
service, and whether the institution also performs that service. 
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Conditions on tax exemption can be used to induce charities to 
undertake specific activities or to engage in certain behavior. The subsidy 
theory places charities in a position subordinate to the state, which can 
determine the parameters of its burdens. To the extent the state is unhappy 
with—or simply uninterested in subsidizing—certain activities, the state 
can fine-tune the property-tax exemption.63 
Under the narrowest conception of the quid-pro-quo approach, the 
state bestows exemption because charities lessen the burdens of 
government. Some states explicitly require that a charity must relieve the 
burdens of government, either in all cases or as one factor. However, an 
absolute “lessening the burdens of government”64 requirement cannot apply 
to churches engaged in activity constitutionally prohibited to government; 
some state property-tax exemption statutes carve out a category for 
churches in order to exclude them from this requirement. Moreover, a 
literal application of the requirement can lead to preposterous results. 
Consider the decision of a divided panel of the Pennsylvania 
Commonwealth Court to deny property-tax exemption to a group devoted 
to finding missing children, partly on the trial court’s finding that “the law 
does not favor the delegation of governmental police duties to private 
entities.”65 More important though, such a grounding for the charity 
exemption reflects an overly cramped view of the role of the Third Sector. 
At the associational level, a wide variety of charities focus on competing 
approaches to social problems and need not reflect governmental or even 
majority perspectives.66 
 
The dissent concluded: 
It is unclear to me what type of evidence the majority would deem 
sufficient to establish that an institution has financially relieved the 
government of a burden. I would suggest that requiring a reviewing 
body to look at the exact amounts of money that a taxpayer’s efforts 
saved the government is an approach that few, if any, taxpayers will, or 
can, ever succeed at, particularly if the government’s own spending on 
that duty is negligible to non-existent. 
  Id. at 601 n.5. 
 63. See Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, Me., 520 U.S. 564, 598-
600 (1997) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (explaining that states have denied exemptions “to 
organizations that do not provide substantial public benefits” as outlined by state public 
policy). For example, Maine denied an exemption to a wildlife sanctuary on the grounds that 
its deer-hunting prohibition conflicted with the state’s game management policy. Id. at 599. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Am. Ass’n for Lost Children, Inc., 977 A.2d at 596-99. 
 66. See Evelyn Brody & John Tyler, How Public Is Private Philanthropy?: Separating 
Reality from Myth, PHILANTHROPY ROUNDTABLE, June 2009, at 21 (forthcoming in 85 CHI.-
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At the practical level, the activities of the charity need not necessarily 
be congruent with services currently provided by government. Separately, 
charities (such as think tanks) that are seen to take controversial positions 
on social, economic, and cultural issues sometimes attract hostile attention. 
Worse, a requirement to lessen the burdens of government raises particular 
difficulties for those charities that rely on government funding for service 
delivery. Courts ruling in favor of exemption in such cases emphasize the 
beneficial form of the services the charity provides.67 In denying exemption 
to a government-subsidized low-income housing charity, though, the 
Indiana Tax Court followed what it found to be the majority position of 
states around the country.68 
 
KENT L. REV.) (challenging the view that charitable assets are public assets subject to 
democratic will). 
 67. See Steven R. Smith, Government Financing of Nonprofit Activity, in NONPROFITS 
AND GOVERNMENT: COLLABORATION AND CONFLICT, supra note 56, at 219; STEVEN R. 
SMITH & MICHAEL LIPSKY, NONPROFITS FOR HIRE: THE WELFARE STATE IN THE AGE OF 
CONTRACTING 4 (1993); see generally Lester M. Salamon, The Marketization of Welfare: 
Changing Nonprofit and For-Profit Roles in the American Welfare State, 67 SOC. SERV. 
REV. 16, 16, 19 (1993) (“As of 1980 . . . over [forty] percent of the funds spent by federal, 
state, and local governments in the United States for a broad range of human service 
activities supported service delivery by nonprofit organizations. Almost [twenty] percent 
went to support for-profit providers.”). 
 68. Jamestown Homes of Mishawaka, Inc. v. St. Joseph County Assessor, 909 N.E.2d 
1138, 1142-43 n.10 (Ind. T.C. 2009). The court looked to the following sources for 
guidance: 
See, e.g., Waterbury First Church Hous., Inc. v. Brown, 170 Conn. 556, 
367 A.2d 1386 (Conn. 1976) (non-profit housing corporation that rented 
apartments to the elderly at below market rates was not a “charitable 
organization” because it did not achieve its charitable purpose through 
use of its own charitable funds, but rather from government subsidies); 
Housing Sw., Inc. v. Washington County, 128 Idaho 335, 913 P.2d 68 
([Idaho] 1996) (non-profit housing corporation’s provision of housing to 
the elderly and disabled at below market rates did not perform a 
function which might otherwise be an obligation of government because 
the housing was supported by federal tax dollars and not private 
donations); P’ship for Affordable Hous. v. Bd. of Review, 550 N.W.2d 
161 (Iowa 1996) (low-income housing was not a charitable use of 
property because owner provided residents with nothing more than 
housing partly subsidized by the government and did not make 
concessions for tenants who were unable to pay their rents); Supervisor 
of Assessments v. Har Sinai W. Corp., 95 Md. App. 631, 622 A.2d 786 
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1993) (nonprofit corporation’s purpose in 
providing low income housing was not charitable because it did not 
provide any services other than housing, and subsidies were provided by 
federal government rather than taxpayer itself); Better Living Serv., Inc. 
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Property-tax exemption—in contrast to income-tax exemption—
typically focuses not only on the charitable character of the property owner, 
but also on whether the charity uses the property for exempt purposes. It is 
usually not enough that the charity occupies the premises or is overall 
engaged in exempt activities. Moreover, some courts reject exemption for 
property used for administration on the ground that only property used for 
the direct conduct of charitable activity qualifies.69 One of the more 
baffling strands of cases relates to nonprofit housing providers that lease 
units to low-income, elderly, or disabled tenants, or rentals by educational 
institutions to students (dorms). Obviously, the nonprofit first has to qualify 
as a charity independent of merely providing housing,70 but a few courts 
have denied exemption on the owner’s failure to use the property itself—
that is, the fact that the property is rented to tenants defeats use by the 
nonprofit. (In Michigan, the statute requires “occupancy,” which a majority 
of the state supreme court distinguished from “use.”71) Other courts view 
 
v. Bolivar County, 587 So.2d 914 (Miss. 1991) (nonprofit corporation 
operating low cost apartments was not a “charitable society” entitled to 
exemption when it received all of its income through government 
subsidies and tenant rents); Pittman v. Sarpy County Bd. of 
Equalization, 258 Neb. 390, 603 N.W.2d 447 ([Neb.] 1999) (stating that 
low-income housing is not a charitable use of property). But see 
Banahan v. Presbyterian Hous. Corp., 553 S.W.2d 48 (Ky. 1977) 
(housing provided to the elderly and handicapped for below market rates 
by “institutions of purely public charity” was employed for a purely 
charitable purpose); In re Rio Vista Non-Profit Hous. Corp. v. County 
of Ramsey, 277 N.W.2d 187 (Minn. 1979) (housing for low and 
moderate income families furthers a charitable objective and lessens the 
burdens of government). 
  Id. 
 69. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 42-11107 (2006) (“Property of charitable institutions 
for the relief of the indigent or afflicted, appurtenant land and their fixtures, equipment and 
other reasonably required property including property used for the administration of such 
relief, are exempt from taxation if the institutions and property are not used or held for 
profit.”). Compare Lifespan Corp. v. City of Providence, 776 A.2d 1061, 1062 (R.I. 2001) 
(denying exemption to property in an administrative building used by an “umbrella entity” 
to provide services to the hospital and entities: “Lifespan’s request that we should equate a 
corporate office computer to a hospital bed should be directed to the Legislature and not to 
this Court”), with Cmty. Health Prof’ls, Inc. v. Levin, 866 N.E.2d 478, 483 (Ohio 2007) 
(holding that lease was incidental; administration building exempt). 
 70. See Christine G. Solt & Marion R. Fremont-Smith, An Argument for Charitable 
Status and Property Tax Exemptions for Nonprofit Assisted Living Facilities, 2 ST. & LOC. 
TAX LAW. 65, 80 (1997) (“If a facility merely provides housing, local assessors or the state 
tax courts are likely to find that the elderly individual leasing the apartment, rather than the 
charity, occupies the space, thereby requiring taxation of the property.”). 
 71. See Liberty Hill Hous. Corp. v. City of Livonia, 746 N.W.2d 282, 291-92 (Mich. 
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the rental in this context as charitable use by the nonprofit.72 A specific 
statute can clarify the result, perhaps with conditions. For example, the 
very detailed Texas low-income housing exemption statute allows “a taxing 
unit any part of which is located in a county with a population of at least 
1.4 million” to deny the exemption if “the taxing unit cannot afford the loss 
of ad valorem tax revenue that would result from approving the 
exemption.”73 More generally, however justified, tax exemption for 
charities results in lost tax revenue. Estimating the amount of forgone 
property-tax revenue cannot be achieved with any precision—not only 
because of the myriad tax rates that apply at the municipal level throughout 
the country, but also because few jurisdictions bother appraising property 
excluded from the tax base. Occasionally cities and other municipalities 
publish estimates of exempt property, although these usually lump in 
government-owned real estate, which far exceeds nonprofit-owned 
property.74 One national study arrived at a rough “order of magnitude” of 
 
2008). The court explained: 
Petitioner, a nonprofit organization, leased housing to disabled and low-
income individuals during the tax years at issue. In question is whether 
petitioner was entitled to a property-tax exemption for charitable 
institutions under MCL 211.7o(1), which requires that the charitable 
institution has “occupied” the property. We affirm the Court of Appeals 
holding that because petitioner did not occupy the property under the 
unambiguous language of MCL 211.7o, it was not entitled to the 
property-tax exemption. Petitioner did not maintain a regular physical 
presence on the property, but instead leased the housing on the property 
for tenants to use for their own personal purposes. 
  Id. at 284. 
 72. See, e.g., Mary Ann Morse Healthcare Corp. v. Bd. of Assessors of Framingham, 
910 N.E.2d 394, 398 n.7 (Mass. App. Ct. 2009). The court explained: 
Cases dealing with analogous shared possession have held that, in the 
absence of exclusive possession by tenants, the owner is considered the 
“occupant.” See M.I.T. Student House, Inc. v. Assessors of Boston, 350 
Mass. 539, 542 (1966) (occupation of cooperative living arrangement 
home was by corporation rather than those to whom it afforded home). 
See also Franklin Square House v. Boston, 188 Mass. 409, 410-411 
(1905) (holding the same for a “home for working girls”). 
  Id. 
 73. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 11.1825(v), (x)(3)(A) (Vernon 2008). The application of this 
statute was upheld in Dallas Independent School District v. Outreach Housing Corp./Desoto 
I, Ltd., 251 S.W.3d 152 (Tex. App. 2008). “[T]he ‘loss’ referred to . . . is loss as a result of 
approving an exemption, not loss of tax revenue when compared to tax revenues collected 
before a property is improved.” 251 S.W.3d at 155. For a discussion of the significance of 
government-subsidized housing, see also Part II.C. 
 74. For a targeted study, see the Cook County Board of Commissioners’ requested 
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between eight and thirteen billion dollars nationally for the annual value of 
property-tax exemption owned by secular charities, plus an additional one-
third for real estate owned by churches.75 Similarly, another study 
estimated the value of property-tax exemption for charities other than 
churches at between nine and fifteen billion dollars.76 
Of course, the effects of property-tax exemption are not spread 
uniformly. First, the exemption typically does no good to nonprofits that 
rent their space; in thirty-nine states, the (same) charity must both own and 
use the property for charitable purposes, while in only eleven states, use 
suffices.77 The distribution of real-estate-owning nonprofits tends to cluster 
in center cities, although in recent years, this problem of the cities has been 
migrating to the suburbs. A 2006 report published in the Chronicle of 
Philanthropy estimated that nonprofit property-tax exemptions annually 
cost New York City $605 million and Boston $258 million.78 In contrast, 
the benefits provided by these nonprofits might be enjoyed by a broader 
population. Only Connecticut, and to a lesser extent, Rhode Island and 
Maine, require the state to provide partial compensation to municipalities 
hosting certain types of exempt nonprofits (hospitals and schools in 
Connecticut and Rhode Island and newer exempt organizations in Maine).79 
 
report estimating the value of property owned by exempt hospitals in Cook County, Illinois. 
Assuming that the real estate of fifty-four Illinois licensed general not-for-profit hospitals is 
fully taxable, the Assessor’s Office estimated a value of about $4.5 billion (as of January 
2006), which amounts to about 0.75% of total property value in Cook County. This 
translates into about $240 million in tax savings. COOK COUNTY ASSESSOR’S OFFICE, 
EXEMPT HOSPITALS: VALUATION ESTIMATES AND APPRAISAL METHODOLOGY 2, 11 (2007), 
www.cookcountyassessor.com/forms/ExemptHospitalValuationEstimates.pdf. 
 75. Joseph J. Cordes, Marie Gantz & Thomas Pollak, What Is the Property-Tax 
Exemption Worth?, in PROPERTY TAX EXEMPTION FOR CHARITIES: MAPPING THE 
BATTLEFIELD, supra note 2, at 81. 
 76. Bowman & Fremont-Smith, supra note 56, at 181, 202. 
 77. See Jaye A. Calhoun, State and Local Tax Issues for Nonprofits and Charitable 
Organizations, materials presented at a meeting of the American Bar Association, Section of 
Taxation, State & Local Tax Committee (Washington, D.C., May 5, 2009), at 4, available at 
http://www.mcglinchey.com/doc/2010/SALTCalhoun.pdf. 
 78. Harvy Lipman, The Value of a Tax Break & Cities Take Many Approaches to 
Valuing Tax-Exempt Property, CHRON. OF PHILANTHROPY, Nov. 23, 2006, at 13. The online 
article includes a chart captioned “How Much the Nation’s Biggest Cities Lose Because 
Charities Are Exempt from Property Taxes,” along with tables of the ten most valuable 
properties owned by nonprofits in each of the following twenty-three cities: Baltimore, 
Boston, Charlotte, Columbus, Dallas, Denver, El Paso, Fort Worth, Houston, Jacksonville, 
Los Angeles, Memphis, Nashville, New York, Philadelphia, Phoenix, Portland, San Diego, 
San Francisco, San Jose, Seattle, Tucson, and Washington, D.C. Id., available at 
http://philanthropy.com/article/The-Value-of-a-Tax-Break/54882/. 
 79. Additionally, Wisconsin has provided for payments for exempt-research property in 
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Politics often results in the passage of legislation favorable to certain 
types of nonprofits or nonprofit activity.80 Nevertheless, regardless of the 
chosen rationale for tax exemption, charities remain vulnerable to tax 
reforms,81 although many proposals fade away or, more rarely, are voted 
down.82 At the state level, “lawsuits and legislation (enacted or proposed) 
asserting tighter definitions for exemption reflect a growing divergence of 
federal and state policies, and a growing acceptance by the states of a quid 
pro quo rationale for granting exemption.”83  
C. Mandating Redistribution Versus Avoiding Private Benefit 
The issue arises from time-to-time with respect to tax-exemption 
whether any given charitable purpose additionally includes a special 
obligation to serve the poor.84 For example, policy makers hear increasing 
demands for charities—notably the two largest nonprofit subsectors, 
hospitals and higher education—to provide greater distributional equity to 
society as a whole. At the federal level, Congress worries not just about 
current financial pressures on public finance systems, but also whether to 
reevaluate the role of nonprofit hospitals following national health care 
reform.85 Similarly, congressional calls for universities to increase the 
 
its 2009-2011 budget. See Act of June 29, 2009, 2009 Wis. Act 28 sec. 176 (2009). 
 80. See, e.g., Tax Analysts, Texas Final SB 2442 Expands Property Tax Exemption for 
Charitable Organizations, STATE TAX TODAY, July 30, 2009, available at 2009 LEXIS STT 
144-26 (“Texas SB 2442 as signed into law provides a property tax exemption for charitable 
organizations operating radio stations that broadcast public interest programming, and for 
real property that is owned by a charitable organization and leased to an institution of higher 
education.”). 
 81. Evelyn Brody, Charities in Tax Reform: Threats to Subsidies Overt and Covert, 66 
TENN. L. REV. 687, 689 (1999). 
 82. See, e.g., North Dakota Association of Nonprofit Organizations, Legislative Update 
(May 7, 2009), http://archive.constantcontact.com/fs062/1102179965161/archive/110257 
1299154.html (noting that HB 1200, which “would have allowed cities and counties to 
impose property tax levies on some nonprofits for the cost of fire, law enforcement and 
emergency services[,] [f]ailed in the House 36-57”). 
 83. Brody, Quid-Pro-Quo Rationale, supra note 3, at 270. For individual PILOT 
agreements between various municipalities and their hosted nonprofits, see Part III. 
 84. See, e.g., John D. Colombo, The Role of Redistribution to the Poor in Federal Tax 
Exemption for Charities, paper presented at the NCPL conference, “Shades of Virtue: 
Measuring the Comparative Worthiness of Charities,” supra note *; Miranda Perry 
Fleischer, Theorizing the Charitable Tax Subsidies: The Role of Distributive Justice, 87 
WASH. U. L. REV. 505 (2010). 
 85. See SENATE FINANCE COMMITTEE, FINANCING COMPREHENSIVE HEALTH CARE 
REFORM: PROPOSED HEALTH SYSTEM SAVINGS AND REVENUE OPTIONS 33-34 (May 20, 
2009), available at http://finance.senate.gov/sitepages/leg/LEG%202009/051809%20Health 
%20Care%20Description%20of%20Policy%20Options.pdf. 
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draws from their endowments in order to reduce tuition effectively would 
mandate exempt organizations to meet the needs of consumers (i.e., 
constituents). 
As a general matter, Boris Bittker and George Rahdert86 shifted the 
exemption analysis from the charity’s to the beneficiaries’ “ability to pay” 
taxes’. To the extent a charity serves low-income persons, any tax rate 
other than zero could be viewed as the wrong rate. However, the few 
studies of the distributional effects of charity87 suggest that most charities 
do not focus their services on the poor. A disjunction between burdens and 
benefits is particularly salient in the context of property tax, because 
exemptions are granted at the state level, but taxing jurisdictions can be 
more strictly bounded than the reach of the services provided by nonprofits 
(notably, cultural institutions, hospitals, and universities). As Thomas 
Heller commented: “Since the bulk of charitable property is located in 
 
The Committee could consider a policy option that would codify 
organizational and operational requirements for determining whether a 
hospital is a charitable organization for purposes of section 501(c)(3) 
tax-exempt status. 
Such requirements include, among other things, that section 501(c)(3) 
hospitals regularly conduct a community needs analysis, provide a 
minimum annual level of charitable patient care, not refuse service 
based on a patient’s inability to pay, and follow certain procedures 
before instituting collection actions against patients. 
Certain hospitals that are critical to the communities they serve or which 
have an independent basis for tax exemption (e.g., as an educational or 
scientific research organization) are excluded from the minimum charity 
care requirement. The proposal includes provisions designed to ensure 
proper reporting and transparency of operations. In addition, the 
proposal provides for excise taxes, or “intermediate sanctions,” designed 
to encourage compliance with the operational requirements. These 
intermediate sanctions could be imposed, for example, in situations 
where revocation of tax-exempt status is viewed as inappropriate. 
  Id. But see MAX BAUCUS, SENATE FINANCE COMMITTEE CHAIR, FRAMEWORK FOR 
COMPREHENSIVE HEALTH REFORM 18 (2009), available at http://finance.senate.gov/press 
/Bpress/2009press/prb090909.pdf (“Non-profit Hospitals Requirements. This proposal 
would establish new requirements applicable to nonprofit hospitals. The requirements would 
include a periodic community needs assessment.”) (typeface altered). 
 86. Boris I. Bittker & George K. Rahdert, The Exemption of Nonprofit Organizations 
from Federal Income Taxation, 85 YALE L.J. 299, 314-16 (1976). 
 87. See the studies collected in WHO BENEFITS FROM THE NONPROFIT SECTOR? (Charles 
T. Clotfelter ed., 1995). 
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urban centers, the overpaying group is likely to be relatively poorer than 
the proper donor class which benefits from charitable activities.”88 
Most visibly, as states become increasingly concerned about the 
health needs of the uninsured, legislatures, if not courts, are tempted to 
equate “charity care” with “charity” as a condition of property-tax 
exemption for nonprofit hospitals.89 The most recent case arose in Illinois, 
but ended with an anticlimactic plurality decision that failed to establish 
precedent—to the distress or relief of observers, depending on their views 
of judicial authority90 and the merits of the debate.91 Provena Covenant 
Medical Center, a nonprofit hospital in Urbana, appealed from an appellate 
court decision upholding the ruling of the Department of Revenue that 
Provena should lose its $1 million a year exemption because it spent less 
than one percent of revenue on charity care. The Revenue Department’s 
ruling came on the heels of an unnerving legislative proposal by Illinois 
Attorney General Lisa Madigan that property-tax exemption for a hospital 
 
 88. Thomas C. Heller, Is the Charitable Exemption from Property Taxation an Easy 
Case? General Concerns About Legal Economics and Jurisprudence, in ESSAYS ON THE 
LAW AND ECONOMICS OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 183, 211 (Daniel Rubinfeld ed., 1979). 
 89. Health care reform could alter this metric. See Scott Allen & Marcella Bombardieri, 
Much Is Given by Hospitals, More Is Asked, BOSTON GLOBE, May 31, 2009, available at 
2009 WLNR 10311580 (“[H]ospital spending on free care is declining because of the state’s 
2006 healthcare reforms. Today, hospitals typically spend about one percent of expenses on 
free medical care, as measured by the attorney general, half of what they spent before 
reform made insurance available to many more low-income people.”); see also Letter from 
Douglas M. Mancino to Senate Finance Committee, May 26, 2009, at 2, available at http 
://www.healthcarelawreform.com/uploads/file/Letter%20re%20policy%20options(2).pdf : 
In its September 2008 report, “Nonprofit Hospitals: Variation in 
Standards and Guidance Limits Comparison of How Hospitals Meet 
Community Benefit Requirements,” (GAO-08-880, September 2008), 
the Government Accountability Office (GAO) found that as of March 
2008 [fifteen] states required that hospitals provide community benefits 
in order to receive state tax exempt or nonprofit status, although those 
requirements “vary substantially in scope and detail.” GAO Report at 
page 16. In addition to these [fifteen] states that have specific 
community benefit requirements for hospitals seeking tax-exempt or 
nonprofit status, other states impose such requirements on hospitals as a 
condition of licensing, real property tax exemptions, or by guidance 
issued by the state’s attorney general. GAO Report at page 16, note 44. 
  Id. See generally Douglas M. Mancino, The Charity Care Conundrum for Nonprofit 
Hospitals, 20 TAX’N OF EXEMPTS 3 (2008). 
 90. See supra Part I. 
 91. For an analysis, see John Colombo, Provena Covenant: The [Sort of] Final Chapter, 
EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. (forthcoming May 2010). 
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should be conditioned on spending at least eight percent of operating costs 
on charity care.92 
The appeals court in Provena declared: “[b]y holding medical care to 
be, in and of itself, charity, we effectively would excuse charitable 
hospitals from their ongoing mission of giving. . . . That holding not only 
would create a deafening cognitive dissonance, but it would ignore the 
supreme court’s repeated rationale in cases involving charitable 
hospitals.”93 The appellate court explained: 
Provena quotes People v. Young Men’s Christian Ass’n of 
Chicago, 365 Ill. 118, 122, 6 N.E.2d 166, 169 (1936): “‘Charity,’ 
in law, is not confined . . . to mere almsgiving.” That is true. But 
it is confined to giving. Charity is a gift, and one can give a gift 
to a rich person as well as to a poor person, the object being “the 
improvement and promotion of the happiness of man.” For 
example, out of kindness and benevolence, one could build a 
water fountain in a park, and rich and poor alike could come and 
drink. But the designation of “charity” would be problematic if 
the water fountain were coin-operated. Regardless of whether the 
recipient of the goods or services is rich or poor or somewhere in 
between, it is nonsensical to say one has given a gift to that 
person, or that one has been charitable, by billing that person for 
the full cost of the goods or services—whether the goods or 
services be medical or otherwise. For a gift (and, therefore, 
charity) to occur, something of value must be given for free.94 
The appellate court upheld, as not clearly erroneous, the 
determination by the Illinois Department of Revenue that the nonprofit 
hospital failed to establish that it was charitable where it spent 0.7% of its 
revenue on charity care. The court examined the record against the 
“backdrop of familiar facts” on the large number of uninsured Americans, 
declaring: 
The Director [of the Department of Revenue] could have drawn 
either of two inferences from that percentage. He could have 
inferred that in 2002, medical care in Champaign County was so 
affordable, and the citizenry so prosperous, that there simply was 
no occasion for Covenant to spend more than 0.7% of its 
revenues on charity care; a higher percentage would have 
required Covenant to “manufacture patients in need,” as Provena 
 
 92. Provena Covenant Med. Ctr. v. Dep’t of Revenue of Ill., No. 107328, 2010 Ill. 
LEXIS 289, at *7 (Ill. 2010), aff’g 894 N.E.2d 452, 481-82 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008). 
 93. 894 N.E.2d at 465. 
 94. Id. at 467-68 (citation omitted). 
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puts it. Alternatively, the Director could have inferred that 
Covenant did not dispense charity to all who needed it and that 
Covenant, therefore, was not used “exclusively” for “charitable 
purposes.” The Director chose the latter inference, and we are 
not left with a definite and firm conviction that he thereby made 
a mistake.95 
Note that the court disregarded evidence of community-benefit activities 
off-site, because property-tax exemption focuses on the use of the premises 
for which exemption is sought.96 
Because two of the seven justices recused themselves, the Illinois 
Supreme Court’s decision was rendered by the five remaining justices. 
While all five agreed that Provena was not entitled to property-tax 
exemption for the year at issue, the two concurring justices focused on 
proof problems and dissented from the plurality’s asserted charity-care 
standard.97 Accordingly, the opinion creates no legal precedent.98 
Moreover, the plurality made the assertion—which I’ve never seen 
before—that the charity factor of “reducing the burdens of government” 
requires that the government whose burden is reduced must be the same 
government that would collect revenue if the property were taxable. 
Specifically, the plurality declared: 
While Illinois law has never required that there be a direct, 
dollar-for-dollar correlation between the value of the tax 
exemption and the value of the goods or services provided by the 
charity, it is a sine qua non of charitable status that those seeking 
a charitable exemption be able to demonstrate that their activities 
will help alleviate some financial burden incurred by the affected 
taxing bodies in performing their governmental functions.99 
The plurality identified the multiple taxing jurisdictions interested in 
this case: “Champaign County, Champaign County Forest Preserve 
District, Community College District 505, Unit School District 116, 
Urbana Corporation, Cunningham Township, Urbana-Champaign Sanitary 
 
 95. Id. at 471. 
 96. Id. at 478 (“In this respect, the Illinois standard for exemption from property taxes is 
different from the more diffuse ‘community benefit’ standard for exemption from the 
federal income tax.” (citing Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1969-2 C.B. 117-18)); John D. Colombo, 
Hospital Property Tax Exemption in Illinois: Exploring the Policy Gaps, 37 LOY. U. CHI. 
L.J. 493, 497-98 (2006). 
 97. See discussion supra Part I. 
 98. See Colombo, supra note 84. 
 99. Provena Covenant Med. Ctr., 2010 Ill. LEXIS 289, at *37-38. For the Commerce 
Clause prohibition on limiting exemption to charities that favor in-state residents, see supra 
note 55 and accompanying text. 
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District, Urbana Park District, Champaign-Urbana Mass Transit District, 
and Champaign-Urbana Public Health District.”100 The minority opinion 
disagreed with the plurality’s premise: 
Alleviating some burden on government is the reason underlying 
the tax exemption on properties, not the test for determining 
eligibility. Despite acknowledging this (slip op. at 19-20), the 
plurality converts this rationale into a condition of charitable 
status. I neither agree with this, nor do I believe that Provena 
Hospitals failed to show it alleviated some burden on 
government.101 
Compare a 2008 decision in which the high court of Massachusetts 
refused to make free care (in any percentage) a sine qua non of 
charitability: 
To determine whether an organization is charitable, the 
court weighs a number of nondeterminative factors. These 
factors include, but are not limited to, whether the organization 
provides low-cost or free services to those unable to pay; 
whether it charges fees for its services and how much those fees 
are; whether it offers its services to a large or “fluid” group of 
beneficiaries and how large and fluid that group is; whether the 
organization provides its services to those from all segments of 
society and from all walks of life; and whether the organization 
limits its services to those who fulfil certain qualifications and 
how those limitations help advance the organization’s charitable 
purposes.102 
Rather, the court looked at how “traditionally charitable” the 
“purposes and methods” of the applicant are: 
The closer an organization’s dominant purposes and methods are 
to traditionally charitable purposes and methods, the less 
 
 100. Id. at *38-39. The opinion noted: 
In reaching this conclusion, we do not mean to suggest that Provena 
Hospitals’ entitlement to a charitable property tax exemption was 
dependent on its ability to show that its use of the PCMC parcels 
reduced the burden on each of the affected taxing districts. It was, 
however, required to demonstrate that its use of the property helped 
alleviate the financial burdens faced by the county or at least one of the 
other entities supported by the county’s taxpayers. 
   Id. at *39 n.10. 
 101. Id. at *70-71 (Burke, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citation omitted). 
 102. New Habitat, Inc. v. Tax Collector of Cambridge, 889 N.E.2d 414, 418-19 (Mass. 
2008) (citations omitted). 
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significant these factors will be in our determination of the 
organization’s charitable status under G. L. c. 59, § 5, Third. The 
farther an organization’s dominant purposes and methods are 
from traditionally charitable purposes and methods, the more 
significant these factors will be.103 
The court added: “In weighing this factor, we consider whether the 
organization’s charging of fees helps to advance the organization’s 
charitable purpose.” 
In finding that New Habitat’s purpose and methods are traditionally 
charitable, the court explained: 
New Habitat provides long-term housing for persons with 
acquired brain injury and provides its residents with personal 
assistance programs, educational programs, and programs to 
improve their physical and psychological health. There is also 
undisputed evidence that New Habitat’s residents cannot live 
independently or care for themselves and that they need twenty-
four-hour support each day.104 
Moreover, while 
New Habitat charges substantial fees for its services, . . . the tax 
collector does not contend that those fees are unreasonable for 
the services provided, and the parties agree that all fees and 
revenue derived from the property are expended solely for the 
successful operation of the residence. The fees thus help to 
advance the organization’s charitable purpose.105 
Fundamentally, one can argue that an anti-poverty requirement for 
exemption has the normative policy backwards: that charity should 
complement not supplement government.106 Because of its ability to raise 
taxes and to allocate resources across the population as a whole, 
government has the comparative advantage in redistributing income or 
benefits in a fair and cost-effective way.107 At the same time, charities have 
the comparative advantage of ascertaining local and specialized needs, 
 
 103. Id. at 419 (citations omitted). In adopting this approach, the court dropped a “but 
see” citation to Under the Rainbow Child Care Center, Inc. v. County of Goodhue, 741 
N.W.2d 880, 887 (Minn. 2007). New Habitat, Inc., 889 N.E.2d at 419; see also supra Part 
I.A. 
 104. New Habitat, Inc., 889 N.E.2d at 420. 
 105. Id. 
 106. See Brody & Tyler, supra note 66, at 22-23. 
 107. Compare generally BURTON A. WEISBROD, THE NONPROFIT ECONOMY (1988) 
(explaining that the government responds to the median voter and private philanthropy 
remedies this government failure). 
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allowing for service delivery that is flexible and compassionate. In 
upholding property-tax exemption for Longwood Gardens, a world-
renowned arboretum and research facility outside Philadelphia, the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court echoed the Illinois Appellate Court decision 
in Provena by focusing not on income redistribution, but rather on whether 
the overall operations provided a gift: 
[A] facility as large and multi-faceted as Longwood is a unique 
resource that virtually no individual could afford to maintain on 
his or her own. It is in this regard comparable to a public library, 
museum, or art gallery. Such institutions have qualified as purely 
public charities notwithstanding the fact that many, indeed 
probably most, of their visitors are not incapacitated or poor.108 
The desire to deny exemption in cases of private benefit sometimes 
turns on state statutes or judicial decisions prohibiting the charity from 
operating the property “for profit.” After all, property-tax exemption 
typically does not extend to real estate held simply for investment or for 
use in an unrelated business.109 But the line can be hard to draw. Special 
focus falls on charities that charge clients a fee for their services. The 
Massachusetts high court recently disavowed the implication from previous 
cases “that the charging of a substantial fee, in itself, might render an 
organization not charitable under G. L. c. 59, § 5, Third.”110 
Indeed, the existence of for-profit competitors is generally not alone 
enough to render property taxable. The Massachusetts decision just 
 
 108. Unionville-Chadds Ford Sch. Dist. v. Chester County Bd. of Assessment Appeals, 
714 A.2d 397, 400 (Pa. 1998). 
 109. Compare this with the federal unrelated business income tax (“UBIT”), which 
defines a business activity as unrelated to the organization’s exempt purpose if its purpose is 
merely to generate funds that will be used to support exempt activities. See I.R.C. § 513(a) 
(2006). The federal rules are more forgiving, however, because they exclude from the UBIT 
many forms of investment income. See id. § 513(b). 
 110. New Habitat, Inc., 889 N.E.2d at 421. The court declined to follow “cases [that] can 
be read to support such a proposition,” while noting “that the results in those cases are fully 
in line with the result reached here and with the principles articulated in this decision.” Id. 
The court gave as one example the decision in Boston Symphony Orchestra, Inc. v. 
Assessors, 1 N.E.2d 6 (Mass. 1936), in which 
the court held that an organization was not charitable for purposes of the 
real estate tax exemption where the organization charged a fee for its 
concerts. However, the court expressed doubt whether the dominant 
purpose of the organization was traditionally charitable and reasoned 
that its concerts may have been geared more to entertain than to educate. 
  Id. (Not to worry—the Symphony was able to obtain exemption shortly after that 
decision. Comments of Marion Fremont-Smith at the NCPL conference, “Shades of Virtue: 
Measuring the Comparative Worthiness of Charities,” supra note *.) 
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discussed rejected a test proposed by the tax collector “whereby the 
charitable status of an organization depends on the wealth of its 
beneficiaries and the existence of sufficient alternative organizations that 
can perform the functions of the organization in question,” on the ground 
that such a test “would set an exceedingly difficult standard to apply as it 
would require the court to delve into the personal finances of individual 
beneficiaries, determine the existence of comparable alternative 
organizations, and compare the quality and services of those organizations 
with the organization in question.”111 
Nevertheless, courts often do consider competition as a factor in the 
analysis. (Providing high executive compensation can also trigger 
questions.) While health clubs remain a focus of municipal challenge, 
hospitals are also vulnerable, even when charity care (as discussed above) 
is not the issue. Given their visibility in the community—both in terms of 
property ownership and economic power as employers—hospitals 
sometimes find that even an explicit statutory mention does not ensure their 
exemption. Long-term housing gives rise to frequent litigation, particularly 
retirement housing offered at market rates—after all, elderly individuals 
must pay property tax on their homes, even if legislatures often give them a 
homestead-exemption amount. 
Decisions relating to retirement, assisted-living, housing for a special-
needs population, and low-income housing facilities vary depending on 
differences in state law. Separately, exemption might be available for 
clergy housing (parsonages). Depending on the vagaries in a state’s 
property tax scheme, a nonprofit daycare facility might have to rely on the 
education category of exemption, which would not be available if the 
daycare service is merely custodial. 
Churches usually fall outside the types of charities from which states 
or municipalities seek to remove exemption or impose PILOTs.112 This 
 
 111. New Habitat, Inc., 889 N.E.2d at 422-23. 
 112. As to the practical difficulties of applying constitutional constraints, see the 
Kentucky Supreme Court decision “‘interpret[ing] the meaning of ‘occupied’ in the strict 
context of this constitutional provision”: 
In keeping with this endeavor, we recognize that churches are unique. 
For the most part, they are never “occupied” in the conventional sense. 
A vast majority of properties owned by “institutions of religion” such as 
churches, mosques, tabernacles, temples, and the like, are used for 
places of worship at specified times and may remain vacant for 
substantial periods during the week. We further recognize that adjacent 
facilities, such as activity buildings, gymnasiums, even shelters, may be 
owned by religious institutions, but perhaps utilized irregularly on an as 
needed basis. School buildings owned by religious institutions may, in 
fact, sit idle for a great deal of time. This would not preclude these 
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attitude might be based as much on expediency as on constitutional 
delicacy—churches do not usually have operating income streams like 
patient revenue or tuition.  However, even a proliferation of churches can 
rankle.113 
III.  Exemption in Practice 
A. Administering and Evaluating Property-Tax Exemption Schemes 
The apparatus for administering the property tax, and thus exemptions 
from property tax, vary among the states. Details might appear in a state’s 
administrative code or agency regulations.114 
However, inconsistencies in application also exist within states. For 
example, the 2008 legislatively mandated survey of Minnesota assessors 
found a range of responses by county: 
It is clear that many of the guidelines used are “feeling-
based” as opposed to “fact-based.” Some criteria are possible to 
verify through documentation: 501(c)(3) statuses, Articles of 
Incorporation, amount of donations, fees charged, etc. However, 
some criteria are less obvious in terms of proving: defining 
“charity,” lessening the burden of government, competition in 
market, etc. 
Of the [eighty-five] respondents, [fifty] said that they did 
require institutions to provide goods or services for free or at 
below-market prices (representing approximately [fifty-nine 
percent] of respondents). However, [twelve] counties do not 
require this practice. Of the remaining respondents, difficulty 
ascertaining market prices or lack of similar organizations made 
this question unanswerable. Other counties said that, while this is 
a factor that is regarded, it is not the sole determining factor used 
 
buildings from being “occupied” under [s]ection 170 of Kentucky’s 
Constitution. It is precisely for these reasons that we find that the trial 
court’s findings were supported substantially by the evidence in this 
case as to the property not being rented out as residences. 
  Freeman v. St. Andrew Orthodox Church, Inc., 294 S.W.3d 425, 429 (Ky. 2009); 
see discussion supra Part III.B. 
 113. See Lianne Hart, Churches Putting Town Out of Business: Stafford, Texas, Has 51 
Tax-Exempt Religious Institutions and Wants No More: “Somebody’s Got to Pay for Police, 
Fire and Schools,” L.A. TIMES, July 31, 2006, at A13; see also supra Part III.A. 
 114. See, e.g., PROP. TAX DIV., UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION PROPERTY TAX 
EXEMPTIONS: STANDARDS OF PRACTICE 2 (June 2007), available at http://propertytax.utah 
.gov/standards/standard02.pdf. Specific criteria for hospitals, nursing homes, and other 
health-care related organizations appear in Appendix 2D. Id. at 2-36. 
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in whether or not an exemption is granted. The determination of 
“market rates” was discussed as a problem by members of the 
nonprofit community as well.115 
Moreover, counties variously answered yes, no, or maybe (as well as “?” or 
left blank) to two questions: “Do you treat government payments for goods 
or services as donations?” and “Do you treat government grants as 
donations?”116 
For another example of differences in application within a state, 
charities can claim exemption in New York not only for property used for 
their charitable purposes, but also for unimproved real estate that is “in 
good faith contemplated” to be used for charitable purposes.117 A recent 
news story provides an example of the back and forth that can occur 
between assessors and the reviewing body: 
The cursory nature of the forms and the potential for fraud 
prompted the city of Rochester last fall to begin scrutinizing the 
1,095 tax-exempt properties owned by nonprofits, including 
churches. 
Appraisers have examined 306 of the properties to date and 
revoked [fourteen] exemptions worth nearly $3 million in 
assessed value. Only $1.3 million of that is taxable today 
because the Board of Assessment Review reinstated some 
exemptions or property owners sold to other nonprofits.118 
 
 
 115. MINN. DEP’T OF REVENUE, supra note 38, at 9. Of eighty-seven counties, eighty-four 
(and the city of Minneapolis) returned the survey. Id. at 7. 
 116. Id. at 17-147. 
 117. See infra Appendix. The high court of New York describes the squishiness of this 
test in Legion of Christ, Inc. v. Town of Mt. Pleasant, 806 N.E.2d 973, 977 (N.Y. 2004): 
The inquiry necessarily is fact-specific. Moreover, each taxable year is 
distinct and separate for purposes of RPTL 420-a (3)(a) exemption 
eligibility. With each application for renewal, the boundaries of good 
faith take on new dimensions. As years pass, the taxpayer may 
reasonably be required to show some concrete act toward developing or 
otherwise improving the property to carry out the tax exempt purpose. 
Property must not be allowed to lie idle indefinitely at the expense of 
the locality and its citizens. This “landbanking” has the effect of 
diminishing the tax base of a locality and increasing the tax burden for 
schools and other municipal operations. 
 118. David Andreatta, Religious Groups Have Wide Latitude for Property Tax Breaks, 
ROCHESTER DEMOCRAT AND CHRON., Aug. 23, 2009, available at http://rocnow.com/ 
article/local-news/2009908230329. 
BRODY_FINAL FOR PDF 6/24/2010  12:36:59 PM 
656 NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44:621 
As a threshold matter to appealing an adverse ruling, a would-be 
exempt charity usually must pay the tax and sue for a refund: “there are 
countless tax-exempt groups which do not have the resources to pay a hefty 
property tax bill, not to mention the funds for a lengthy court battle against 
a municipality.”119 
Of paramount practical importance is the burden of proof, which is 
essentially a positive versus a negative requirement regarding public 
benefit. Even though the putative exempt organization has the burden under 
both the federal and state tax systems, it is harder for a charity to 
demonstrate existence of specific requirements for public benefit (as under 
some state law systems) than generally to show a charitable purpose (public 
benefit assumed). Compare this to the removal of a presumption of public 
benefit for charities of all types—reportedly aimed at private schools—in 
the Charities Act 2006 of England and Wales, mentioned above. 
While a nonprofit usually need not apply for exemption every year, 
state requirements vary on how often the nonprofit must renew its 
exemption.  In the Provena case in Illinois, for example, the hospital had to 
reapply for exemption after a change in ownership, at which time the 
county board of review scrutinized the level of charity care the hospital 
provided.120 Moreover, each tax year stands on its own. In many of the 
cases described above and in the Appendix, the court emphasized that the 
charity failed to meet its burden for the year at issue. Presumably, the now-
instructed applicant will cure the defects in the record for future years. 
Some jurisdictions have undertaken studies to assess and quantify the 
impact of exempt property.121 In one statewide study, Pennsylvania issued a 
detailed report in May 2009 on: (1) the value of tax-exempt property in 
individual municipalities by property type (“federal, state, or local 
governments; government designated instrumentalities; churches; hospitals; 
 
 119. Glen Fries, To Tax, or Not to Tax? Elder Trust v. Town of Epsom Answers the 
Question, N.H. BAR J., Summer 2007, at 14, available at www.nhbar.org/publications/ 
archives/display-journal-issue.asp?id=368. 
 120. Debra Pressey, Arguments on Provena’s Tax Case in High Court Begin, THE NEWS-
GAZETTE (Urbana/Champaign), Sept. 24, 2009, available at http://www.new-gazette.com 
/news/health-care/2009-09-24/arguments-provenas-tax-case-high-court-begin.html. 
The Provena tax case originated with a 2003 decision by the local board 
of review after it came to light that a change of ownership for the long 
tax-exempt Catholic hospital required a new application for a tax 
exemption. The board of review took a look at how much charity care 
Covenant offered needy patients during the 2002 tax year and deemed it 
insufficient to warrant an exemption. 
  Id. 
 121. See discussion of PILOTs infra Part III.B. 
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private colleges and universities; parks and recreations; museums; and 
other federal 501(c)(3) entities holding tax-exempt real property”); (2) 
PILOTs, SILOTs, and other taxes, fees, and grants provided to individual 
municipalities by tax-exempt property owners, including governments and 
government affiliates; (3) the “effect of a disproportionate share of tax-
exempt properties on the fiscal health of the Commonwealth’s 
municipalities”; (4) Pennsylvania programs addressing the disproportionate 
impact of tax-exempt real properties on local government; and (5) 
“[a]pproaches taken by the federal government and other states to address 
the disproportionate impact of exempt real property on municipal 
government and their options for replication in the Commonwealth.”122 
Portions of the study “capture the value of nonprofit services to their local 
communities” and “underscore the importance of nonprofit collaboration 
with the legislature and with each other.”123 The report found, among other 
things: 
1. Governments and religious organizations are the major 
holders of tax-exempt property; 
2. Relatively few Pennsylvania municipalities host non-profit 
acute-care hospitals and public and private universities; 
3. Of the Pennsylvania municipalities that host non-profit acute-
care hospitals and public and private higher education 
institutions, only about twenty-five percent have high fiscal 
distress scores; 
4. Host municipalities, hospitals and public and private colleges 
and universities have developed a variety of approaches to 
strengthen their community and, in the words of the state-
owned universities’ governing board, “minimize, to the extent 
practicable, the burden of municipal services provided to the 
university”; and 
5. While many hospitals and universities, including those with 
thin operating margins, seek to assist their municipalities, 
some are better positioned financially than others. 
A bitter dispute over exemption for low-income rental housing in 
Madison, Wisconsin illustrates the complexities and indeterminacy of 
 
 122. LEGISLATIVE BUDGET AND FIN. COMM.: A JOINT COMM. OF THE PA. GEN. ASSEMBLY, 
TAX-EXEMPT PROPERTY AND MUNICIPAL FISCAL STATUS 1 (2009), available at 
http://lbfc.legis.state.pa.us/reports/2009/26.PDF [hereinafter PENNSYLVANIA LEGISLATIVE 
BUDGET & FINANCIAL COMMITTEE] . 
 123. Pano.org, State Releases Report on Impact of Property Tax Exemptions on 
Municipalities LB&FC Report (Apr. 1, 2009), http://www.pano.org/publicpolicy/public 
policy-state_taxation.php. 
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administering a property-tax regime. Madison had prevailed in court in 
2008 with its argument: 
[T]hat to qualify for a property tax exemption, nonprofits can 
only use rental income for maintenance or construction debt. 
Housing providers say they use rent income for all sorts of 
management costs and that they cannot afford to pay property 
taxes. Some say they might have to close their doors if forced to 
pay—putting hundreds of low-income people out on the 
streets.124 
A majority of the city council wanted to grant a two-month grace 
period for collecting taxes from several organizations that filed appeals, 
rejecting the advice of the city attorney who asserted that the city lacked 
discretion to forbear collecting tax.125 The local newspaper quoted one 
council member: “[City Attorney] Mike May looked very upset the other 
night. But I simply don’t agree. I’m the policymaker, I’m not the attorney. I 
have to do the best for the people of the city of Madison, and I think I 
did.”126 The issue was resolved in favor of exemption in the 2009-2010 
budget legislation.127 
B. Exemption Work-Arounds: User Fees and PILOTs 
As the current recession grinds on, municipalities and their 
educational institutions and other nonprofit organizations increasingly find 
themselves cast as misunderstood fiscal opponents.  The barrage of news 
stories attests to the degree that tax-exempt real estate can rankle in times 
when home values are falling, jobs are in jeopardy or hard to find, and 
pressure for municipal services grows while governments adopt deep cuts 
to meet shrinking budgets. 
Even in good times, the picture is not a simple one of the taxed versus 
the tax-exempt.  Charities are not exempt from user fees for specific 
services (such as water, sewage, and trash collection) or from special 
assessments that relate to improvements that benefit specific property.  
 
 124. Joe Tarr, Low-Income Property Tax Issue Spurs ‘Tent City’ Protest at Capitol, 
ISTHMUS-THE DAILY PAGE (Madison, Wis.), May 12, 2009, http://www.thedaily 
page.com/daily/article.php?article=25869. 
 125. Joe Tarr, Alders Clash with Madison City Attorney over Property Tax Exemption, 
ISTHMUS-THE DAILY PAGE (Madison, Wis.), April 30, 2009, http://www.thedailypage. 
com/daily/article.php?article=25760. 
 126. Id. For discussion of the “rent use restriction” and the political process, see Posting 
of Kristiin Czubkowski to Madison.com, http://host.madison.com/news/local/govt_and_ 
politics/city_hall/article_dade90d0-730c-5472-8647-7ea75ce1cf77.html (Apr. 29, 2009, 
12:00 EST). 
 127. See Wisconsin Nonprofits Association, supra note 6. 
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Census Bureau data show that only thirty percent of municipalities’ 
revenue is attributable to property tax, while forty percent comes from user 
fees (the rest is redistributed from the federal and state levels).128 However, 
specific charges cannot recoup the general portion of the forgone tax, 
notably the amount paid for public schools. Nor can taxes legitimately be 
disguised as fees to cover the costs of imposing essential services such as 
police and fire protection.  The Nelson A. Rockefeller Institute reported in 
January 2010129 that property taxes “tend to be relatively stable” and indeed 
rose by 3.3% in the third quarter of 2009.  But this is because property-tax 
rates are calculated after the jurisdiction determines the value of taxable 
property—in order to hit a target.  Thus, unless the jurisdiction operates 
under a tax-rate cap—like Proposition 2-1/2 in Massachusetts—only 
political considerations prevent a town from increasing the rate on taxable 
property to meet a revenue target.  Of course, when property values fall, 
this means higher rates for those paying tax.  What can a revenue-hungry 
municipality burdened by significant exempt property do? 
A few states explicitly authorize or encourage municipalities and 
exempt charities to enter into “voluntary” PILOT agreements.130 But the 
 
 128. Penelope Lemov, Full Interviews with User-Fee Experts, GOVERNING, May 1, 2009, 
available at www.governing.com/article/full-interviews-user-fee-experts (Mike Pagano, 
Dean of Urban Planning and Public Affairs at the University of Illinois, Chicago, and a 
long-time consultant to the National League of Cities on local revenues was quoted: “If you 
look at municipal revenues, the largest own-source revenue is no longer the property tax. 
Today, [forty] percent of own-source revenue comes from fees, [thirty] percent from 
property taxes.”). The third category of local-government revenue is made up of 
intergovernmental (federal and state) transfers. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 4 COMPENDIUM 
OF GOVERNMENT FINANCES: 2002: 2002 CENSUS OF GOVERNMENTS 168, Tbl.48 (2005), 
available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2005pubs/gc024x5.pdf; see also FEDERATION OF 
TAX ADMINISTRATORS, 2007 STATE & LOCAL OWN SOURCE REVENUE (reporting Census 
Bureau data that local own-source revenue represents 44.8% of total local revenue), 
http://www.taxadmin.org/fta/rate/slshare.html (last visited Apr. 15, 2010). Contra Tax 
Policy Center, Urban Institute & Brookings Institution, Local Property Taxes as a 
Percentage of Local Tax Revenue, http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/taxfacts/displaya 
fact.cfm?Docid=518 (last visited Apr. 15, 2010) (reporting that U.S. Census Bureau data 
found that nationwide property tax represents 71.1% of local government revenue). 
 129. Lucy Dadayan & Donald J. Boyd, Recession or No Recession, State Tax Revenues 
Remain Negative, ROCKEFELLER INST., Jan. 2010, http://www.rockinst.org/pdf/ 
government_finance/state_revenue_report/2010-01-07-SRR_78.pdf. 
 130. See, e.g., Institutions of Purely Public Charities Act, Act No. 1997-55, 10 P.S. § 371 
et seq. The legislative intent for which included the following declaration: 
It is the intent of this act to encourage financially secure 
institutions of purely public charity to enter into voluntary 
agreements or maintain existing or continuing agreements for the 
purpose of defraying some of the cost of various local 
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practice is found in many states, albeit with variation within the state.  
Some arrangements include SILOTs, a term that covers a variety of in-kind 
transactions.  Unfortunately, the data that exist on PILOTs and SILOTs are 
not systematic or comparable,131 but apparently a growing number of 
charities find themselves in this shadowy realm. 
The dollar amounts that can be raised by even a modest PILOT 
program can add up. A January 2009 report by the City of Boston 
explained: 
The City of Boston began collecting Payment-in-Lieu-of-
Tax (“PILOT”) contributions from tax-exempt institutions many 
years ago in an attempt to relieve the strain on residential and 
commercial taxpayers by diversifying the City’s revenue stream. 
In Fiscal Year 2008, [forty-three] tax-exempt organizations made 
PILOT contributions totaling $31.1 million [$15.6 million of 
which came from Massport]. Of that amount, educational and 
medical institutions contributed $12.7 million. For Fiscal Year 
2009, it is estimated that education and medical institutions will 
contribute $14.5 million. 
Tax-exempt institutions are not required by law to make 
annual PILOT contributions to the City of Boston. These 
institutions enter into PILOT agreements with the City on a 
 
government services. Payments made under such agreements 
shall be deemed to be in compliance with any fiduciary 
obligation pertaining to such institutions of purely public charity, 
its officers or directors. 
  Id. at § 372(a)(7); see also New Hampshire’s authorization of “voluntary” PILOTs, 
set forth in the Appendix. 
 131. The Springfield study laments: 
No statistics are kept nationally on the number of PILOTs in local 
jurisdictions, or on the amounts collected. There are occasional regional 
studies conducted on the subject, but surprisingly no national municipal 
or state organizations (International City Managers Association, 
Government Finance Officers Association, U.S. Conference of Mayors, 
National League of State Legislators, etc.) or academic institution or 
association collects the information on a regular basis. However, there is 
ample evidence that some jurisdictions have been more aggressive in 
soliciting PILOTs from local nonprofit organizations over the past 
[twenty] years—particularly as the fiscal plight of many urban 
communities has worsened. 
  J.F. RYAN ASSOCIATES, INC., SPRINGFIELD FINANCIAL CONTROL BOARD PROJECT 
PLAN: ESTABLISHMENT OF A PAYMENT IN LIEU OF TAX (PILOT) PROGRAM 2 (2005), 
available at http://www.mass.gov/Asfcb/docs/PILOTProjectPlan.pdf (last visited Apr. 15, 
2010). 
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voluntary basis. In so doing, the institutions provide the City 
with funds to help offset a portion of the cost of providing 
essential City services to the institutions. PILOT payments are an 
important measure of civic engagement, but they represent just 
one category of benefits that colleges and hospitals provide to 
the City. Many institutions also provide other services and 
contributions, such as scholarships for Boston Public School 
students and low-cost medical care, which can directly benefit 
Boston residents.132 
PILOTs and SILOTs represent a compromise between the parties 
using what leverage they have available and negotiating in light of the 
hazards of litigation.133  As in any negotiation, either party could be making 
the concession: in some cases, PILOTs represent an erosion of statutory tax 
exemption; in other cases, they forestall the imposition of tax, and so are 
synonymous with giveaways.  Municipalities often find their hand to be 
strongest when a university or other nonprofit is expanding and needs a 
zoning waiver or other approval, and the agreement might apply only to 
property being taken off the taxable rolls.  The town has to be careful, 
though, since it cannot use the threat of disapproval to extract PILOTs on 
account of property entitled to exemption.134  The case studies from 2009 in 
the Conclusion illustrate the limits on the legal authority—and thus 
negotiating leverage—of municipalities and other local taxing jurisdictions.  
In the battles fought in this realm, it is sometimes difficult to agree even on 
rhetoric: charity partisans characterize PILOTs as “extortion,” while 
municipality supporters label them “contributions.”135 
 
 132. CITY OF BOSTON ASSESSING DEPARTMENT, EXEMPT PROPERTY ANALYSIS: 
EDUCATIONAL AND MEDICAL INSTITUTIONS 6 (Fiscal Year 2009), available at 
http://www.cityofboston.gov/TridionImages/ExemptRPT_09_WEB_tcm1-3932.pdf. 
 133. See David L. Sjoquist, A Public-Choice Approach to Explaining Exemptions and 
PILOTs, in PROPERTY-TAX EXEMPTION FOR CHARITIES: MAPPING THE BATTLEFIELD, supra 
note 2, at 361-67. 
 134. See, e.g., Hosp. Council of W. Pa. v. City of Pittsburgh, 949 F.2d 83, 85 (3d Cir. 
1991) (granting standing to the plaintiff Council—“a Pennsylvania nonprofit corporation 
which functions as a membership organization that represents, assists and speaks for its 
members in matters where joint action is appropriate”—to pursue a complaint alleging “that 
the defendant governmental units had attempted and were attempting to ‘coerce’ or ‘force’ 
tax-exempt member hospitals to make payments in lieu of taxes by ‘indicat[ing] that those 
[hospitals] which [did] not agree to such payments and/or agreements “in lieu of taxes” 
[would] have their tax exempt status challenged, [would] be likely to run into difficulties in 
obtaining zoning approvals, and [would] not be offered the opportunity to provide services 
to the taxing authority.’”) (alteration in the original). 
 135. See generally PROPERTY-TAX EXEMPTION FOR CHARITIES: MAPPING THE 
BATTLEFIELD, supra note 2, especially the Introduction and the chapters by Pam Leland, 
Joan Youngman, David Glancey, and Janne Gallagher. 
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The lack of consistency and transparency in PILOT programs results 
in uncomfortably ad hoc public-finance regimes.  A 2005 Springfield 
(Mass.) study136 found “that virtually every successful PILOT program 
focuses exclusively on only the large, private, tax exempt institutions—
primarily hospitals and universities. Churches, social service agencies, 
social clubs, etc. are generally excluded from these efforts due to social and 
political opposition.”137 Complicating matters, that report observes: 
Operationally, PILOT programs are not necessarily the 
typical function of one municipal department. The highly 
successful Boston program is managed by the Assessor’s Office, 
but requires a great deal of interdepartmental cooperation among 
several departments. For instance the Inspectional Services 
Department and the Boston Redevelopment Authority work 
closely with the Assessor’s Office to notify them when an 
exempt institution intends to remodel or expand. The Law 
Department typically drafts the formal agreements; the Fire and 
Police Departments track and provides [sic] information on 
direct service calls to exempt institutions; the Budget Office 
provides the data on the costs of services; the Press Office assists 
with the public relations; and on occasion the Mayor’s Office 
lends its authority. However, one office in the City, the 
Assessor’s Office coordinates, manages and ultimately is 
responsible for effective implementation of the PILOT 
program.138 
Some cities have adopted a variety of town-gown economic 
development and strategic collaborations—for example, Worcester, 
Massachusetts’s now-disbanded “UniverCity Partnership” (2004-2008) was 
established following a proposal for a PILOT program. 
Separately, tuition proposals were beaten back everywhere in the 
country they were proposed139 but remain attractive to revenue-hungry 
college towns and cities.  A proposal by the mayor of Montclair, New 
Jersey, in December 2009 asking for state legislation allowing towns to 
impose municipal-service fees—generally, one-hundred dollars annually 
for full-time students, fifty dollars for part-timers—was supported by 
almost one-hundred mayors attending the New Jersey League of 
Municipalities annual convention.140  A January 2, 2010 editorial in the 
 
 136. See J.F. RYAN ASSOCIATES, INC., supra note 131. 
 137. Id. at 4. 
 138. Id. at 9. 
 139. See the Conclusion for discussion of Providence and Pittsburgh. 
 140. Richard Khavkine, S. Orange Aims to Collect Cash from Students, STAR-LEDGER 
(Newark, N.J.), Dec. 16, 2009, http://www.nj.com/news/ledger/essex/index.ssf?/base/news-
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Star-Ledger opposing the proposal reported that on December 21, “South 
Orange’s village council approved its own nonbinding resolution to 
institute a student fee.”141 
Generally, local governments depend on state legislation for authority 
to impose not just taxes, as described above, but also charges that look like 
taxes. The fact that the state grants an exemption makes it fair that states 
should shoulder some responsibility for the uneven adverse effects of the 
property-tax exemptions they create.  The Pennsylvania report described in 
Part III.A, above, concludes by analyzing several proposals, including 
amending Act 55 to require—not just encourage—nonprofits to pay 
PILOTs. In considering a state-paid PILOT for nonprofit property (along 
the Connecticut/Rhode Island model), the report observes: 
[A] challenge to successful implementation of such an approach 
is the absence of standard county assessment data systems. . . . 
Alternatively, some standard distribution unit could be 
developed, as occurs with the distribution of earmarked revenues 
for local municipal pension funds, with units assigned based on 
the number, size, and type of institutions (e.g., one unit for a 
small non-profit hospital, two units for a mid-size university, 
etc.), possibly weighted by other factors such as percent of the 
municipality living in poverty.142 
In addition, many municipalities complain that their resident 
educational institutions and other nonprofits serve out-of-town residents—
while leaving behind that much less taxable real estate to support city 
services.  In a model for other states, Connecticut (and to a lesser extent 
Rhode Island) makes PILOTs to those of its municipalities that host 
nonprofit hospitals and universities. Under a statute dating back to the 
1970s, Connecticut pays municipalities up to seventy-seven percent of the 
taxes they lose because of exempt property owned by nonprofit hospitals 
and educational institutions.143 These state payments are funded by 
 
6/1260936907128440.xml&coll=1. 
 141. Editorial, Local Taxes on Colleges Would Burden Students, STAR-LEDGER (Newark, 
N.J.), Jan. 2, 2010, http://blog.nj.com/njv_editorial_page/2010/01/local_taxes_on_colleges_ 
would.html. 
 142. PENNSLYVANIA LEGISLATIVE BUDGET & FINANCIAL COMMITTEE, supra note 122, at 
S-11. 
 143. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 12-20a (West 2008). But cf. Town of Stonington v. State 
of Connecticut, CV064006164, 2009 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2291, at *2 (Conn. Super. Ct. 
July 2, 2009) (upholding decision of the Office of Policy & Management to deny payments 
on account of real estate leased indefinitely to Williams College but owned by the Mystic 
Seaport Museum, which is not a “private nonprofit institution of higher learning” as defined 
in the statute). 
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appropriation, however, and the percentage has been declining.  The 
payments made in September 2009 represented 45.7% of lost taxes—but 
still came to more than $115 million.144 Connecticut paid $37 million to 
New Haven alone, in addition to PILOTs and SILOTs that Yale provides. 
Charities commonly complain—justifiably—that most exempt 
property is government owned (including parks and streets). But whether it 
makes sense for higher levels of government to make PILOTs to 
municipalities for their real estate, nonprofits are not off the hook. Indeed, 
if the state makes PILOTs for the public university, why shouldn’t the 
private schools compensate their host towns? If the state does not make 
PILOTs for its property, this could be viewed as an illustration of the state 
not requiring payments to itself. 
Separately, a charity occasionally declares that its donors did not 
make gifts so that it could make payments in lieu of taxes.145 As a legal 
matter, though, a charity generally has the power to make a contribution to 
the community in which it operates—as, indeed, businesses can be good 
corporate citizens.146 Except perhaps in the case of a charity with an 
extremely narrow charitable purpose all of whose funding is dedicated to 
that purpose, charities that enjoy property-tax exemption cannot properly 
 
 144. Telephone interview with Paul LaBella, Intergovernmental Policy Division, Conn. 
Office of Policy & Mgmt. (Jan. 11, 2010). Data for 2007 and 2008 are available at CONN. 
OFFICE OF POLICY & MGMT., INTERGOVERNMENTAL POLICY DIV., COLLEGES (PRIVATE) AND 
GENERAL/FREE STANDING CHRONIC DISEASE HOSPITALS–PAYMENT IN LIEU OF TAXES, 
http://www.ct.gov/opm/cwp/view.asp?a=2985&q=383134 (last visited Apr. 15, 2010). 
 145. See, e.g., Press Release, Ruth J. Simmons, President of Brown University, The 
Success of Colleges and Universities Is Crucial to R.I. Cities and Towns (Mar. 7, 2003), 
available at http://brown.edu/Administration/News_Bureau/2002-03/02-086.html. 
Our donors, whether individuals, corporations or foundations, know 
their philanthropy will be used entirely for the academic and scholarly 
activities they wish to support. In fact, Brown’s endowment is rightly 
understood as an historical record of donor intentions, which are 
stringently protected by Rhode Island law. If a donor has provided 
specific endowment funding for a lecture series, it would be a breach of 
faith to use it for another purpose. More than three-quarters of Brown’s 
endowment is restricted as to purpose. 
  Id. Shortly thereafter, Brown made a slightly different argument: “Ruth J. Simmons, 
Brown president, said it would be ‘wrongheaded’ to tax a nonprofit institution such as 
Brown, which would be forced to raise tuition, already at $29,200 a year.” Gina Macris, 
Graphic Improvements at Hope, PROVIDENCE J.-BULL., Mar. 12, 2003, at B1. Within three 
months, Brown joined with five other Providence area institutions in entering into a PILOT 
agreement with the city. Scott MacKay, Colleges to Pay Millions to City, PROVIDENCE J.-
BULL., June 6, 2003, at A1. See case study in the Conclusion below. 
 146. Cf. PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 
2.01, cmt. i (Am. L. Inst. 1994). 
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refuse to make PILOTs solely on the argument that such payments would 
conflict with their charitable purposes. 
On the other hand, charities argue that viewing nonprofits as “tax 
exempt” fails to recognize the many financial contributions they make to 
the economy, including through tax payments. Not only do they pay the 
employers’ share of payroll taxes, but everyone they deal with—employees 
and suppliers of goods and services—pays taxes on what they earn. But 
nonprofits might find touting their economic power to be a risky strategy.  
After all, if—as is often true—the nonprofit sector is the healthiest in the 
community, why should those that own real estate be subsidized by the 
less-well-off? 
Colleges and universities also need to worry about the difficulties that 
property-tax exemption raises in mixed industries. Notably, we find for-
profit, nonprofit, and public hospitals. As described above, low-income and 
assisted housing, administrative facilities, ancillary facilities such as 
parking structures, “commercial” property, and even large endowments and 
“high salaries” are pressure points. 
Certain charities have a strong argument about unfairness. While the 
eds and meds garner much of the focus of revenue-starved and 
geographically bounded municipalities, focusing just on a subsector raises 
troubling questions. If the property tax is a “benefits tax”—that is, it 
reflects services provided to the property—then why shouldn’t churches, 
cultural institutions, and even social-service agencies also make PILOTs?  
Remember that we’re talking about nonprofits that own their real estate—
the landlord of a social-service-agency tenant already pays tax. Separately, 
municipalities commonly use tax abatements to lure and keep for-profit 
businesses, which create jobs and stabilize communities. 
Finally, PILOTs—and perhaps even more so SILOTs—raise the 
potential for “pay to play” or special treatment. Is that agreement to grant 
scholarships to the children of municipal employees made in return for a 
zoning waiver? 
The lesson of the property-tax exemption for educational institutions 
and other nonprofits is that all real estate is local—and therefore political. 
Even if a college or university is only one of many nonprofits in the 
municipality, the larger the nonprofit exempt footprint, the greater the 
pressure will be on the ones which look like they have the financial 
wherewithal to pay. 
CONCLUSION: A TALE OF THREE CITIES 
To get a sense of how statehouses and municipalities are approaching 
these issues, this Article concludes with a brief case study of the recent 
(indeed, ongoing) wrangling taking place in Boston, Providence, and 
Pittsburgh. 
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Boston 
In January 2009, the mayor of Boston appointed a PILOT task force, 
charged with reviewing the current PILOT system, as well as the 
institutions’ community benefits, and to recommend ways to standardize 
the level of contributions and strengthen the partnership between Boston 
and its tax-exempt institutions, particularly educational and medical 
nonprofits.147 It might seem surprising that the municipality with the oldest 
(since 1925) and most systematic program for collecting PILOTs is back at 
the drawing board. However, Boston found a wide variety of responses by 
specific institutions to the city’s request for twenty-five percent of the 
amount a non-exempt property owner would pay—a level calculated to 
cover the cost of providing the institutions with essential city services such 
as police, fire, and snow removal. 
Needless to say, moreover, these amounts were all below—often far 
below—the city’s desired level. To use everyone’s favorite example, 
Harvard University’s real estate in Boston, according to a 2009 city report, 
is worth nearly $1.5 billion; if the property were taxable, Harvard would 
pay $40 million a year, compared with the $2 million it makes in 
PILOTs.148  “Eds and meds” collectively contributed an estimated $14.5 
million for fiscal year 2009—not counting significant SILOTs. In 
September 2009, the task force published a detailed interim report.149  If 
negotiations do not produce satisfactory results, the task force will consider 
recommending legislative changes. 
Separately, one member of Boston’s Task Force said he was 
considering a payroll tax on eds and meds, another common municipal 
approach that raises state legal issues.150 
Providence 
Rhode Island—unusually—has no state constitutional provision 
addressing property taxes, much less property-tax exemption for charities.  
Rhode Island General Laws § 44-3-3(8) provides exemption for: 
 
 
 147. For background and material (including public meeting minutes) relating to the Task 
Force, see generally PILOT TASK FORCE: PAYMENT IN LIEU OF TAXES, http://www.cityof 
boston.gov/assessing/PILOT.asp (last visited Apr. 15, 2010). 
 148. See CITY OF BOSTON ASSESSING DEPARTMENT, supra note 132, at 7 tbl. 
 149. MAYOR’S PILOT TASK FORCE, INTERIM REPORT (2009), available at 
http://www.cityofboston.gov/Images_Documents/PILOT_Interim%20Report_tcm3-
8009.pdf. 
 150. See generally Eric A. Lustig, The Boston City PILOT Task Force: An Emerging Best 
Practice?, 44 NEW ENG. L. REV. 601, 611-12 (2010). 
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Buildings and personal estate owned by any corporation used for a 
school, academy, or seminary of learning, and of any incorporated 
public charitable institution, and the land upon which the buildings 
stand and immediately surrounding them to an extent not exceeding one 
acre, so far as they are used exclusively for educational purposes, but no 
property or estate whatever is hereafter exempt from taxation in any 
case where any part of its income or profits or of the business carried on 
there is divided among its owners or stockholders.151 
Separately—partially following the Connecticut statute—Rhode Island 
requires the state to make PILOTs to towns in the amount of twenty-seven 
percent of taxes that would otherwise have been paid by resident nonprofit 
schools and hospitals.152 As in Connecticut, this appears to create an 
incentive for local assessors to overvalue nonprofit real estate! 
In Rhode Island, legislative proposals arose in 2009 that initially 
focused on institutions of higher education and then extended to nonprofit 
hospitals.  February brought a senate bill to tax twenty percent of the 
assessed value of all real and personal property owned by private colleges 
and universities—except for institutions with a PILOT agreement with their 
municipality.153 In May, the Rhode Island House took a different track, 
considering an “impact fee” to be imposed on hospitals and private 
universities and colleges with more than twenty million dollars worth of 
real estate within the municipality. The impact fee could not exceed 
twenty-five percent of the municipality’s property-tax rate.154 
Separately, in May 2009 a bill was introduced in the Rhode Island 
House to impose a $150 per-student, per-semester fee on institutions of 
higher education to defray the costs of fire and police protection provided 
to students.155 This proposal came at the urging of Providence Mayor 
Cicillene, who initially suggested that the tax apply at the student level. 
 
 151. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 44-3-3(8) (2008). 
 152. See id. § 45-13-5.1. 
 153. S.0181, Gen. Assem., Jan. Sess. (R.I. 2009) (introduced Feb. 4, 2009, by Senators 
Tassoni, McBurney, and Ciccone). 
 154. H.R. 6214, Gen. Assem., Jan. Sess. (R.I. 2009) (introduced May 26, 2009, by 
Representatives Slater, Costantino, Almeida, and Diaz). As just mentioned, the state already 
makes partial PILOTs. If the organizations now have to pay a percent of the tax that would 
otherwise be collected, nonprofits will put pressure on the assessor to hold down the value, 
thus returning tension to the appraisal process. 
 155. H.R. 6205, Gen. Assem., Jan. Sess. (R.I. 2009). This bill would have added section 
16-57-6.8, to read, in part: 
(a) Notwithstanding any statute, regulation or charter to the contrary, 
commencing with the fiscal year starting July 1, 2009, every city and 
town is authorized to assess a fee of one hundred fifty dollars ($150) per 
semester, or one hundred dollars ($100) per trimester, upon every 
private college or university for each full-time student at a private 
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Importantly, though, four Providence educational institutions have 
already been making millions of dollars in annual PILOTs under a 
memorandum of understanding relating to property these institutions took 
off the tax rolls.  In 2003, the City of Providence reached an agreement 
with Brown University, the Rhode Island School of Design (“RISD”), 
Providence College, and Johnson & Wales University calling for PILOTs 
totaling $50 million dollars over the next twenty years.156  While Brown 
University might seem to be the wealthiest institution, over the first four 
years RISD was scheduled to make the highest payments because of the 
amount of then-taxable property it was acquiring.157 
In 2009, Brown University and RISD, among others, lobbied hard 
against both the impact fee and head tax, in a strategy that focused on their 
positive contributions and gratitude to Providence (RISD appropriately 
produced a lovely design—”RISD  Providence”—in a Robert-Indiana style 
square). Their efforts paid off. In a flurry of hearings and activity before the 
assembly broke for indefinite recess, a vote on the impact-fee proposal was 
avoided on the House floor; the head-tax proposal was not voted on by the 
House Finance Committee. Consideration of these proposals, however, 
seemed intended to pressure Providence institutions to agree to reopen the 
2003 PILOTs agreement. 
With the failure of progress in the statehouse, the focus immediately 
shifted to the Providence City Council. On July 2, 2009, the Council 
approved the creation of the Commission to Study Tax-Exempt 
Institutions, which will have 180 days to report its recommendations “to 
 
institution of higher education within said city or town for the express 
purpose of off-setting, in part, the municipality’s costs of providing 
police, fire, rescue, and other municipal services to students. . . . 
  Id. Subsection (c) provided: 
Any student who is a bona fide resident of the state of Rhode Island who 
has demonstrated payment of real estate taxes by the student or his or 
her parent or guardian to a Rhode Island municipality during the 
relevant semester or trimester shall be exempt from this student 
assessment fee. 
  Id. 
 156. Scott MacKay, Colleges to Pay Millions to City, PROVIDENCE J.-BULL., June 6, 
2003, at A1. 
 157. The agreement provides for two types of payments: “annual cash payments, which 
are based roughly on the size of each institution’s budget” and “payments instead of 
property taxes for [fifteen] years on taxable properties [the colleges] buy in Providence.” Id. 
Specifically: “The institutions will pay [one-hundred] percent of the assessed rate for the 
first five years they own a property. That will drop to [sixty-six] percent for the next five 
years and [thirty-three] percent for the next five. After [fifteen] years, the properties will 
become fully tax-exempt . . . .” Id. 
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establish a standard level of contributions by major tax-exempt institutions” 
to the Council. Similar to the task force created by Boston Mayor Thomas 
Menino, the Providence Council Commission will include representatives 
from the business community, tax-exempt and community organizations, 
labor unions, and two council members and a mayoral appointee.158 
Pittsburgh 
For the three-year period from 2005 to 2007, a coalition of about one-
hundred nonprofit organizations known as the Pittsburgh Public Service 
Fund—following extensive negotiation with the mayor and city council—
”voluntarily” transferred $14 million to the city to help ameliorate the 
ailing city budget.159 The fund released the names of the 102 contributing 
organizations, but not the amounts they contributed—although some 
numbers leaked out.160  This unique experiment in collective action raised 
several interesting possibilities.  Because this agreement replaced existing 
PILOT agreements, it seemed to provide an opportunity for those 
nonprofits making high payments to reduce their contributions.  At the 
same time, one might expect particularly generous nonprofits to want 
public credit.  One press report observed critically: “[S]ome of the 
organizations that chose not to contribute to the cash-strapped city 
constitute a Who’s Who of prominent charities in Pittsburgh.”161 
Eventually, even the amounts given by each participating charity leaked 
out.162 “But the agreement with tax-exempt groups that brought the city $14 
million from 2005 to 2007 has eroded to a proposed $5.5 million in 
donations for 2008 through 2010. So far, city council has turned up its nose 
at that deal.”163 
 
 158. Philip Marcelo, Panel to Study City’s Nonprofit Tax-Free Entities, PROVIDENCE J.-
BULL., July 3, 2009, at B1. 
 159. Rich Lord, 2004 Plan Revisited for Nonprofits, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Dec. 9, 
2009, available at 2009 WLNR 24833084. 
 160. Rich Lord, City Asking Nonprofits for Consistent Contributions, PITTSBURGH POST-
GAZETTE, Feb. 20, 2007, available at 2007 WLNR 3352078 [hereinafter Lord, City Asking]. 
 161. Jeremy Boren, Some Nonprofits Do Not Chip In, PITTSBURGH TRIB. REV., Jan. 6, 
2006, available at 2006 WLNR 355468. For the list of contributing organizations, see City 
Gets First Payment from Nonprofit Coalition, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Jan. 5, 2006, 
available at http://www.post-gazette.com/pg/06005/632763.stm. 
 162. See Lord, City Asking, supra note 160; see also Rich Lord, City Backs Formula for 
Taxing of Nonprofit Organizations; Nonprofits’ Group Opposes Guidelines for What It 
Views as Gifts to the City, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Feb. 21, 2007, available at 
http://www.post-gazette.com/pg/07052/76397-53.htm (reporting that for 2005, “according 
to documents obtained by the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, donations ranged from $10 by the 
Pittsburgh Ballet Theater to $1.5 million by the University of Pittsburgh Medical Center”). 
 163. Rich Lord, Mayor Ravenstahl to Nonprofits: Pay Up or Else; Says He’ll Impose 
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Instead, the city considered seeking General Assembly approval 
under its recovery plan to expand the business payroll tax to include 
nonprofit institutions.164 A 2009 Pennsylvania report concludes by 
analyzing several proposals, including amending the state property-tax 
exemption statute to require—not just encourage, as it currently does—
nonprofits to pay PILOTs.165  The report also considers a state-paid PILOT 
for nonprofit property, along the Connecticut-Rhode Island model.166 
At year-end 2009, the mayor of Pittsburgh conceded defeat in his bid 
for a “Fair Share Tax”—a tax equal to one percent of tuition paid to the 
City’s ten colleges and universities—to raise over $15 million to address 
shortfalls in the city’s pension obligations.167  Instead, the nonprofits 
pledged to donate (an unspecified amount) to the City and help lobby the 
legislature for a long-term solution to the City’s fiscal challenges.168  
Separately, in November, the Allegheny County Executive vetoed as illegal 
a proposal passed by the County Council to impose a “tax-exempt 
certification and essential services fee” for tax-exempt property owned by 
nonprofits other than churches, with the resulting funds to be used for 
homeowner property-tax relief.169 
In early January 2010, Senator Fontana and Representative Solobay 
reintroduced their bill (S.B. 1175 and H.B. 2191) for an “essential services 
fee” that could be imposed, at the option of a municipality, annually on tax-
exempt real property owned by resident charities.170  The fee would be 
uniformly applied.  It does not apply to the first 5000 square feet of 
 
Surcharges to Hike Revenues if They Aren’t Willing, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, June 20, 
2009, available at http://www.post-gazette.com/pg/09171/978773-53.stm [hereinafter Lord, 
Pay Up or Else]. 
 164. Editorial, Time to Deal: Pittsburgh’s Budget Needs Should Be Approved Now, 
PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, July 22, 2009, available at http://www.post-gazette.com/pg/09 
203/985405-192.stm. “The administration has concluded that it doesn’t need the state’s OK 
to charge hospitals $25 per inpatient admission, or colleges and universities $50 per 
undergraduate student per semester. Those fees would raise $5.4 million and $3 million, 
respectively.” Lord, Pay Up or Else, supra note 163. 
 165. See supra note 122 and accompanying text. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Rich Lord & Tom Barnes, Pittsburgh’s Mayor Drops Tuition Tax; Cites an 
Undefined Promise of Help from Schools, Tax-Exempts and Corporations on Pension 
Solution, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Dec. 22, 2009, available at http://www.post-
gazette.com.pg/09356/1022750.stm. 
 168. See id. 
 169. See Karamagi Rujumba, Onorato Vetoes Fee on Nonprofits, PITTSBURGH POST-
GAZETTE, Nov. 7, 2009, available at http://post-gazette.com/pg/09311/1011618-455.stm. 
 170. Press Release, Fontana and Solobay Introduce Non-Profit Services Fee Bill (Jan. 4, 
2010), http://www.senatorfontana.com/media/Releases/2010/Jan4.htm. 
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structures on the parcel, and could not exceed $100 per every 1000 square 
feet of these structures.  With a phase-in for property acquired in 2009, no 
fee could exceed fifty percent of the tax that would otherwise apply.  The 
fee would not apply if the town and the charity have a PILOT agreement.171 
But Allegheny County has not given up, leading to the ominous 
potential that both the city and the county have their sights on the same 
nonprofit property owners for PILOTs.172  It seems that the next generation 
of the property-tax debate will be even more layered. 
Final Thoughts 
 The three stories in this Conclusion illustrate the limits of legal 
protection from property tax, and the need for nonprofits to become willing 
to enter into political negotiations and the possibility of being called upon 
to make PILOTs or SILOTs.  Because PILOT agreements are voluntary, 
though, both sides can feel unappreciated and slighted.  Many nonprofits 
make monetary and in-kind contributions to their communities, but few 
arrangements are transparent. It is time for nonprofits to trumpet their 
agreements. 
APPENDIX: FIFTY-ONE-JURISDICTION SURVEY 
CONSTRUING CHARITY PROPERTY-TAX EXEMPTION 
Caveats: A state-by-state comparison does not allow for easy 
comparisons even though, with a few exceptions, this Appendix focuses on 
the general category of charities.  Frequently, specific constitutional or 
statutory provisions apply to such entities as nonprofit schools, hospitals, 
nursing homes, libraries, assisted or affordable living facilities, art 
galleries, and open/conservation space.  Property-tax statutes are often 
complex and detailed—some statutes even name specific organizations.  
Some statutes allow for partial exemption of property used in part for 
unrelated commercial purposes.  Cases (which in different states have gone 
both ways) typically involve housing (low-income, elderly, and parsonage) 
and nursing homes, hospitals, medical-office buildings owned by otherwise 
exempt hospitals, health clubs (YMCA’s), and daycare centers.  Factors 
affecting the outcome primarily include market-rate fees, government 
financing, level of donations, level of charity care (for hospitals), and, of 
course, inurement or private benefit. Also dependent on state law is the 
 
 171. See S. 1175, Gen. Assem. Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2010). 
 172. See Rich Lord & Karamagi Rujumba, City, County Chase Same Dollars: Which 
Would Have First Dibs on Nonprofit Contributions?, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Feb. 1, 
2010, available at http://post-gazette.com/pg/10032/1032596-53.stm. 
BRODY_FINAL FOR PDF 6/24/2010  12:36:59 PM 
672 NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44:621 
exemption of property used for administration (or other support activities 
such as parking structures or lots) or property rented from the nonprofit 
owner to another nonprofit. 
 
Eighteen State Constitutions Mandate Exemption for Charities 
(variously termed): Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Kansas (legislature may 
broaden), Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota (for churches; 
legislature may exempt others), New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, 
North Dakota (except for property used for conservation, which legislature 
may exempt), Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota (“the Legislature 
shall . . . exempt”), Utah, and Vermont. 
 
Twenty-Five State Constitutions Grant Exemption Authority to the 
Legislature: Arizona, California, Colorado (shall be exempt unless general 
law says otherwise), Delaware (“public welfare”), Florida (note: court 
struck down an unconstitutional limit on low-income housing), Georgia 
(requires 2/3 vote of each legislative body to repeal charity exemption), 
Idaho, Illinois (legislature may restrict but not expand charity exemption), 
Indiana, Massachusetts, Minnesota (mandating exemption for churches), 
Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, North Carolina, Ohio, 
Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia (legislature may repeal or 
modify—but not extend), Washington, West Virginia, and Wyoming. 
 
Eight State Constitutions (and the U.S. Constitution, with respect to 
the District of Columbia,) are Silent on Taxes or Exemption: 
Connecticut, District of Columbia, Hawaii, Iowa, Maryland, New 
Hampshire, Oregon, Rhode Island, and Wisconsin. 
 
Three States Make Partial PILOTs on Account of Some Nonprofit 
Property: Connecticut (by statute for hospitals and schools), Maine (by 
constitution for exemptions granted after April 1, 1978), and Rhode Island 
(by statute for hospitals and schools). 
—————————————————————————————— 
Alabama 
Constitution & Statute(s) 
ALA. CONST. art. IV, § 91 prohibits the legislature from taxing property 
“used exclusively . . . for purposes purely charitable,” and Amendment No. 
373(k) exempts from all ad valorem taxation “property devoted exclusively 
to religious, educational or charitable purposes.” 
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ALA. CODE  § 40-9-1 (2003), exempts, in part: 
(1) . . . [A]ll property, real and personal, used exclusively for 
religious worship, for schools or for purposes purely charitable; 
provided, that property, real or personal, owned by any 
educational, religious or charitable institution, society or 
corporation let for rent or hire or for use for business purposes 
shall not be exempt from taxation, notwithstanding that the 
income from such property shall be used exclusively for 
education, religious or charitable purposes; . . . . 
(2) All property, real or personal, used exclusively for hospital 
purposes, to the amount of $75,000, where such hospitals 
maintain wards for charity patients or give treatment to such 
patients; provided, that the treatment of charity patients 
constitutes at least [fifteen] percent of the business of such 
hospitals. . . . 
 
Case Holding(s) 
Mingledorff v. Vaughan Regional Medical Center, Inc., 682 So. 2d 415, 
416 (Ala. 1996) implicitly rejected the theory that I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) status 
automatically entitles a taxpayer to exemption from ad valorem taxation: 
“The dispositive issue is whether the property sought to be taxed, which is 
being used exclusively as a hospital, is being used exclusively in charitable 
pursuits. If it is, then there is no question that [the hospitals] are exempt 
from ad valorem taxation under the clear wording of Amendment 373(k) 
and [Ala. Code] § 40-9-1(1).” 
 
Cf. Surtees v. Carlton Cove, Inc., 974 So. 2d 1013, 1022 (Ala. Civ. App. 
2007) (“Although a charitable facility, to be considered as such, is not 
limited . . . to the provision of free or reduced-cost services, there must be 
an element of gift and of service to the general public. There is at least 
substantial evidence that this public benefit is not present . . . here, given 
the luxury accommodations, the high fees, and the limited number of 




Constitution & Statute(s) 
ALASKA CONST. art. IX, § 4 exempts from municipal property tax real 
property exclusively used for “non-profit . . . charitable . . . purposes.” 
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ALASKA STAT. § 29.45.030(a)(3) (2008) requires exemption for: “property 




In absence of constitutional or statutory definition, the courts adopted 
[T]he broad common law definition of “charity” [] and observed 
that this definition reflects the “humanitarian rationale” of 
property tax exemptions: they are granted “as an aid or 
encouragement to individuals, corporations, or businesses, to do 
something supposedly for the good of the community at large, 
although such an act is not itself a proper or even permissible 
function of the government.” This definition provides some 
guidance, but it does not purport to specify prerequisites for 
eligibility. It provides only a general framework for determining 
eligibility. Applying this framework, we have concluded that 
properties used for a youth summer recreational camp, a youth 
hostel, and a church radio station were being used for charitable 
purposes. 
Fairbanks North Star Borough v. Dena’ Nena’ Henash, 88 P.3d 124, 132 
(Alaska 2004) (internal quotations and footnotes omitted).That case upheld 
tax exemption of an organization that provides health, social, and economic 
services to Alaska Natives and villages, despite the borough assessor’s 
factual finding “that TCC is fully, or more than fully, remunerated for its 
services by federal and state government funding, medical insurance 
payments, and its investment and rental income.” Id. at 130. The Alaska 
Supreme Court explained: “Our constitution and statutes do not mention 
lessening of a governmental burden as a factor in charitable-purpose 
analysis, nor do our cases.” Id. at 137. The court observed: “It may also be 
significant that some cases in which receipt of government funding 
rendered property ineligible, federal grant money was used to construct 
low-income housing and subsidize rent.” Id. at 134.  By contrast, “many of 
the cases upholding exemptions despite government funding involved 
corporations that provided services to their beneficiaries.” Id. (footnotes 
omitted). 
 
See also McKee v. Evans, 490 P.2d 1226, 1230 (Alaska 1971) (holding that 
the statutory definition of “educational purposes . . . includes systematic 
instruction in any and all branches of learning from which a substantial 
public benefit is derived,” and rejecting the argument “that only such 
school properties as relieve some substantial educational burden from the 
state should receive rights of tax exemption”). The court noted: 
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Nor do we find the quid pro quo policy logically 
compelling. Even if the education given at a private school (e.g., 
a trade school) were not substantially similar to that provided in 
publicly supported schools, some lessening of the state 
educational tax burden probably occurs from election by students 
to forego general public education in favor of more specialized 
training. Moreover, where no such tax relief occurs, the public 
benefit may be most profound since without the private school 
there would be no such specialized training. 
Id. at n.16 (citation omitted). 
—————————————————————————————— 
Arizona 
Constitution & Statute(s) 
ARIZ. CONST. art. IX, § 2(2): “Property of educational, charitable and 
religious associations or institutions not used or held for profit may be 
exempt from taxation by law.” 
 
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 42-11107 (2006) provides: “Property of 
charitable institutions for the relief of the indigent or afflicted, appurtenant 
land and their fixtures, equipment and other reasonably required property 
including property used for the administration of such relief, are exempt 
from taxation if the institutions and property are not used or held for 
profit.” 
 
Other special statutes include § 42-11116 (“Property of musical, dramatic, 
dance and community arts groups, botanical gardens, museums and zoos [if 
exempt under Internal Revenue Code § 501(c)(3)].”) and § 42-11105 




No Supreme Court cases. 
 
See University Physicians v. Pima County, 75 P.3d 153 (Ariz. Ct. App. 
2003) (ruling that a hospital—which for some reason did not seek 
exemption under section 42-11105—is not entitled to exemption as an 
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In this article, unless the context otherwise requires: 
1. “Afflicted” means persons who, because of a mental or 
physical condition, illness or condition of distress, adversity or 
harassment, or imminent risk of such condition, are unable to 
reasonably take care of themselves or their families or to 
properly function in society without periodic or continuous 
assistance. 
2. “Indigent” means a person who is without sufficient means or 
ability to provide themselves with adequate food, shelter or 
social necessaries. 
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 42-11101. 
 
See also Volunteer Center of Southern Arizona v. Staples, 147 P.3d 1052 
(Ariz. Ct. App. 2006) (ruling that the nonprofit was entitled to exemption 




Constitution & Statute(s) 
ARK. CONST. art. 16, § 5(b) provides: “The following property shall be 
exempt from taxation: public property used exclusively for public 
purposes; . . . and buildings and grounds and materials used exclusively for 
public charity.” 
 
ARK. CODE ANN. § 26-3-301(7) (2009) exempts: “All buildings belonging 
to institutions of purely public charity, together with the land actually 
occupied by these institutions, not leased or otherwise used with a view to 
profit . . . .” 
 
Case Holding(s) 
See Crittenden Hosp. Ass’n v. Board of Equalization, 958 S.W.2d 512, 516 
(Ark. 1997) (Corbin, J., dissenting) (denying exemption to nonprofit 
hospital’s medical office building): 
The majority’s decision is based on a long-standing precedent 
that entitlement to a tax exemption has to be proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt. It gives no consideration to the legislative 
intent . . . . The burden here is too onerous. Proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt is a criminal standard and should not be 
applicable in a civil proceeding because it violates due process 
guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the 
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United States Constitution and Article 2 of our Arkansas 
Constitution. 
. . . . 
I am forced to the inescapable conclusion that, historically, it is 
rare to find a tax that this court does not like. 
—————————————————————————————— 
California 
Constitution & Statute(s) 
CAL. CONST. art. XIII, § 4 provides in part: 
The Legislature may exempt from property taxation in whole or 
in part: 
. . . . 
(b) Property used exclusively for religious, hospital, or charitable 
purposes and owned or held in trust by corporations or other 
entities (1) that are organized and operating for those purposes, 
(2) that are nonprofit, and (3) no part of whose net earnings 
inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual. 
CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE, § 214(a)(1) (West 2009) (other subsections 
include various special provisions for, e.g., affordable housing): 
However, in the case of hospitals, the organization shall not be 
deemed to be organized or operated for profit if, during the 
immediately preceding fiscal year, operating revenues, exclusive 
of gifts, endowments and grants-in-aid, did not exceed operating 
expenses by an amount equivalent to [ten] percent of those 
operating expenses. As used herein, operating expenses include 
depreciation based on cost of replacement and amortization of, 
and interest on, indebtedness. 
Case Holding(s) 
71 Ops. Cal. Atty. Gen. 106 (1988): 
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[W]e . . . view  [the hospital earnings provision] as an additional 
protection for nonprofit hospitals in the face of the [Sutter 
Hospital v. City of Sacramento, 244 P.2d 390 (Cal. 1952)] 
decision rather than the exclusive means by which they can 
qualify for the welfare exemption. In other words the proviso 
was never meant to prevent a non-profit hospital that did earn 
surplus revenue in excess of ten percent during the immediate 
fiscal year from still qualifying for the “welfare exemption” 
under the general provision of section 214 subsection (a)(1). 
—————————————————————————————— 
Colorado 
Constitution & Statute(s) 
COLO. CONST. art. X, § 5 provides: “Property, real and personal, that is 
used solely and exclusively for religious worship, for schools or for strictly 
charitable purposes, also cemeteries not used or held for private or 
corporate profit, shall be exempt from taxation, unless otherwise provided 
by general law.” 
 
COLO. REV. STAT. § 39-3-101 (2008) (“Legislative declaration–
presumption of charitable purpose.”): 
The general assembly recognizes that only the judiciary may 
make a final decision as to whether or not any given property is 
used for charitable purposes within the meaning of the Colorado 
constitution; nevertheless, in order to guide members of the 
public and public officials alike in the making of their day-to-day 
decisions and to assist in the avoidance of litigation, the general 
assembly hereby finds, declares, and determines that the uses of 
property which are set forth in this part 1 as uses for charitable 
purposes benefit the people of Colorado and lessen the burdens 
of government by performing services which government would 
otherwise be required to perform. Therefore, property used for 
such purposes shall be presumed to be owned and used solely 
and exclusively for strictly charitable purposes and not for 
private gain or corporate profit . . . . This legislative finding, 
declaration, determination, and presumption shall not be 
questioned by the administrator and shall be entitled to great 
weight in any and every court. 
 
Case Holding(s) 
To the extent that Young Life [Campaign v. Board of County 
Commissioners, 300 P.2d 535 (Colo. 1956),] established some 
requirement of benefit to the people of the state of Colorado as a 
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condition for the property tax exemption of religious 
organizations, it is hereby overruled. While such ‘social benefit’ 
analysis may have continuing validity in the determination of 
charitable exemptions, see WHYY, Inc. v. Borough of Glassboro, 
393 U.S. 117 (1968), it has no place in the state’s evaluation of 
its treatment of bona fide religious groups. This conclusion is 
self-evident from the rationale for the grant of a tax exemption 
that was articulated in Young Life. There the court concluded that 
the purpose of the exemption was to relieve taxpayers of 
obligations that they would otherwise have to perform . . . . 
General Conference of Church of God–7th Day v. Carper, 557 P.2d 832, 
833 (Colo. 1976) (parallel citations omitted); cf. Catholic Health Initiatives 
Colorado v. City of Pueblo, 207 P.3d 812 (Colo. 2009) (including religious 
organizations in a municipal sales tax exemption for “charitable 
organization[s] . . . which exclusively, . . . and for the benefit of an 
indefinite number of persons, freely and voluntarily ministers to the 
physical, mental or spiritual needs of persons, and which thereby lessens 
the burdens of government”). 
 
For the denial of exemption to a (not primarily religious) recreational 
ranch, see West Brandt Foundation, Inc. v. Carper, 652 P.2d 564 (Colo. 
1982) (“While not dispositive, it is nevertheless noteworthy that the uses 
made of the camp during the most desirable times of year involve non-
residents and do not benefit the people of Colorado.”). Factors applied 
included: charging “remunerative” fees (although merely earning a surplus 
is not fatal so long as devoted to charitable purpose); lessening the burdens 
of government; “showing that the normal fees were ever reduced or waived 
because of an individual’’s inability to pay”; and whether access is limited 
“based on any criteria of worthiness” or providing “lower rates for 
[religious and charitable] groups than for any others.” Id. at 568-70. 
——————————————————————————————
Connecticut 
Constitution & Statute(s) 
No applicable constitutional provision. 
 
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 12-81 (2009) provides in relevant part: 
The following-described property shall be exempt from taxation: 
. . . . 
(7)(A) [R]eal property [used] for scientific, educational, literary, 
historical or charitable purposes . . . and used exclusively for 
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carrying out one or more of such purposes . . . provided (i) any 
officer, member or employee thereof does not receive or at any 
future time shall not receive any pecuniary profit from the 
operations thereof, except reasonable compensation for services 
in effecting one or more of such purposes or as proper 
beneficiary of its strictly charitable purposes . . . . 
The state makes PILOTs to municipalities hosting private hospitals and 
colleges, but the program still depends on annual legislative appropriation. 
Notably, the statute allows the state to pay up to seventy-seven percent of 
the property taxes the nonprofit hospitals and colleges would otherwise 
pay, but as of 2006, the appropriated rate was sixty-four percent. 
 
Case Holding(s) 
Isaiah 61:1, Inc. v. City of Bridgeport, 851 A.2d 277, 287 (Conn. 2004) 
(exempting a halfway house for prison inmates that received ninety percent 
of its funding from the state department of correction) (citations omitted): 
We glean from the . . . cases a number of principles to apply in 
determining whether property is exempt from taxation under § 
12-81(7). First, the rental of property does not necessarily 
prevent the property from qualifying for tax exemption, as long 
as the property is used exclusively for carrying out the charitable 
purposes of the organization to which the property belongs. 
Second, when a charitable organization does nothing to “make it 
less likely that [the individuals it services] will become burdens 
on society and more likely that they will become useful citizens,” 
the subject property cannot qualify for a tax exemption. Finally, 
housing provided for low or moderate income individuals is not 
tax-exempt. 
St. Joseph’s Living Center, Inc. v. Town of Windham, 966 A.2d 188, 221 
(Conn. 2009): 
Providing short-term rehabilitative care to the general public, 
although a necessary service and surely helpful to the Center’s 
bottom line, simply cannot be characterized as falling within the 
Center’s charitable purpose. If the Center limited its provision of 
rehabilitative care to its existing population of elderly, long-term 
residents, we would be inclined to conclude that such services 
are within the scope of its charitable purpose as expressed in its 
corporate charter. Alternatively, the Center could amend its 
charter to broaden the availability of rehabilitative services for 
those elderly persons who are not part of its long-term patient 
population but who are drawn from the community at large. 
—————————————————————————————— 
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Delaware 
Constitution & Statute(s) 
DEL. CONST. art. VIII, § 1 provides in part: “County Councils of New 
Castle and Sussex Counties and the Levy Court of Kent County are hereby 
authorized to exempt from county taxation such property in their respective 
counties as in their opinion will best promote the public welfare.” 
 
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 9, § 8103 (1989) provides: 
Property belonging to . . . any church or religious society, and 
not held by way of investment, or any college or school and used 
for educational or school purposes, except as otherwise provided, 
shall not be liable to taxation and assessment for public purposes 
by any county or other political subdivision of this State. 
Nothing in this section shall be construed to apply to ditch taxes, 
sewer taxes and/or utility fees. Corporations created for 
charitable purposes and not held by way of investment that are in 
existence on July 14, 1988, together with existing and future 
charitable affiliates of such corporations that are also not held by 
way of investment, shall not be liable to taxation and assessment 
for public purposes by any county, municipality or other political 
subdivision of this State. 
Case Holding(s) 
New Castle County Department of Land Use v. University of Delaware, 
842 A.2d 1201, 1212 (Del. 2004) (distinguishing “school purposes” from 
“educational purposes” in the statute, requiring, for the former, that “the 
use of the school-owned property must contribute to the legitimate welfare, 
convenience, and/or safety of the school community or its members,” and 
upholding exemption for space in the student center leased to a bank). 
 
Burris v. Tower Hill School Association, 179 A. 397, 399-400 (Del. Super. 
Ct. 1935) (“[S]tatutes exempting from taxation property devoted to 
educational purposes are in general construed more liberally than other tax 
exempting statutes . . . .”). 
—————————————————————————————— 
District of Columbia 
Constitution & Statute(s) 
D.C. CODE § 47-1002 (2009) exempts from taxation: “(8) Buildings 
belonging to and operated by institutions which are not organized or 
operated for private gain, which are used for purposes of public charity 
principally in the District of Columbia[.]” 
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Case Holding(s) 
District of Columbia v. Cato Institute, 829 A.2d 237, 245-46 (D.C. 2003) 
(holding that because the Commerce Clause does not bind Congress itself, 
the property-tax exemption law Congress wrote for the District of 
Columbia could properly limit exemption to those charities that benefit 
District residents; on statutory interpretation grounds, reversing the trial 
court’s finding that the Cato Institute provides benefits in the District by 
focusing its charitable activities on educating Congress). 
—————————————————————————————— 
Florida 
Constitution & Statute(s) 
FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 3(a): “Such portions of property as are used 
predominantly for educational, literary, scientific, religious or charitable 
purposes may be exempted by general law from taxation.” 
 
FLA. STAT. § 196.196 (2009) reads, in part: 
(1) In the determination of whether an applicant is actually using 
all or a portion of its property predominantly for a charitable, 
religious, scientific, or literary purpose, the following criteria 
shall be applied: 
(a) The nature and extent of the charitable, religious, scientific, 
or literary activity of the applicant, a comparison of such 
activities with all other activities of the organization, and the 
utilization of the property for charitable, religious, scientific, or 
literary activities as compared with other uses. 
(b) The extent to which the property has been made available to 
groups who perform exempt purposes at a charge that is equal to 
or less than the cost of providing the facilities for their use. Such 
rental or service shall be considered as part of the exempt 
purposes of the applicant. 
 
Case Holding(s) 
Presbyterian Homes of the Synod v. Wood, 297 So. 2d 556, 558 (Fla. 1974) 
(ruling unconstitutional the statutory exemption regime for affordable 
housing because it contained limits on residents’ income: “Inasmuch as an 
‘income test’ is the primary determinant of the eligibility for tax exemption 
of a home, other factors traditionally used in determining the status of such 
a home are minimized contrary to the intent of the constitutional 
limitation.”). 
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Haines v. St. Petersburg Methodist Home, Inc., 173 So. 2d 176, 185 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1965) (noting “Florida’s welcome aggregation of elderly 
citizens,” rejecting exemption for nonprofit elderly housing facility that 
“though altruistically motivated and serving a socially constructive 
purpose, is nevertheless a financially viable institution . . . .”). 
——————————————————————————————
Georgia 
Constitution & Statute(s) 
GA. CONST. art. VII, § 2, para. IV provides: 
[E]xemptions from ad valorem taxation provided for by law on 
June 30, 1983, are hereby continued . . . until otherwise provided 
for by law. . . . Any law which reduces or repeals exemptions 
granted to . . . institutions of purely public charity must be 
approved by two-thirds of the members elected to each branch of 
the General Assembly. 
 
GA. CODE ANN. § 48-5-41 (1999 & Supp. 2009), exempts, in part: 
(a)(4) All institutions of purely public charity; 
. . . . 
[(b) requires colleges, schools, and nonprofit hospitals to be open 
to the general public.]. 
(c) The property exempted . . . shall not be used for the purpose 
of producing private or corporate profit and income distributable 
to shareholders . . . or to other owners . . . . 
(d)(1) Except as . . . provided in paragraph (2) . . . , this Code 
section . . . shall not apply to real estate or buildings which are 
rented, leased, or otherwise used for the primary purpose of 
securing an income thereon . . . . 
(2) With respect to paragraph (4) of subsection (a) . . . , a 
building which is owned by a charitable institution . . . that is 
exempt from taxation under [IRC] Section 501(c)(3) . . . and 
which building is used . . . exclusively for the charitable 
purposes of such charitable institution, and not more than 15 
acres of land on which such building is located, may be used for 
the purpose of securing income so long as such income is used 
exclusively for the operation of that charitable institution. 
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Case Holding(s) 
York Rite Bodies of Freemasonry v. Board of Equalization, 408 S.E.2d 699, 
700 (Ga. 1991) (emphasis in original) (internal quotations omitted) 
(alteration to the original in the quoted text): 
 
In determining whether property qualifies as an institution 
of ‘purely public charity’ as set forth in OCGA § 48-5-41 (a)(4), 
three factors must be considered and must coexist. First, the 
owner must be an institution devoted entirely to charitable 
pursuits; second, the charitable pursuits of the owner must be for 
the benefit of the public; and third, the use of the property must 
be exclusively devoted to those charitable pursuits. 
. . . . 
. . . However, “‘[n]o matter how high the ideals of an 
institution, nor how lofty its purposes, in order for it to qualify as 
a charitable institution for tax exemption under [OCGA § 48-5-
41 (a)(4)], it must have the sole purpose and activity of 
dispensing public charity.” 
Board of Tax Assessors of Ware County v. Baptist Village, Inc., 605 S.E.2d 
436, 438, 440 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004) (granting exemption under a specific 
statute for nonprofit homes for the aged—the court rejected the argument 
that the independent-living units located on a property that also included 
assisted-living and nursing-care facilities were held for investment 
purposes, which under the statute would have resulted in taxability). 
 
GA. CODE ANN. § 48-5-41(d)(2), added pursuant to statewide referendum 
in 2006, was construed in Athens-Clarke County Board of Tax Assessors v. 
Nuci Phillips Memorial Foundation, Inc., Case No. SU-08-CV-2067-S (Ga. 





Constitution & Statute(s) 
No applicable constitutional provision. 
 
At the municipal level, see, e.g., HONOLULU, HAW., REV. ORDINANCES § 
8-10.10, available at http://www.honolulu.gov/refs/roh/8a1_4.htm, reading 
as follows: “(a) There shall be exempt from real property taxes real 
property . . . designated in subsection (b) or (c) . . . and meeting the 
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requirements stated therein, actually and (except as otherwise specifically 
provided) exclusively used for nonprofit purposes.” 
 
However, a general excise tax, originally enacted in 1935, is the state’s 
principal source of governmental revenue; exemptions are available for 
entities, among other things, “organized and operated exclusively for 
religious, charitable, scientific, or educational purposes . . . .”  HAW. REV. 
STAT. § 237-23(a)(4) (2001 & Supp. 2007). 
 
Case Holding(s) 
Matter of Tax Appeal of Queen’s Medical Center, 715 P.2d 349, 353 (Haw. 
Ct. App. 1985) (“The physicians are providing a service to their patients, 
not all of whom are the hospital’s patients. Additionally, the parking 
structure is serving not only the hospital’s parking needs, but those of the 
physicians and their patients.”). 
 
Under the general excise tax, see, e.g., Matter of Tax Appeal of Central 
Union Church-Arcadia Retirement Residence, 624 P.2d 1346, 1352 (Haw. 
1981): 
Proverbially, charity should know no bounds; practically, it 
must often be tempered by available means. . . . However, . . . 
not . . . all enterprises providing residential accommodations and 
other services for the elderly, even when conducted by religious 
organizations, are charitable activities. Exempt status still turns 
on the absence of a profit motive and the presence of an altruistic 
goal. 
Cf. Matter of Tax Appeal Queen’s Medical Center, reconsideration denied, 
661 P.2d 1201, 1205 (Haw. 1983) (“While we do not doubt the 
construction and operation of an office building and parking garage can be 
related to ‘better, more efficient, and cost effective medical care,’ we do 
not think the activities constitute hospital activities in themselves.”). 
—————————————————————————————— 
Idaho 
Constitution & Statute(s) 
IDAHO CONST. art. VII, § 5 states: “All taxes shall be uniform . . . : 
provided, that the legislature may allow such exemptions from taxation 
from time to time as shall seem necessary and just, and all existing 
exemptions provided by the laws of the territory, shall continue until 
changed by the legislature of the state . . . .” 
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IDAHO CODE ANN. § 63-602C (2010): “The following property is exempt 
from taxation: property belonging to any fraternal, benevolent, or charitable 
[limited liability company,] corporation or society, . . . used exclusively for 
the purposes for which such [limited liability company,] corporation or 
society is organized . . . .” 
 
Case Holding(s) 
Matter of the Appeal of Sunny Ridge Manor, Inc., 675 P.2d 813, 815 (Idaho 
1984) (citation omitted): 
A number of factors must be considered: (1) the stated purposes 
of its undertaking, (2) whether its functions are charitable . . . , 
(3) whether it is supported by donations, (4) whether the 
recipients of its services are required to pay for the assistance 
they receive, (5) whether there is general public benefit, (6) 
whether the income received produces a profit, (7) to whom the 
assets would go upon dissolution of the corporation, and (8) 
whether the ‘charity’ provided is based on need. . . . 
Determination of an institution’s charitable status is 
necessarily . . . to be decided on a case-by-case basis. There may 
be factors listed above which have no application to particular 
cases, and factors not listed which would need to be considered. 
Housing Southwest, Inc. v. Washington County, 913 P.2d 68, 72 (Idaho 
1996) (holding that because Housing Southwest was funded by government 
loans and grants, rather than private donations, it did not lessen the burdens 
of government); see also Community Action Agency, Inc. v. Board of 
Equalization of Nez Perce County, 57 P.3d 793, 795-96 (Idaho 2002) 
(noting that to make up the shortfall from rental income, CAA received in 




Constitution & Statute(s) 
ILL. CONST., art. IX, § 6 begins: “The General Assembly by law may 
exempt from taxation only the property of the State, units of local 
government and school districts and property used exclusively for 
agricultural and horticultural societies, and for school, religious, cemetery 
and charitable purposes.” 
 
35 ILL. COMP. STAT. 200/15-65 (2009) begins: “All property of the 
following is exempt when actually and exclusively used for charitable or 
beneficent purposes, and not leased or otherwise used with a view to profit: 
(a) Institutions of public charity.” 
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Case Holding(s) 
Methodist Old Peoples Home v. Korzen, 233 N.E.2d 537, 541-42 (Ill. 
1968), required that: (1) the benefits extend to an indefinite number of 
persons for their general welfare or in some way reduce the burdens on 
government; (2) the organization has no capital, capital stock, or 
shareholders, and does not profit from the enterprise; (3) funds derive 
mainly from private and public charity, and are held in trust for the objects 
and purposes expressed in the organization’s charter; (4) charity is 
dispensed to all who need and apply for it; (5) no obstacles are placed in 
the way of those seeking the benefits; and (6) the exclusive (i.e. primary) 
use of the property is for charitable purposes. See the discussion of the 
inconclusive decision in Provena Covenant Medical Center v. Department 
of Revenue, No. 107328, 2010 Ill. LEXIS 289 (Ill. March 18, 2010), in 
Parts I and II, above. 
—————————————————————————————— 
Indiana 
Constitution & Statute(s) 
IND. CONST. art. 10, § 1 begins: 
(a) The General Assembly shall provide, by law, for a uniform 
and equal rate of property assessment and taxation and shall 
prescribe regulations to secure a just valuation for taxation of all 
property, both real and personal. The General Assembly may 
exempt from property taxation any property in any of the 
following classes: 
(1) Property being used for municipal, educational, literary, 
scientific, religious, or charitable purposes. 
IND. CODE § 6-1.1-10-16(a) (2009). 
 
Case Holding(s) 
No recent supreme court case. 
 
Indianapolis Osteopathic Hospital, Inc. v. Department of Local 
Government Finance, 818 N.E.2d 1009, 1014 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2004) (citation 
omitted) (“A charitable purposes exemption is granted when there is an 
expectation of a benefit that will inure to the public by reason of the 
exemption. ‘The rationale justifying a tax exemption is that there is a 
present benefit to the general public from the operation of the charitable 
institution sufficient to justify the loss of tax revenue.’”); see also College 
Corner, L.P. v. Department of Local Government Finance, 840 N.E.2d 
905, 911 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2006) (noting that the legislation “does not 
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Constitution & Statute(s) 
No relevant constitutional provision. 
 
IOWA CODE § 427.1 (2009) reads, in part: 
The following classes of property shall not be taxed: 
 . . . . 
8. . . . All grounds and buildings used or under construction by 
literary, scientific, charitable, benevolent, agricultural, and 
religious institutions and societies solely for their appropriate 
objects, not exceeding three hundred twenty acres in extent and 




Carroll Area Child Care Center, Inc. v. Carroll County Board of Review, 
613 N.W.2d 252, 257 (Iowa 2000) (“[C]harity—gratuitous or partly 
gratuitous care—can be provided in two different ways. One manner . . . is 
to subsidize the care of those who are unable to pay. Another . . . is to use 
charitable contributions to cover the costs of establishing the facility and 
some portion of the ongoing operating expenses, thereby subsidizing the 
cost of the facility for all persons who use it, regardless of their ability to 
pay.”), cited in Deerfield Retirement Community, Inc. v. Board of Review 
of Polk County, No. 08-0115, 2009 WL 1491902, at *1-3 (Iowa App. May 
29, 2009) (denying exemption to a retirement and life-care facility that did 
not accept Medicaid: “Deerfield has not established charitable or volunteer 
subsidies to underwrite indigent patients”). 
—————————————————————————————— 
Kansas 
Constitution & Statute(s) 
KAN. CONST. art. 11, § 1: “(b) All property used exclusively for state, 
county, municipal, literary, educational, scientific, religious, benevolent 
and charitable purposes, . . . and all household goods and personal effects 
not used for the production of income, shall be exempted from property 
taxation.” 
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Paragraph Second of the detailed KAN. STAT. ANN. § 79-201 (2009) 
exempts: 
All real property, and all tangible personal property, 
actually and regularly used exclusively for literary, educational, 
scientific, religious, benevolent or charitable purposes . . . . 
Except with regard to real property which is owned by a 
religious organization, . . . this exemption shall not apply to such 
property, not actually used or occupied for the purposes set forth 
herein, nor to such property held or used as an 
investment. . . . . . . .. 
Paragraph Fourth of § 79-201b is a more specific statute addressed to 
various charitable housing purposes. 
 
Case Holding(s) 
In the Matter of the Appeal of University of Kansas School of Medicine-
Wichita Medicine Practice Ass’n, 973 P.2d 176 (Kan. 1999) (detailing the 
history of narrow Supreme Court decisions followed by liberalizing 
legislation of the exemption regime for housing and for humanitarian 
purpose, and the differences in the statutory regimes for different types of 
nonprofit activities—notably, whether leasing to another jeopardizes 
exemption); cf. Matter of Application of KSU Foundation, 114 P.3d 176, 
182 (Kan. App. 2005), held that a foundation formed to support Kansas 
State University was not entitled to a property-tax exemption on a building 
that it acquired at the university’s request to lease at cost for the 
university’s printing operations: “Under this lease arrangement, we 
conclude the Foundation’s only use of the property is a financial one.” 
 
Appeals courts have ruled that section 79-201b  applies for exemption of 
elderly, low-income, or other housing. Cf. In the Matter of the Application 
of KSU. SE Agricultural Research Center for Exemption, 157 P.3d 1, 5 
(Kan. Ct. App. 2007) (stating that Paragraph Second exempts property 
owned and operated by a state educational institution for the caretaker of its 
research farm: “occupancy was clearly for the benefit of KSU rather than 
the occupant; it was part of the machinery by which the education and 
research affairs of KSU were administered”). In December 2009, however, 
the state supreme court recognized the “plain-language requirements of 
K.S.A. 2008 Supp. 79-201 Second and Ninth” to the nonprofit owner of 
property used, without profit, “to provide both living quarters and 
counseling for severely mentally ill citizens. . . . [N]o cost or reduced cost 
to individuals who would otherwise likely be homeless and without access 
to public assistance programs.”  Matter of Mental Health Ass’n of the 
Heartland, 211 P.3d 580, 586 (Kan. 2009). The court held that the two 
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statutes were not in conflict; moreover, “The analysis by the Court of 
Appeals reaches an incongruous contrary result—that the legislature 
enacted three statutes with the intention each would expand the scope of 
tax-exempt charitable-use property beyond the restrictive constitutional 
language, but that these statutes operate to cancel each other out.” 
—————————————————————————————— 
Kentucky 
Constitution & Statute(s) 
KY. CONST. § 170: 
There shall be exempt from taxation public property used for 
public purposes; . . . real property owned and occupied by, and 
personal property both tangible and intangible owned by, 
institutions of religion; institutions of purely public charity, and 
institutions of education not used or employed for gain by any 
person or corporation, and the income of which is devoted solely 
to the cause of education, public libraries, their endowments, and 
the income of such property as is used exclusively for their 
maintenance . . . . 
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 132.190 (West 2005) begins: “(1) All property 
shall be subject to taxation, unless it is exempted by the Constitution or in 
the case of personal property unless it is exempted by the Constitution or 
by statute.” 
 
Note: In 1992, the legislature repealed KY. REV. STAT. § 132.011 (“Public 
charity” defined); no reported case cited that statute. 
 
Case Holding(s) 
Department of Revenue ex rel. Luckett v. Isaac W. Bernheim Foundation,  
Inc., 505 S.W.2d 762, 763 (Ky. Ct. App. 1974) (citation omitted):  
No case has been called to our attention which requires that 
a charity have as its objective the fulfillment of basic human 
needs for food, clothing and shelter to qualify as a charity for 
purposes of tax exemption under Section 170 of the Constitution. 
We are mindful that tax exemption deprives the treasury of 
revenue which must be replenished from other sources and 
consequently all claims for tax exemptions should be carefully 
scrutinized. We do not propose to allow the perpetuation of 
individual idiosyncrasies in a tax-exempt status under the guise 
of charity. Nevertheless, we feel that charity is broader than 
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relief to the needy poor and includes activities which reasonably 
better the condition of mankind. 
Banahan v. Presbyterian Housing Corp., 553 S.W.2d 48 (Ky. 1977) 
(recognizing exemption for housing and related facilities provided by a 
nonprofit to low-income senior citizens and disabled persons). 
—————————————————————————————— 
Louisiana 
Constitution & Statute(s) 
LA. CONST. art. VII, § 21 provides, in part: 
[T]he following property and no other shall be exempt from ad 
valorem taxation: 
. . . . 
(B)(1)(a)(i) Property owned by a nonprofit corporation or 
association organized and operated exclusively for religious, 
dedicated places of burial, charitable, health, welfare, fraternal, 
or educational purposes, no part of the net earnings of which 
inure to the benefit of any private shareholder or member thereof 
and which is declared to be exempt from federal or state income 
tax; and 
. . . . 
(2) property of a bona fide labor organization representing its 
members or affiliates in collective bargaining efforts; and 
(3) property of an organization such as a lodge or club organized 
for charitable and fraternal purposes . . . , and property of a 
nonprofit corporation devoted to promoting trade, travel, and 
commerce, and also property of a trade, business, industry or 
professional society or association . . . . 
None of the property . . . shall be exempt if owned, operated, 
leased, or used for commercial purposes unrelated to the exempt 
purposes of the corporation or association. 
 
Case Holding(s) 
Sherwood Forest Country Club v. Litchfield, 998 So. 2d 56, 61 (La. 2008), 
remanded on rehearing, 6 So. 3d 141 (La. 2009): “The people of our state 
are called upon to sustain the burdens of taxation as a requisite of civil 
government. Historically, exemptions were allowed based upon the theory 
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that the concessions are due as quid pro quo for the performance of 
services essentially public.” 
 
See also id. at 62 (citations omitted): 
[A]ll property shall pay its just portion of public burdens. 
Historically, when property is put to some use calculated to 
minimize the expenses of government are exemptions justified. 
Although the word ‘fraternal’ can be defined broadly,—and in 
one sense neighbors who get together for back-yard barbeques 
are gathering for fraternal purposes—it is only on the theory that 
fraternal acts alleviate the burdens of government that tax 
exemptions of property devoted to fraternal purposes can be 
justified. The predominate rule is to deny a property tax 
exemption for property used primarily for social or recreational 
purposes, even if that property is owned by a fraternal 
organization. 
See also id. at 67: 
Of the four activities cited by sociologists that formed the basis 
for the establishment of the large contingency of fraternal orders 
that exists in the United States today, three obviously conferred 
public benefits—social integration, through education, into a 
democratic society; economic security with insurance and/or 
welfare benefits; and religious and morality practices and/or 
education. The fourth attribute of fraternal associations—social 
prestige—is more personal than public, but can be said to 
contribute to a cohesive community. 
—————————————————————————————— 
Maine 
Constitution & Statute(s) 
ME. CONST. art. IV, pt. 3, § 23 begins: 
The Legislature shall annually reimburse each municipality from 
state tax sources for not less than [fifty percent] of the property 
tax revenue loss suffered by that municipality during the 
previous calendar year because of the statutory property tax 
exemptions or credits enacted after April 1, 1978. The 
Legislature shall enact appropriate legislation to carry out the 
intent of this section. 
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, § 652(1)(A) (2009) begins: 
The real estate and personal property owned and occupied or 
used solely for their own purposes by benevolent and charitable 
institutions incorporated by this State are exempt from taxation. 
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Such an institution may not be deprived of the right of exemption 
by reason of the source from which its funds are derived or by 
reason of limitation in the classes of persons for whose benefit 
the funds are applied. 
 
Case Holding(s) 
Christian Fellowship & Renewal Center v. Town of Limington, 896 A.2d 
287, 295 (Me. 2006) (4-3 decision) (citations omitted), granted exemption 
for facilities rented out to houses of worship or other religious societies at a 
low rate. The dissent emphasized the ambiguous record that could support 
either a recreational, charitable, or religious use. The majority stated: 
The charitable exemption was created in an age when 
government provided few services and religious institutions and 
charities provided many services that government neither 
provided nor subsidized.  Then and now, organizations need not 
displace government programs in order to serve the common 
good and qualify for the charitable exemption by providing 
charitable services to defined groups or to the public at large.  
One legislative study indicated that the original purposes of the 
charitable exemption were to promote not only providing 
services in lieu of government services, but also “providing a 
service in which the state has a genuine interest.” 
—————————————————————————————— 
Maryland 
Constitution & Statute(s) 
No constitutional provision exists on tax exemption. Murray v. Comptroller 
of Treasury, 216 A.2d 897, 902 (Md. 1966) (upholding tax exemption of 
churches, noting that: “This Court has consistently recognized the power of 
the legislature to grant full exemptions from taxation when reasonable and 
for a public purposee”). 
 
MD. CODE ANN., TAX-PROP. § 7-202(b)(1) (LexisNexis 2007) reads, in 
part: 
Property is not subject to property tax if the property: 
(i) is necessary for and actually used exclusively for a charitable 
or educational purpose to promote the general welfare of the 
people of the State, including an activity or an athletic program 
of an educational institution; and 
(ii) is owned by: 
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1. a nonprofit hospital; 
2. a nonprofit charitable, fraternal, educational, or literary 
organization . . . . 
 
Case Holding(s) 
Supervisor of Assessments v. Group Health Ass’n, 517 A.2d 1076, 1079 
(Md. 1986) (citations omitted): 
We do not at this time attempt to establish a hard-and-fast rule as 
to the meaning of ‘charitable’ for purposes of [the statutes]. 
Indeed, we doubt whether such a rule can be formulated. Clearly, 
however, a determination of whether an institution is charitable 
must include a careful examination of the stated purposes of the 
organization, the actual work performed, the extent to which the 
work performed benefits the community and the public welfare 
in general, and the support provided by donations. 
 
Baltimore Science Fiction Society, Inc. v. State Department of Assessment 
& Taxation, 863 A.2d 969, 971, 975 (Md. 2004). Rejecting the tax 
department’s argument that “the property did not qualify for the tax 
exemption because it was used primarily as a social or hobby club,” the 
court ruled that “educational” cannot be limited to formal instruction, 
noting the Society’s use of the property for the following educational 
purposes: a library’s writing workshops, readings and presentations by 
authors; and encouraging high school students to compose literature.  
—————————————————————————————— 
Massachusetts 
Constitution & Statute(s) 
MASS. CONST. pt. 2, ch. 1, § 1, art. IV reads, in part: 
And further, full power and authority are hereby given and 
granted to the said general court [the legislature], from time to 
time, . . . to impose and levy proportional and reasonable 
assessments, rates, and taxes, upon all the inhabitants of, and 
persons resident, and estates lying, within the said 
commonwealth, except that . . . reasonable exemptions may be 
granted. . . . 
 
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 59, § 5 (2009) provides, in part: 
The following property shall be exempt from taxation . . . 
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. . . . 
Third, Personal property of a charitable organization, which 
term, as used in this clause, shall mean (1) a literary, benevolent, 
charitable or scientific institution or temperance society . . . 
and . . . real estate owned by or held in trust for a charitable 
organization and occupied by it or its officers for the purposes 
for which it is organized or by another charitable organization or 
organizations or its or their officers for the purposes of such 
other charitable organization or organizations. . . . 
 
Case Holding(s) 
Massachusetts (and many other states) adopted the following definition (in 
other states, sometimes without attribution or by citing Black’s Law 
Dictionary): 
“A charity, in the legal sense, may be more fully defined as a gift 
to be applied consistently with existing laws, for the benefit of an 
indefinite number of persons, either by bringing their minds or 
hearts under the influence of education or religion, by relieving 
their bodies from disease, suffering or constraint, by assisting 
them to establish themselves in life, or by erecting or 
maintaining public buildings or works or otherwise lessening the 
burdens of government.” 
Boston Symphony Orchestra, Inc. v. Board of Assessors, 1 N.E.2d 6, 9 
(Mass. 1936) (quoting Jackson v. Phillips, 96 Mass. (14 Allen) 539, 556 
(1867)). As discussed above in footnote 109, the court denied exemption to 
the Symphony, explaining: “The way in which the appellant carried out its 
purpose by means of concerts in Symphony Hall has features which 
differentiate it from other corporations whose profits have been held to be 
exempt under the statute.” Id. at 10. 
 
New Habitat, Inc. v. Tax Collector, 889 N.E.2d 414, 418-19 (Mass. 2008) 
(citations omitted): 
To determine whether an organization is charitable, the 
court weighs a number of nondeterminative factors. These 
factors include, but are not limited to, whether the organization 
provides low-cost or free services to those unable to pay, 
whether it charges fees for its services and how much those fees 
are, whether it offers its services to a large or ‘fluid’ group of 
beneficiaries and how large and fluid that group is, whether the 
organization provides its services to those from all segments of 
society and from all walks of life, and whether the organization 
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limits its services to those who fulfill certain qualifications and 
how those limitations help advance the organization’s charitable 
purposes. 
The significance of these factors depends in no small part 
on the dominant purposes and methods of the organization. The 
closer an organization’s dominant purposes and methods are to 
traditionally charitable purposes and methods, the less significant 
these factors will be in our determination of the organization’s 
charitable status under G. L. c. 59, § 5, Third. 
—————————————————————————————— 
Michigan 
Constitution & Statute(s) 
MICH. CONST. art. IX, § 3 begins: “The legislature shall provide for the 
uniform general ad valorem taxation of real and tangible personal property 
not exempt by law except for taxes levied for school operating purposes.” 
 
MICH. CONST. art. IX, § 4: “Property owned and occupied by nonprofit 
religious or educational organizations and used exclusively for religious or 
educational purposes, as defined by law, shall be exempt from real and 
personal property taxes.” 
 
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 211.7o (West 2009) begins: “(1) Real or 
personal property owned and occupied by a nonprofit charitable institution 
while occupied by that nonprofit charitable institution solely for the 
purposes for which that nonprofit charitable institution was incorporated is 
exempt from the collection of taxes under this act.” 
 
Case Holding(s) 
Wexford Medical Group v. City of Cadillac, 713 N.W.2d 734, 737 (Mich. 
2006) (finding no particular monetary level of charity care required by the 
exemption statute; the total amount of pure charity care in one year was 
$2400 out of a total budget of $10 million). On the difficulty of 
determining what forgone revenue to count as charity care, the court 
concluded: “Clearly, courts are unequipped to handle these and many other 
unanswered questions. Simply put, these are matters for the legislature.” Id. 
at 746. Defining factors include: 
(1) A “charitable institution” must be a nonprofit 
institution. 
(2) A “charitable institution” is one that is organized 
chiefly, if not solely, for charity. 
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(3) A “charitable institution” does not offer its charity on a 
discriminatory basis by choosing who, among the group it 
purports to serve, deserves the services. Rather, a “charitable 
institution” serves any person who needs the particular type of 
charity being offered. 
(4) A “charitable institution” brings people’s minds or 
hearts under the influence of education or religion; relieves 
people’s bodies from disease, suffering, or constraint; assists 
people to establish themselves for life; erects or maintains public 
buildings or works; or otherwise lessens the burdens of 
government. 
(5) A “charitable institution” can charge for its services as 
long as the charges are not more than what is needed for its 
successful maintenance. 
(6) A “charitable institution” need not meet any monetary 
threshold of charity to merit the charitable institution exemption; 
rather, if the overall nature of the institution is charitable, it is a 
“charitable institution” regardless of how much money it devotes 
to charitable activities in a particular year. 
See id. at 746. 
—————————————————————————————— 
Minnesota 
Constitution & Statute(s) 
MINN. CONST., art. X, § 1 reads, in part: 
Taxes shall be uniform upon the same class of subjects . . . , 
but . . . academies, colleges, universities, all seminaries of 
learning, all churches, church property, houses of worship, [and] 
institutions of purely public charity . . . shall be exempt from 
taxation except as provided in this section. . . . The legislature 
may authorize municipal corporations to levy and collect 
assessments for local improvements upon property benefited 
thereby without regard to cash valuation. The legislature by law 
may define or limit the property exempt under this section other 
than churches, houses of worship, and property solely used for 
educational purposes by academies, colleges, universities and 
seminaries of learning. 
 
See the legislative change described below. 
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Case Holding(s) 
North Star Research Institute v. County of Hennepin, 236 N.W.2d 754, 757 
(Minn. 1975), adopted a six-factor test to qualify an institution as a purely 
public charity: 
(1) whether the stated purpose of the undertaking is to be helpful 
to others without immediate expectation of material reward; (2) 
whether the entity involved is supported by donations and 
gifts . . . ; (3) whether the recipients of the ‘charity’ are required 
to pay for the assistance received . . . ; (4) whether the income 
received from gifts and donations and charges to users produces 
a profit to the charitable institution; (5) whether the beneficiaries 
of the ‘charity’ are restricted or unrestricted and, if restricted, 
whether the class of persons to whom the charity is made 
available is one having a reasonable relationship to the charitable 
objectives; (6) whether dividends, in form or substance, or assets 
upon dissolution are available to private interests. 
 
Under the Rainbow Child Care Center, Inc. v. County of Goodhue, 741 
N.W.2d 880 (Minn. 2007), found that a daycare center was not an 
institution of purely public charity. The “factor three inquiry”—”the extent 
to which the recipients of the charity are required to pay”—”tests for a 
value that is fundamental to the concept of charity—that is, whether the 
organization gives anything away.” Id. at 886. “If the legislature had 
intended all organizations exempt . . . under I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) also to be 
exempt from payment of real property taxes, it could have so provided, as it 
did with regard to state income taxation.” Id. at 889. Under “the dissent’s 
interpretation of charity[,] . . . a ‘charitable’ enterprise could charge the 
same for its services as a for-profit competitor and nevertheless enjoy 
exemption from property taxation, as long as no profits inured to the 
benefit of members of the organization.” Id. 
[I]t is not sufficient to provide free or reduced-rate goods or 
services on such a small scale that they are merely an incidental 
part of the organization’s operations. Nor will free or reduced-
rate goods or services that are provided primarily for business 
purposes be adequate. The organization must demonstrate that its 
intended purpose is to provide a substantial proportion of its 
goods or services on a charitable basis. 
Id. at 892. 
 
After Under the Rainbow, months of deliberations among the Minn. 
Council of Nonprofits, the Department of Revenue, and the Association of 
County Assessors reached a consensus, adopted by the legislature in May 
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2009, to codify the definition of an institution of purely public charity.  
While “not contract[ing] or expand[ing] the definition,” MINN. STAT. § 
272.02(7)(a) (2009) requires charities to meet all six judicially created 
factors for determining tax exempt status; factors (1), (4), and (6) are 
mandatory and factors (2), (3), and (5) allow a “reasonable justification” 
exception (rejecting the Senate’s proposed “compelling factual reason”). 
 
Guidance published by the Minnesota Department of Revenue explains that 
the three mandatory factors are automatically satisfied by Internal Revenue 
Code § 501(c)(3) status, and provides examples for satisfying (or not) the 
three other factors. See Letter from Minn. Rev. Dept., Property Tax 
Division, Bulletin to All City and County Assessors, Property Tax 
Exemptions for Institutions of Purely Public Charity, at 7-12 (Mar 1, 2010) 
available at http://www.mncn.org/charitable_tax_exemption/final%20 
Revenue%20Bulletin.pdf. 
 
HealthEast v. County of Ramsey, 770 N.W.2d 153 (Minn. 2009), denied 
exemption to nonprofit health system parent that not only leased property 




Constitution & Statute(s) 
MISS. CONST. art. 4, § 112 reads, in relevant part: “The Legislature may, by 
general laws, exempt particular species of property from taxation, in whole 
or in part.” 
 
MISS. CODE ANN. § 27-31-1 (1972) exempts, in part: “(d) All property, real 
or personal, belonging to any religious society, or ecclesiastical body, or 
any congregation thereof, or to any charitable society, or to any historical 
or patriotic association or society . . . and used exclusively for such society 
or association and not for profit. . . .” It also exempts property of nonprofit 
schools and property owned and occupied by fraternal and benevolent 




Hattiesburg Area Senior Services v. Lamar County, 633 So. 2d 440, 444-45 
(Miss. 1994), while denying exemption to a retirement home, footnote 5 
notes: “Since the inception of this litigation the legislature has provided 
that properties such as the properties here in question shall be 
[prospectively] exempt. Miss. Code Ann. 1972 § 27-31-1(dd) (Supp. 
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1992).” The court cited Better Living Services, Inc. v. Bolivar County, 587 
So. 2d 914 (Miss. 1991), which denied exemption to a corporation which 
operated federally-subsidized apartments for the elderly, destitute, 
handicapped, and disabled. That court noted: “We see no reason why an 
institution, merely because it caters to the needs of the aged and infirm, 
should be exempt from taxation if someone other than that institution is 
furnishing the cost of the care and maintenance provided by the 
institution.” Id. at 917 (quoting Oea Senior Citizens, Inc. v. Douglas 
County, 185 N.W.2d 464, 470 (Neb. 1971)). 
—————————————————————————————— 
Missouri 
Constitution & Statute(s) 
MO. CONST. art. X, § 6(1) provides: “All property . . . not held for private 
or corporate profit and used exclusively for religious worship, for schools 
and colleges, for purposes purely charitable, or for agricultural and 
horticultural societies, or for veterans’ organizations may be exempted 
from taxation by general law.” 
 
MO. ANN. STAT. § 137.100(5) (2009) exempts: 
All property . . . actually and regularly used exclusively for 
religious worship, for schools and colleges, or for purposes 
purely charitable and not held for private or corporate profit, . . . 
[but not] real property not actually used or occupied for the 
purpose of the organization but held or used as investment even 
though the income or rentals received therefrom is used wholly 
for religious, educational or charitable purposes[.] 
 
Case Holding(s) 
Franciscan Tertiary Province, Inc. v. State Tax Commission, 566 S.W.2d 
213, 218-19, 223-24, 226 (Mo. 1978), found that: 
An analysis of the cases relied on to support those 
respective positions has led us to the conclusion that the cases 
considering a charitable exemption for housing for the elderly 
and those considering such an exemption with reference to 
property used for other purposes have interpreted the words 
“used exclusively . . . for purposes purely charitable” differently 
and have established different requirements for granting an 
exemption under such language. It is beyond question that the 
language enacted may have but one meaning to be consistently 
applied in all areas. 
The court continued: 
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We hold that the words ‘used exclusively . . . for purposes 
purely charitable, and not held for private or corporate profit’ 
which appear in § 137.100 should and do have the same meaning 
whether applied to property used for a hospital, for training 
handicapped workers, for operating a YMCA type of program or 
for providing housing for the aged. 
Applying a three-factor test, the court concluded: 
Franciscan is a not-for-profit corporation whose clearly stated 
purpose was to operate a rental facility for the aged on a non-
profit basis. It did not operate at a profit. It contributed some of 
its own funds to supplement rentals received in order to meet 
expenses of operating Chariton. No profit to any individual or 




Constitution & Statute(s) 
MONT. CONST. art. VIII, § 5 reads, in part: “(1) The legislature may exempt 
from taxation: . . . (b) Institutions of purely public charity, hospitals and 
places of burial not used or held for private or corporate profit, places for 
actual religious worship, and property used exclusively for educational 
purposes.” 
 
MONT. CODE ANN. § 15-6-201 (2009). 
 
Case Holding(s) 
Steer, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 803 P.2d 601, 605 (Mont. 1990) 
notes that: 
Steer, through its innovative stewardship program, provides 
a valuable service by raising funds which, in turn, are donated to 
needy people world-wide. However, the fact that Steer’s unique 
fund-raising method produces worthwhile results through its 
member evangelical organizations does not negate its tax 
obligations under Montana constitutional and statutory mandate. 
We have already held that Steer’s use of its cattle as a capital 
investment was determinative in deciding that it did not qualify 
for a tax-exemption based on being an “institution of purely 
public charity.” We feel, however, that this case requires us to 
further clarify “institutions for purely public charity.” 
. . . . 
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. . . Taken together, the Montana Constitution and the 
Montana legislative acts intend “institutions” to mean property 
or place employed for purely public charitable purposes or 
activities rather than an entity. The cattle are property and tax is 
imposed on property. If it is charitable property in its purpose 
and employment and not for profit or gain of income, taxes are 
not imposed. Here, the cattle’s employment was for the gain of 
income, and therefore, the cattle are taxable. 
Mont. Const. art. VIII, § 5(1) provides that the legislature 
may exempt property from taxation. The exemptions of property 
from taxation is clearly left to the discretion of the legislature 
and as noted, are to be strictly construed. The history and 
provisions of § 15-6-201, MCA, reflect the many times when 
this section of the code has been amended to add property to the 
list of exempted items, which includes such items as residences 
of the clergy to a bicycle used for personal transportation of the 




Constitution & Statute(s) 
NEB. CONST. art. VIII, § 2(2) reads: “[T]he Legislature by general law may 
classify and exempt from taxation property owned by and used exclusively 
for . . . educational, religious, charitable, or cemetery purposes, when such 
property is not owned or used for financial gain or profit to either the 
owner or user . . . .” 
 
NEB. REV. STAT. § 77-202(1)(d) (2003) reads: 
Property owned by educational, religious, charitable, or 
cemetery organizations, or any organization for the exclusive 
benefit of any such educational, religious, charitable, or cemetery 
organization, and used exclusively for . . . [such] purposes, when 
such property is not (i) owned or used for financial gain or profit 
to either the owner or user, (ii) used for the sale of alcoholic 
liquors for more than twenty hours per week, or (iii) owned or 
used by an organization which discriminates in membership or 
employment based on race, color, or national origin. . . . 
[E]ducational organization means (A) an institution operated 
exclusively for the purpose of offering regular courses with 
systematic instruction . . . or (B) a museum or historical society 
operated exclusively for the benefit and education of the 
public. . . . [C]haritable organization means an organization 
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operated exclusively for the purpose of the mental, social, or 
physical benefit of the public or an indefinite number of 
persons . . . . 
Case Holding(s) 
Bethesda Foundation v. Buffalo County Board of Equalization, 640 
N.W.2d 398, 404-05 (Neb. 2002). In granting an exemption to an assisted 
living facility, the court stated: 
The residents . . . are admitted without regard to race, color, 
or national origin and without regard to the ability of the 
residents to pay. The criteria for admission is the need for care. 
No resident has ever been discharged for failure to pay, nor has 
Bethesda ever filed a suit to collect delinquent accounts. . . . In 
the event a facility needs improvements or is unable to pay for 
them, Bethesda uses excess receipts from other facilities to pay 
the deficit or cover expenses. 
Cf. Pittman v. Sarpy County Board of Equalization, 603 N.W.2d 447, 455 
(Neb. 1999) (“It is well established that low-income housing is not a 
charitable use of property.”). 
 
Nebraska State Bar Foundation v. Lancaster County Board of 
Equalization, 465 N.W.2d 111, 124 (Neb. 1991) (ruling that the Nebraska 
Bar Foundation is not a charitable or educational organization). 
[Section] 77-202(1)(c) contains a two-tier approach to tax 
exemption for property. At the first tier is the particular nature, 
character, or status of a property owner as an organization which 
is one of the types designated in § 77-202(1)(c). At the second 
tier is use of the property, that is, the specific kinds and degrees 
of use which qualify or disqualify property concerning the 
charitable or educational tax exemptions available under § 77-
202(1)(c). At the first tier, if an owner is not an organization of a 
type entitled to property tax exemption pursuant to § 77-
202(1)(c), continuation to the second tier, namely, consideration 
of the property’s use, is unnecessary, since the property owner 
has failed to qualify as an organization entitled to tax exemption 
for its property. 
See also Fort Calhoun Baptist Church v. Washington County Board of 
Equalization, 759 N.W.2d 475, 481-82 (Neb. 2009) (holding that church 
property leased to a school during the week, except when school use would 
interfere with a church function, “was used exclusively for religious and/or 
educational purposes”). “The Constitution and the statutes do not require 
that the ownership and use must be by the same entity.” Id. 
—————————————————————————————— 
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Nevada 
Constitution & Statute(s) 
NEV. CONST. art. 8, § 2: “All real property, and possessory rights to the 
same . . . belonging to corporations . . . shall be subject to taxation . . . ; 
Provided, that the property of corporations formed for Municipal, 
Charitable, Religious, or Educational purposes may be exempted by law.” 
 
NEV. CONST. art. 10, § 1, cl. 8 reads, in part: “The legislature may exempt 
by law property used for municipal, educational, literary, scientific or other 
charitable purposes. . . .” 
 
NEV. REV. STAT. § 361.140(2) (2009): “All buildings belonging to a 
corporation defined in subsection 1, together with the land actually 
occupied by the corporation for the purposes described and the personal 
property actually used in connection therewith, are exempt from taxation 
when used solely for the purpose of the charitable corporation.” 
 
See also § 361.105 (exemptions of nonprofit private schools); § 361.125 
(exemption of churches and chapels); § 361.135 (exemptions of certain 
lodges, societies and similar charitable or benevolent organizations). 
 
NEV. REV. STAT. § 361.140(1): 
In addition to the corporations defined by law to be charitable 
corporations there are hereby included: 
(a) Any corporation whose objects and purposes are 
religious, educational or for public charity and whose funds have 
been derived in whole or substantial part from grants or other 
donations from governmental entities or donations from the 
general public, or both, not including donations from any officer 
or trustee of the corporation; and 
(b) Any corporation prohibited by its articles of 
incorporation from declaring or paying dividends, and where the 
money received by it is devoted to the general purpose of charity 
and no portion of the money is permitted to inure to the benefit 
of any private person engaged in managing the charity, except 
reasonable compensation for necessary services actually 
rendered to the charity, and where indigent persons without 
regard to race or color may receive medical care and attention 
without charge or cost. 
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Case Holding(s) 
Simpson v. International Community of Christ, 796 P.2d 217, 219 (Nev. 
1990) (“[Not all of the] two square miles of vacant land should be tax 
exempt because a religious group conducts open-air religious ceremonies a 
few times a week at different locations on the land.”); see also id. at 221 
(Mowbray, J., concurring): 
While I certainly favor and support the tax exemptions 
granted religious and charitable organizations by the legislature, 
enough is enough! 
As in all cases, reasonableness and honesty must be applied 
in granting those exemptions. To do otherwise, is not only unfair 
to all religious and charitable organizations, but also to our 
citizens who must bear and pay their individual share of the 
overall tax burden. 
—————————————————————————————— 
New Hampshire 
Constitution & Statute(s) 
No constitutional provision. 
 
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 72:23(V) (LexisNexis 2009), exempts: “The 
buildings, lands and personal property of charitable organizations and 
societies . . . used and occupied by them directly for the purposes for which 
they are established. . . .” 
 
Section 72:23-l reads: 
The term ‘charitable’ . . . shall mean a corporation, society 
or organization established and administered for the purpose of 
performing, and obligated, by its charter or otherwise, to perform 
some service of public good or welfare advancing the spiritual, 
physical, intellectual, social or economic well-being of the 
general public or a substantial and indefinite segment of the 
general public that includes residents of the state of New 
Hampshire, with no pecuniary profit or benefit to its officers or 
members, or any restrictions which confine its benefits or 
services to such officers or members, or those of any related 
organization. The fact that an organization’s activities are not 
conducted for profit shall not in itself be sufficient to render the 
organization ‘charitable’ . . . , nor shall the organization’s 
treatment under the United States Internal Revenue Code . . . . 
This section is not intended to abrogate the meaning of 
‘charitable’ under the common law of New Hampshire. 
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Section 72:23-n  provides: “The governing body of any municipality may 
enter into negotiations for a voluntary payment in lieu of taxes from 
otherwise fully or partially tax exempt properties. . . .” 
 
While the legislature may create exemptions, there is no constitutional right 
to exemption. See Franklin Street Society v. Manchester, 60 N.H. 342, 350-
51 (1880) (“Whether any exemption of the plaintiff’s property is 
constitutional is a question we do not decide. . . . The plaintiff [church] . . . 




St. Paul’s School v. City of Concord, 372 A.2d 269, 271-72 (N.H. 1977) 
(answering detailed questions as to use of specific types of educational 
property). 
 
There are several cases regarding assisted living centers which go both 
ways. See the “close” case of ElderTrust of Florida, Inc. v. Town of Epsom, 
919 A.2d 776, 780 (N.H. 2007), where the New Hampshire Supreme Court 
took “the opportunity to join a number of other courts,” and set out a four-
part test to clarify the statutory requirements, asking whether the 
organization: (1) was established and is administered for a charitable 
purpose; (2) has an obligation to perform its stated purpose to the public 
rather than simply to its members; (3) occupies and uses its property 
directly for the stated charitable purposes; and (4) uses income or profits 
for any purpose other than the purpose for which it was established (which 
prohibits the organization’s officers and members from deriving any 
pecuniary profit or benefit). 
 
Town of Peterborough v. MacDowell Colony, Inc., 943 A.2d 768, 770-71 
(N.H. 2008) (upholding exemption for 450 acres “on which are located 
thirty-two art studios and various common buildings . . . . MacDowell 
operates an artist-in-residence program on the property. Each artist 
admitted to the program . . . may spend up to eight weeks at the Colony, 
where he or she is provided a studio in which to create art. The studios . . . 
provide, in the trial court’s words, ‘a secluded, natural environment in 
which to work.’”). “The provision of that service benefits a far greater 
segment of society than the artists who actually use MacDowell’s property 
and, in so doing, serves the ‘general public’ as that term is used in RSA 
72:23-l.” Id. at 773. While the artists may sell or do what they please with 
the art, the statute’s “prohibition against private inurement applies to it, not 
the Colony Fellows.” Id. at 775. 
—————————————————————————————— 
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New Jersey 
Constitution & Statute(s) 
N.J. CONST. art. VIII, § 1, ¶ 2, ends: 
Exemptions from taxation may be altered or repealed, except 
those exempting real and personal property used exclusively for 
religious, educational, charitable or cemetery purposes, as 
defined by law, and owned by any corporation or association 
organized and conducted exclusively for one or more of such 
purposes and not operating for profit. 
 
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54:4-3.6 (West 2002), exempts, in part: 
[A]ll buildings actually used for colleges, schools, academies or 
seminaries . . . ; all buildings actually used for historical 
societies, associations or exhibitions, when . . . located on land 
owned by an educational institution which derives its primary 
support from State revenue; all buildings actually and 
exclusively used for public libraries . . . ; all buildings actually 
used in the work of associations and corporations organized 
exclusively for religious purposes . . . ; all buildings actually 
used in the work of associations and corporations organized 
exclusively for hospital purposes . . . ; [and] all buildings owned 
by a corporation . . . subject to the provisions of Title 15 . . . or 
Title 15A of the New Jersey Statutes and actually and 
exclusively used in the work of one or more associations or 
corporations organized exclusively for charitable or religious 
purposes. . . . 
 
Case Holding(s) 
See Hunterdon Medical Center v. Township of Readington, 951 A.2d 931, 
945 (N.J. 2008) for a discussion of the factors to be considered when an 
entity claims an exemption, including: (1) “the core aspects of a hospital’s 
purposes are to address the needs of all of the types of patients that a 
hospital is expected to serve. Therefore, we hold that any medical service 
that a hospital patient may require pre-admission, during a hospital stay . . . 
or post-admission, constitutes a presumptive core ‘hospital purpose’”; (2) 
“whether the hospital delivers such services in the hospital’s main 
facility . . . or in a hospital-owned building adjoining or adjacent to the 
main hospital campus, makes no difference”; (3) “as the hospital-used 
property is situated away from the main hospital campus and adjacent or 
adjoining property, concerns about hospital integration and supervision 
become more pronounced, even when the use is for a core hospital 
purpose.” 
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[I]n the analysis under factor three  above when the hospital’s 
off-site activity is not one for which the hospital has been 
licensed to perform off site by regulatory authorities . . . [we also 
consider]: (1) whether the facility competes with like 
commercial or privately owned facilities; and, even if the answer 
to (1) is in the affirmative, (2) whether the facility, or the 
particular disputed part, is actually used predominantly by 
patients and hospital employees or by commercial members. . . . 
[T]his part to the analysis does not replace the separate 
consideration . . . that an endeavor not be established or run as a 
profit-making operation. 
See also id. at 946 
 
Unlike for hospitals, the legislature does not require assisted living 
facilities to provide charity care. See Presbyterian Home at Pennington, 
Inc. v. Borough of Pennington, 976 A.2d 413, 415 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 
Div. 2009). 
 
Cf. University Cottage Club of Princeton New Jersey Corp. v. New Jersey 
Department of Environmental Protection, 921 A.2d 1122, 1131 (N.J. 2007) 
(upholding agency requirement (now codified in specific statute) that 
“public access is a fundamental element of an historic site tax exemption,” 
and that this Princeton private eating club satisfied the requirement). The 
court commented: “important is the fact that tax exemptions drain the 
public coffers just as expenditures do, and could not be justified in the 
absence of public access.” Id. 
—————————————————————————————— 
New Mexico 
Constitution & Statute(s) 
N.M. CONST. art. VIII, § 3 begins: “[A]ll church property not used for 
commercial purposes, [and] all property used for educational or charitable 
purposes . . . shall be exempt from taxation.” 
 
N.M. STAT. § 7-38-8.1 (2009) reads: 
The [tax] division shall adopt regulations to insure that all real 
property owned by any nongovernmental entity and claimed to 
be exempt from property taxation . . . shall be reported for 
valuation purposes to the appropriate valuation authority. These 
regulations shall include provisions for initial reporting of the 
property and claiming of the exempt status pursuant . . . . 
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Case Holding(s) 
Georgia O’Keeffe Museum v. County of Santa Fe, 62 P.3d 754, 758 (N.M. 
Ct. App. 2002) (“We hold the phrase ‘used for educational purposes’ to 
mean ‘the direct, immediate, primary and substantial use of property that 
embraces systematic instruction in any and all branches of learning from 
which a substantial public benefit is derived.’” (citing NRA Special 
Contribution Fund v. Board of County Commissioners, 591 P.2d 672, 679 
(N.M. Ct. App. 1978)). NRA ruled that lobbying on legislation is 
inconsistent with education. Concerned about the burden to other taxpayers 
of exempting the NRA’s 36,300 acres, the court observed: 
We note also that the necessary expenses of government 
are becoming greater and the necessity for better utilization of 
the existent property tax is urgent. Tax exemption has a direct 
effect on the size of the tax base. The scope of tax exemption has 
broadened so that exempt organizations tend to grow wealthier 
and often increase the percentage of exempt property within the 
state . . . . Such increased exemptions may create a serious 
problem because a diminished tax base lessens the amount 
available to meet governmental costs. This factor also requires 
an organization that seeks a tax exemption to give the public a 
“substantial public benefit.” 
NRA Special Contribution Fund, 591 P.2d at 679. 
 
Georgia O’Keeffe Museum declared: 
[F]or us now to read NRA to allow an exemption only for a 
formal, structured, teacher-student instructional school 
environment would be too restrictive a reading of NRA. 
Application of too narrow a standard can easily defeat the 
obvious purpose of the exemption, which is to encourage private 
citizens to engage in educational pursuits from which the public 
derives a substantial benefit. To adhere to NRA as narrowly as 
the County suggests in order to defeat an exemption, with respect 
to a private museum that provides a substantial educational 
benefit to the community, is too restrictive . . . . 
Georgia O’Keeffe Museum, 62 P.3d at 765. The court adds: “Museums, 
whether private or public, must integrate themselves into the community 
and have subjects of public interest in order to survive. . . . [T]hey depend 
primarily on donations (including grants and legislative funding), 
admission fees, and retail sales in gift shops.” Id. at 766. 
—————————————————————————————- 
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New York 
Constitution & Statute(s) 
N.Y.  CONST. art. XVI, § 1 ends: 
Exemptions from taxation . . . may be altered or repealed except 
those exempting real or personal property used exclusively for 
religious, educational or charitable purposes as defined by law 
and owned by any corporation or association organized or 
conducted exclusively for one or more of such purposes and not 
operating for profit. 
 
N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW  § 420-a (McKinney 2008) begins: 
1. (a) Real property owned by a corporation or association 
organized or conducted exclusively for religious, charitable, 
hospital, educational, or moral or mental improvement of men, 
women or children purposes, . . . and used exclusively for 
carrying out . . . such purposes . . . shall be exempt from 
taxation . . . . 
(b) Real property . . . shall not be exempt if any officer, member 
or employee . . . receive[s or is entitled to] any pecuniary profit 
from the operations thereof, except reasonable compensation for 
services in effecting one or more of such purposes, or as proper 
beneficiaries of its strictly charitable purposes; or if the 
organization thereof for any such avowed purposes be a guise or 
pretense for directly or indirectly making any other pecuniary 
profit . . . ; or if it be not in good faith organized or conducted 
exclusively for one or more of such purposes. 
 
Subsection 3 exempts, in part, nonrevenue-producing property whose 
“improvement[] is in progress or is in good faith contemplated . . . .” Id. § 
420-a(3). 
 
N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX. § 420-b contains a local option to revoke 
exemption, adopted in 1971 out of concern over lost tax base: 
1. (a) Real property owned by a corporation or association which 
is organized exclusively for bible, tract, benevolent, missionary, 
infirmary, public playground, scientific, literary, bar association, 
medical society, library, patriotic or historical purposes, for the 
development of good sportsmanship for persons under the age of 
eighteen years through the conduct of supervised athletic games, 
for the enforcement of laws relating to children or animals, or for 
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two or more such purposes, and used exclusively for carrying out 
thereupon one or more of such purposes either by the owning 
corporation or association, or by another such corporation or 
association as hereinafter provided, shall . . . be taxable by any 
municipal corporation within which it is located if the governing 
board of such municipal corporation, after public hearing, adopts 
a local law, ordinance or resolution so providing.  
This statute was upheld by Ass’n of the Bar of the City of New York v. 
Lewisohn, 313 N.E.2d 30, 32 (N.Y. 1974). 
 
Case Holding(s) 
Adult Home at Erie Station, Inc. v. Assessor of Middleton, 886 N.E.2d 137, 
142 (N.Y. 2008) (upholding exemption for housing rented to participants in 
the nonprofit’s programs to combat homelessness, substance abuse, and 
other social ills): 
[A]partments in commercial complexes are not provided solely 
to people struggling against alcoholism, drug addiction and the 
like on condition that they participate in programs designed to 
help them. That these people (or the government agencies that 
support them) pay market rents, and that RECAP may even 
benefit economically from its rental income, does not change the 
result. The issue is not whether RECAP benefits, but whether the 
property is “used exclusively” for RECAP’s charitable purposes. 
RECAP could lose its exemption under RPTL 420-a (1) (b) if the 
economic benefit went to its officers or employees personally, 
but an economic benefit to a charitable organization does not by 
itself extinguish a tax exemption. The question is how the 
property is used, not whether it is profitable. 
—————————————————————————————— 
North Carolina 
Constitution & Statute(s) 
N.C. CONST. art. V, § 2(3) reads, in part: “The General Assembly may 
exempt cemeteries and property held for educational, scientific, literary, 
cultural, charitable, or religious purposes . . . . No taxing authority other 
than the General Assembly may grant exemptions, and the General 
Assembly shall not delegate the powers accorded to it . . . .” 
 
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-278.7 (2009) exempts buildings and land owned by 
a “charitable association or institution” if “[w]holly and exclusively used 
by its owner for nonprofit educational, scientific, literary, or charitable 
purposes . . . .” Subsection (f)(4) states: “A charitable purpose is one that 
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has humane and philanthropic objectives; it is an activity that benefits 
humanity or a significant rather than limited segment of the community 
without expectation of pecuniary profit or reward. The humane treatment of 
animals is also a charitable purpose.” Id. § 105-278.7(f)(4). 
 
Case Holding(s) 
No recent North Carolina high court decision. 
 
See, e.g., In re Appeal of Chapel Hill Residential Retirement Center, 299 
S.E.2d 782, 788-89 (N.C. Ct. App. 1983): 
[M]erely supplying care and attention to elderly persons cannot, 
alone, constitute charity. Petitioner does not rely on outside 
funding in order to operate. The contributions it has received are 
not a primary source of its financing. The Center is more in the 
nature of a cooperative operated for the mutual benefit of its 
residents who collectively pay for their care; it is not an 
institution providing for the special needs of individuals who are 
in need of charity, the aid of whom benefits society as a whole in 
addition to the residents. 
The court observed: 
To allow petitioner’s property to qualify for exemption because 
its residents are elderly would be to give such persons clearly 
preferential treatment over those persons over 65 years of age 
who continue to live in their own discretely owned residences. 
While we recognize and applaud efforts similar to Carol Woods 
as being a progressive and desirable approach to the residential 
and health care and personal security of elderly persons, these 
laudable aspects of petitioner’s operation do not suffice to bring 
it within the statutory classification of a charitable purpose. 
In response, in 1987 the legislature enacted “An Act to Classify Property 
Owned by Certain Non Profit Homes for the Aged, Sick or Infirm and 
Exclude this Property from Taxation,” codified at section N.C. GEN. STAT. 
§ 105-275(32) (2009) and upheld by In Matter of the Appeal of Barbour, 
436 S.E.2d 169, 177 (N.C. Ct. App. 1993). 
—————————————————————————————— 
North Dakota 
Constitution & Statute(s) 
N.D. CONST. art. X, § 5 reads, in part: “[P]roperty used exclusively for 
schools, religious, cemetery, charitable or other public purposes shall be 
exempt from taxation. Real property used for conservation or wildlife 
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purposes is not exempt from taxation unless an exemption is provided by 
the legislative assembly.” 
 
The lengthy and detailed N.D. CENT. CODE § 57-02-08 (2009) exempts, 
among other things, “buildings belonging to institutions of public charity.” 
See also § 57-02-08.4 (conditional property-tax exemption for owners of 
wetlands). 
 
See also section 57-02.3-02: “The board of [state-owned] university and 
school lands shall annually make payments, subject to legislative 
appropriations, to any county in which property subject to valuation is 
located. The payments are in lieu of ad valorem taxes that would be 
payable to the county if the real property for which the payments are made 
were not owned by the state. . . .” 
 
Case Holding(s) 
Riverview Place, Inc. v. Cass County, 448 N.W.2d 635, 642 (N.D. 1989) 
(“[A] facility for the elderly must supply some type of care for their 
residents in order to constitute a charitable use.”). 
—————————————————————————————— 
Ohio 
Constitution & Statute(s) 
OHIO CONST. art. XII, § 2 ends: 
 
[G]eneral laws may be passed to exempt burying grounds, public 
school houses, houses used exclusively for public worship, 
institutions used exclusively for charitable purposes, and public 
property used exclusively for any public purpose, but all such 
laws shall be subject to alteration or repeal; and the value of all 
property so exempted shall, from time to time, be ascertained 
and published as may be directed by law. 
 
Exemption for charities is provided in OHIO REV. CODE § 5709.12 as 
defined in § 5709.121 (2010), which, among other things, exempts property 
leased from one charity to another for charitable purposes. 
 
American Committee of Rabbinical College of Telshe, Inc. v. Board of Tax 
Appeals, 102 N.E.2d 589, 590 (Ohio 1951): 
In both Section 2 of Article XII of the Constitution and Section 
5353, General Code, the words “institutions of purely public 
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charity” have now been replaced by the words “institutions used 
exclusively for charitable purposes.” It follows that it is no 
longer necessary that an institution used exclusively for the 
lawful advancement of education and of religion be open 
generally to the public in order to have tax exemption of property 




Northeast Ohio Psychiatric Institute v. Levin, 903 N.E.2d 1188, 1193 (Ohio 
2009) (denying exemption to charitable property owner leasing to 
charitable affiliate because the rental income is more than incidental). The 
dissent commented: 
Funding for social services such as mental-health care for the 
underprivileged is scarce enough and is increasingly being cut 
during these tough economic times. Permitting the taxation of 
the property herein further deprives a charitable-care provider of 
funding to continue treatment, much of which is provided by the 
state . . . in the first place. Peter is being robbed to pay Paul 
instead. 
Id. at 1196 (Lundberg Stratton, J., dissenting); cf. Community Health 
Professionals, Inc. v. Levin, 866 N.E.2d 478, 483 (Ohio 2007) (noting that 
the lease was incidental and the administration building was exempt). 
—————————————————————————————— 
Oklahoma 
Constitution & Statute(s) 
OKLA. CONST. art. X, § 6(A): “[A]ll property used for free public libraries, 
free museums, public cemeteries, property used exclusively for nonprofit 
schools and colleges, and all property used exclusively for religious and 
charitable purposes . . . shall be exempt from taxation . . . .” 
 
OKLA. STAT. tit. 68, § 68-2887(9) (2000) adds: “All property used 
exclusively and directly for charitable purposes within this state, provided 
the charity using said property does not pay any rent . . . unless the owner is 
a charitable institution described in Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal 
Revenue Code. . . .” 
 
Case Holding(s) 
Integris Realty Corp. v. Oklahoma County Board of Tax Roll Corrections 
(In re Assessment of Real Property), 58 P.3d 200, 206 (Okla. 2002) (ruling 
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that property leased by nonprofit tenants from a for-profit owner was 
exempt): 
In recognition of the burden on state government which is lifted 
by the charitable acts of others, the framers allow an exemption 
from taxation for property which is “used exclusively”—i.e., 
property which is physically dedicated and devoted—for 
charitable purposes. . . . 68 O.S. 2001 § 2887(9) to the extent that 
it creates a burden on entitlement to an art. 10, § 6 exemption in 
a way inconsistent with the constitutional provision’s language is 
disapproved. 
A dissenting opinion expressed skepticism that the use by the nonprofit 
tenants was charitable: 
There is documentary evidence establishing the general identities 
of the tenants as engineering, education and training, facility 
planning, physician services, foundation, legal, plaza hotel, 
managed care, CVI lab, diabetes center, heart center, surgery 
center, and fertility institute. However, there is no evidence that 
these tenants are care centers providing services to the public or 
that these tenants’ doors are open to the public, poor persons and 
paying persons alike. 
Id. at 207 (Boudreau, J., dissenting). 
—————————————————————————————— 
Oregon 
Constitution & Statute(s) 
No exemptions referenced in Constitution. 
 
OR. REV. STAT. § 307.130(2) (2000) reads, in part: “property owned . . . 
by . . . incorporated literary, benevolent, charitable and scientific 
institutions shall be exempt from taxation . . . [but] only such real or 
personal property, or proportion thereof, as is actually and exclusively 
occupied or used in the literary, benevolent, charitable or scientific work 
carried on by such institutions.” And in (3) and (4), an “institution shall not 
be deprived of an exemption . . . solely because its primary source of 
funding is from one or more governmental entities” or “because its purpose 
or the use of its property is not limited to relieving pain, alleviating disease 
or removing constraints.” Id. at § 307.130(3)-(4). 
 
Case Holding(s) 
Southwestern Oregon Public Defender Services, Inc. v. Department of 
Revenue, 817 P.2d 1292, 1298 (Or. 1991) (“[T]he fact that taxpayer 
contracts with the state to perform indigent defense in Coos County does 
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not disqualify it from receiving an exemption . . . .”). The Court explained 
that the statute has three requirements: “(1) the organization must have 
charity as its primary, if not sole, object; (2) the organization must be 
performing in a manner that furthers its charitable object; and (3) the 
organization’s performance must involve a gift or giving.” Id. at 1296. As 
to the last, “the question becomes, not whether taxpayer gains some kind of 
remuneration from some source, but whether, so far as the recipient is 
concerned, the taxpayer’s services are given to the recipients with strings 
attached.” Id. at 1297. 
 
The Oregon Tax Court recently denied exemption for a college bookstore. 
Portland State University Bookstore v. Multnomah County Assessor, No. 
TC-MD 060824C, 2009 Ore. Tax LEXIS 27, at *19 (Or. T.C. January 29, 
2009) (“There is no allegation or evidence that the relatively few college 
students benefiting from Plaintiff’s nominal giving fall into the category of 
‘poor and needy.’”). 
—————————————————————————————— 
Pennsylvania 
Constitution & Statute(s) 
PA. CONST. art. 8, § 2(a) permits the General Assembly to exempt from 
taxation, among other property, “(v) Institutions of purely public charity, 
but . . . only that portion of real property of such institution which is 
actually and regularly used for the purposes of the institution.” 
 
The 1997 Institutions of Purely Public Charity Act set forth statutory 
factors in response to Hospitalization Utilization Project v. 
Commonwealth, 487 A.2d 1306, 1317 (Pa. 1985), which set forth five 
requirements: “(a) Advances a charitable purpose; (b) Donates or renders 
gratuitously a substantial portion of its services; (c) Benefits a substantial 
and indefinite class of persons who are legitimate subjects of charity; (d) 
Relieves the government of some of its burden; and (e) Operates entirely 
free from profit motive.” The very detailed provisions of 10 PA. STAT. 
ANN. § 375 (West 1999) explicate and expand on these criteria, and 
provide safe harbors and rebuttable presumptions. The statute encourages 
nonprofits to make PILOTs by offering an exemption safe harbor and gives 
standing to aggrieved for-profit competitors. 
 
Case Holding(s) 
The Commonwealth Court repeatedly asserts that only the courts can 
interpret the constitutional term “institution of purely public charity” 
despite reversals by the State Supreme Court, which seems to suggest more 
deference to the legislature. See, e.g., Alliance Home of Carlisle v. Board of 
BRODY_FINAL FOR PDF 6/24/2010  12:36:59 PM 
2010] PROPERTY-TAX EXEMPTION FOR CHARITIES 717 
Assessment Appeals, 919 A.2d 206, 223 (Pa. 2007) (footnote omitted): 
If the Act 55 presumption and test would lead to a holding that a 
taxpayer qualified as “an institution of purely public charity,” 
where the HUP test would not, fundamental and foundational 
questions could arise concerning whether: (1) the HUP test, 
which was adopted in the absence of legislation addressing the 
constitutional term, occupied the constitutional field concerning 
the exemption, or instead left room for the General Assembly to 
address the matter; (2) the legislative scheme as adopted 
comported with the constitutional command and displaced the 
HUP test; and/or (3) if HUP were deemed authoritative and 
comprehensive, whether the legislative findings and scheme set 
forth in Act 55 gave reason to reconsider the contours of the test 
thus distilled from judicial experience with individual cases. 
 
Government-funded nonprofits (e.g., prisons, low-income and elderly 
housing) are a particular area of dispute, leading one commentator to call 
on the Pennsylvania Supreme Court to clarify the question. “Otherwise, 
well-meaning charitable social service organizations will continue to waste 
money pursuing lengthy litigation with frustrating results.” Joseph C. 
Bright, Pennsylvania Charities Suffer String of Defeats from 
Commonwealth Court, STATE TAX TODAY, July 6, 2007, available at  2007 




Constitution & Statute(s) 
No tax provision in Constitution. 
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 44-3-3(8) (2005) exempts: 
Buildings and personal estate owned by any corporation used for 
a school, academy, or seminary of learning, and of any 
incorporated public charitable institution, and the land upon 
which the buildings stand and immediately surrounding them to 
an extent not exceeding one acre, so far as they are used 
exclusively for educational purposes, but no property or estate 
whatever is hereafter exempt from taxation in any case where 
any part of its income or profits or of the business carried on 
there is divided among its owners or stockholders. . . . 
Note: R.I. GEN. LAWS § 45-13-5.1 (1999) requires state PILOTs to towns 
of twenty-seven percent of taxes that would otherwise have been paid by 
nonprofit schools and hospitals. [Update for 2009 proposed “impact fee”]. 
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Case Holding(s) 
Few cases. See, e.g., Order of St. Benedict v. Gordon, 417 A.2d 881 (R.I. 
1980) (granting exemption to faculty housing in dorms at boarding school); 
Roger Williams General Hospital v. Littler, 566 A.2d 948 (R.I. 1989) 
(denying exemption to equipment leased from business vendor). Old 
charters set forth a tax exemption that is not affected by the statute. 
 
See also Lifespan Corp. v. City of Providence, 776 A.2d 1061, 1061-62 
(R.I. 2001) (denying exemption to property in an administrative building 
used by an “umbrella entity” to provide services to the hospital and 
entities): “Lifespan’s request that we should equate a corporate office 




Constitution & Statute(s) 
S.C. CONST. art. X, § 3 reads, in part: 
There shall be exempt from ad valorem taxation: 
. . . . 
(b) all property of all schools, colleges and other 
institutions of learning and all charitable institutions in the nature 
of hospitals and institutions caring for the infirmed, the 
handicapped, the aged, children and indigent persons, except 
where the profits of such institutions are applied to private use; 
(c) all property of all public libraries, churches, parsonages 
and burying grounds; 
(d) all property of all charitable trusts and foundations used 
exclusively for charitable and public purposes; 
 . . . . 
. . . In addition . . . the General Assembly may provide for 
exemptions from the property tax, by general laws applicable 
uniformly to property throughout the State . . . , but only with the 
approval of two-thirds of . . . each House. 
 
Lengthy and detailed S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-37-220(B) (2009) adds 
exemptions for specific types of nonprofits (e.g., Boy Scouts, YMCA’s, 
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museums, theaters and symphonies, and certain housing for low-income, 
disabled, or elderly persons). Subsection (B)(16)(a) covers: 
The property of any religious, charitable, eleemosynary, 
educational, or literary society, corporation, or other association, 
when the property is used by it primarily for the holding of its 
meetings and the conduct of the business of the society, 
corporation, or association and no profit or benefit therefrom 
inures to the benefit of any private stockholder or individual. 
S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-37-220(B)(16)(a). 
 
Case Holding(s) 
No recent state supreme court cases, and few appeals court cases.  See, e.g., 
Citadel Development Foundation v. County of Greenville, 308 S.E.2d 797, 
800 (S.C. Ct. App. 1983) (“It is one thing to say the Foundation benefits 
The Citadel, but quite another to claim The Citadel is the beneficial owner 
of Foundation property.”). 
—————————————————————————————— 
South Dakota 
Constitution & Statute(s) 
S.D. CONST. art. XI, § 6 reads: “The Legislature shall, by general law, 
exempt from taxation, property used exclusively for agricultural and 
horticultural societies, for school, religious, cemetery and charitable 
purposes. . . .” 
 
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 10-4-9.1 (1996) reads: 
Property owned by a public charity and used for charitable 
purposes is exempt from taxation. A public charity is any 
organization or society which devotes its resources to the relief 
of the poor, distressed or underprivileged. A public charity must 
receive a majority of its revenue from donations, public funds, 
membership fees or program fees generated solely to cover 
operating expenses; it must lessen a governmental burden by 
providing its services to people who would otherwise use 
governmental services; it must offer its services to people 
regardless of their ability to pay for such services; it must be 
nonprofit and recognized as an exempt organization under 
section 501(c)(3) of the United States Internal Revenue Code of 
1954, as amended, and in effect on January 1, 1986; and it may 
not have any of its assets available to any private interest. 
Separately, S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 10-4-9.3 (1996) exempts property used 
for human health care. 
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Case Holding(s) 
See Sioux Valley Hospital Ass’n v. South Dakota State Board of 
Equalization, 513 N.W.2d 562  (S.D. 1994) (rejecting exemption for fitness 
center run by hospital). The court considered both exemption statutes, 
beginning with section 10-4-9.3: 
When the Legislature provided a tax exemption for human health 
care and human health care related purposes, it did not intend to 
give a tax exemption for “Splashbash Parties.” Despite the 
Center’s mandate on health over physique, we find it contrary 
to . . . associate these fitness activities with human health care 
per SDCL 10-4-9.3. 
Id. at 565. 
 
On the separate question of exemption under section 10-4-9.1, the court 
concluded: 
Although Minnehaha County does provide swimming and some 
fitness activities, the Center does not alleviate a governmental 
burden merely by providing some similar services. Federal 
Express delivers letters and packages, but does not achieve 
charitable status by competing with the United States Postal 
Service. 
A charitable exemption “is granted as a concession by 
government in return for unselfish ministrations to human 
welfare,” and is “accorded as a matter of legislative grace and 
not as a matter of tax payer right.” We do not impugn the Center 
for its good acts; however, the Center does not primarily devote 
its resources to the poor, distressed or underprivileged. We find 
that the facts do not support the conclusion that the Center is a 
charitable organization per SDCL 10-4-9.1. 
Id. at 566 (citations omitted). 
 
Cf. Freeman Community Hospital & Nursing Home v. Hutchinson County, 
633 N.W.2d 179, 184 (S.D. 2001) (ruling exempt a congregate living 
facility owned and operated by a community hospital), explaining that 
section 9.1: 
[R]equires its subject entity to relieve a governmental 
burden . . . . Section 9.3 governs tax-exempt status for nonprofit 
corporations, such as Hospital. Importantly, section 9.3 does not 
require a nonprofit corporation to relieve a governmental burden. 
Had the legislature intended to place that requirement on 
nonprofit corporations it would have done so, but it did not. 
—————————————————————————————— 
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Tennessee 
Constitution & Statute(s) 
TENN. CONST. art. II, § 28 begins: “[A]ll property real, personal or mixed 
shall be subject to taxation, but the Legislature may except . . . such as may 
be held and used for purposes purely religious, charitable, scientific, 
literary or educational. . . .” 
 
TENN. CODE ANN. § 67-5-212(a)(1) (2006) begins: 
There shall be exempt from property taxation the real and 
personal property, or any part . . . owned by any religious, 
charitable, scientific or nonprofit educational institution that is 
occupied and actually used by the institution or its officers 
purely and exclusively for carrying out one (1) or more of the 
exempt purposes for which the institution was created or 
exists . . . [As well as] property . . . owned by an exempt 
institution that is occupied and actually used by another . . . [for] 
which the owning institution receives no more rent than a 
reasonably allocated share of the cost of use, excluding the cost 
of capital improvements, debt service, depreciation and interest, 
as determined by the board of equalization. 
Subsection (c) provides: “As used in this section, ‘charitable institution’ 
includes any nonprofit organization or association devoting its efforts and 
property, or any portion thereof, exclusively to the improvement of human 
rights and/or conditions in the community.”  Id. § 67-5-212(c). 
 
Case Holding(s) 
Shared Hospital Services Corp. v. Ferguson, 673 S.W.2d 135, 137 (Tenn. 
1984) (exempting a nonprofit organization that supplies laundry services to 
its charitable hospital members on a cooperative basis): 
It is insisted by appellee that the furnishing of laundry 
services is an essential and integral part of the operation of a 
hospital. Most cases which have considered this subject support 
that contention, and we agree. There is no question but that if 
each member hospital operated its own laundry, the laundry 
facilities would be exempt. 
See also Youth Programs, Inc. v. Tennessee State Board of Equalization, 
170 S.W.3d 92, 97 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004) where the court affirmed 
exemption for a golf tournament, observing: “In Tennessee, unlike many 
other states, tax exemption statutes are construed liberally in favor of 
religious, charitable, scientific, and educational institutions.” The court 
continued: 
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The fact that a charitable institution’s activities may be similar to 
or in competition with tax-paying businesses does not by itself 
render the property on which it conducts those activities taxable. 
For-profit entities may exist to provide the same services as non-
profit, charitable entities. We recognize, moreover, that the 
tournament in this case includes a substantial purse or profit to 
the tournament winner. However, the fact that a profit is 
generated by an organization’s activities is not determinative. 
Section 67-5-212 disallows the exemption only where 
stockholders, officers, members, or other employees receive or 
are entitled to receive profits other than reasonable compensation 
for services. 
Id. at 104-05 (citations omitted). Furthermore: 
The State vehemently asserts that the statutes were not intended 
to encompass charities which exist to raise funds for other 
charities. We note, as Youth Programs submits, that this 
argument has broad implications for a number of charitable 
institutions such as, for example, the United Way. In light of the 
ambiguity of the statutes and the historically liberal construction 
in favor of charitable institutions, we are loathe to disturb that 
construction here. Without so suggesting, if such institutions 
should not be recognized as charitable, it is within the province 
of the legislature to disturb the construction of the statutes 
historically afforded in Tennessee. 
Id. at 106 (citations omitted). 
—————————————————————————————— 
Texas 
Constitution & Statute(s) 
TEX. CONST. art. VIII, § 2(a) reads: 
[T]he legislature may, by general laws, exempt from taxation . . . 
places of religious worship [and a parsonage]; . . . all buildings 
used exclusively and owned . . . for school purposes . . . and 
property used . . . [by] any association engaged in promoting the 
religious, educational and physical development of boys, girls, 
young men or young women operating under a State or National 
organization of like character; also the endowment funds of such 
institutions of learning and religion not used with a view to 
profit[;] . . . and institutions engaged primarily in public 
charitable functions, which may conduct auxiliary activities to 
support those charitable functions. 
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TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 11.18 (2010) describes specific requirements for 
charities generally and for certain types of charities. Subsection (d) begins: 
“A charitable organization must be organized exclusively to perform 
religious, charitable, scientific, literary, or educational purposes” and 
“engage exclusively in performing one or more of the following charitable 
functions”—and as long as that list is, it does not contain a catchall 
category. (The first item requires “providing medical care without regard to 
the beneficiaries’ ability to pay, which in the case of a nonprofit hospital or 
hospital system means providing charity care and community benefits in 
accordance with Section 11.1801”). 
 
Moreover, subsection (f) requires assets to be committed, on dissolution, 
for transfer to a similar charity or to the government. Id. § 11.18(f). 
 
Case Holding(s) 
City of McAllen v. Evangelical Lutheran Good Samaritan Society, 530 
S.W.2d 806, 810 (Tex. 1975): 
With the advent of present day social security and welfare 
programs, the traditional concept of charity, involving the 
extension of free services to the poor and alms-giving, will be 
rarely found since wide ranging assistance is available to the 
poor under such programs. Furthermore, the courts have defined 
charity to be something more than mere alms-giving or the relief 
of poverty and distress. The ultimate consideration then, should 
be based upon an evaluation of the total operation of the 
institution engaged in humanitarian activities whose services are 
rendered at cost or less and which are maintained to care for the 
physical and mental well-being of the recipients. By that total 
operation the institution must assume “to a material extent, that 
which otherwise might become the obligation or duty of the 
community or the state.” 
 
North Alamo Water Supply Corp. v. Willacy County Appraisal District, 804 
S.W.2d 894, 898-99 (Tex. 1991) (denying exemption to nonprofit 
organizations that supply water “to individual water district ‘members’ who 
are able to pay for those benefits”): 
Any organization, whether classified as almsgiving or non-
almsgiving, which seeks to be classified as a ‘purely public 
charity’ must make no gain or profit and be organized to 
accomplish ends wholly benevolent by engaging in humanitarian 
services maintained to care for the physical or mental well-being 
of its recipients. The total operation of the charity must affect all 
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the people of a community or state by assuming, to a material 
extent, services which otherwise might devolve to and become 
the obligations of the community or state. 
Rejecting the argument that the plaintiff satisfies the statute, the court 
added: “Before an organization can be considered for qualification for tax 
exempt status under section 11.18 of the Texas Tax Code, that organization 
must first meet the applicable constitutional requirements which entitle 
those organizations to seek the exemption.” Id. at 899. 
—————————————————————————————— 
Utah 
Constitution & Statute(s) 
UTAH CONST. art. XIII, § 3(1)(f) exempts “property owned by a nonprofit 
entity used exclusively for religious, charitable, or educational purposes.” 
 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 59-2-1101 (2008). 
 
Case Holding(s) 
Utah County by County Board of Equalization v. Intermountain Health 
Care, 709 P.2d 265 (Utah 1985), ruled unconstitutional a statute 
automatically exempting nonprofit hospitals, and denied exemption to two 
hospitals that failed to prove they made a substantial gift of services—
payments from the government, insurers, and patients basically covered the 
hospitals’ operating expenses for the years at issue (the court ignored $4 
million donated for construction) (citing Mark Pauley & Michael Redisch, 
The Not-For-Profit Hospital as a Physicians’ Co-operative, 63 AM. ECON. 
REV. 87 (1973) and Robert Charles Clark, Does the Nonprofit Form Fit the 
Hospital Industry?, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1416 (1980)): 
It may very well be . . . that all hospitals, for-profit and 
nonprofit, should be granted a tax exemption because of the great 
public need they serve. But it is beyond the power of the 
Legislature to grant such a public policy-based exemption under 
the language of the Utah Constitution as it now reads. This Court 
has clearly and recently affirmed the necessity of identifying the 
element of “gift,” a nonreciprocal contribution to the community. 
Intermountain Health Care, 709 P.2d at 277. “Furthermore, nonprofit 
hospitals that generate a surplus from their operations ought not to be tax 
exempt under the ‘burden’ theory because they are not passing along the 
benefit of the exemption to the public unless they are charging less for 
services than would be required absent the tax exemption[.]” Id. at 278; see 
also Howell v. County Board  ex rel. IHC Hospitals, Inc., 881 P.2d 880, 
882 (Utah 1994) (upholding State Tax Commission’s standards for 
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exempting nonprofit hospitals and nursing homes, and Intermountain’s 
satisfaction of them). 
Intermountain Health Care’s factors for charitable use are: 
(1) whether the stated purpose of the entity is to provide a 
significant service to others without immediate expectation of 
material reward; (2) whether the entity is supported, and to what 
extent, by donations and gifts; (3) whether the recipients of the 
“charity” are required to pay for the assistance received, in whole 
or in part; (4) whether the income received from all sources 
(gifts, donations, and payment from recipients) produces a 
“profit” to the entity in the sense that the income exceeds 
operating and long-term maintenance expenses; (5) whether the 
beneficiaries of the “charity” are restricted or unrestricted and, if 
restricted, whether the restriction bears a reasonable relationship 
to the entity’s charitable objectives; and (6) whether dividends or 
some other form of financial benefit, or assets upon dissolution, 
are available to private interests, and whether the entity is 
organized and operated so that any commercial activities are 
subordinate or incidental to charitable ones. 
Intermountain Health Care, 709 P.2d at 269-70. Note six adds: “adapted 
from the test articulated by the Minnesota Supreme Court in North Star 
Research Institute v. County of Hennepin, 236 N.W.2d 754, 757 (Minn. 
1975).” Id. at 270 n.6. 
 
Cf. Yorgason v. County Board  of Equalization, 714 P.2d 653, 654 (Utah 
1986) (exempting a nonprofit apartment building leased under HUD regs to 
the needy, elderly and handicapped). The dissent was skeptical: 
[W]hat happens here is simply shifting the burden for providing 
housing for the elderly and handicapped from local and state 
government to the federal government . . . . Shifting the financial 
burden from local and state government to the federal 
government does not relieve the taxpayers of Salt Lake County 
[who also pay federal taxes] from any burden. 
Id. at 665-66 (Howe, J., dissenting). 
—————————————————————————————— 
Vermont 
Constitution & Statute(s) 
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 3802(4) (2009) exempts: 
Real and personal estate granted, sequestered or used for 
public, pious or charitable uses; real property owned by churches 
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or church societies or conferences and used as parsonages . . .; 
real and personal estate set apart for library uses . . . ; and lands 
owned or leased by colleges, academies or other public 
schools . . . ; but private buildings on such lands shall be set in 
the list . . . and shall not be exempt. The exemption of lands 
owned or leased by colleges, academies or other public schools, 
shall not apply to lands or buildings rented for general 
commercial purposes . . . . 
 
In my favorite case, American Museum of Fly Fishing, Inc. v. Town of 
Manchester, 557 A.2d 900, 905 (Vt. 1989), the dissent complained that by 
the majority’s overruling of its governmental function test, “[t]he door has 
been opened wide for every fly-by-night enterprise to acquire property and 
forthwith remove it as a source of revenue for the town in which it is 
located.” Id. at 907. 
 
Case Holding(s) 
Medical Center Hospital v. Burlington, 566 A.2d 1352, 1355 (Vt. 1989) 
(citations omitted): 
[T]his state has never required a certain percentage of free care 
to be rendered before finding an organization to be a tax-exempt 
charity, unlike other jurisdictions which have imposed such 
restrictions. In our opinion, pegging charitability to a stated 
amount of free care rendered would not be workable in 
determinating an organization’s taxable status. Instead, 
uncertainty would reign, with taxability determined on a yearly 
basis depending on economic factors not within the control of 
any one person or organization. 
Rather, an “‘open-door’ policy . . . reflects settled Vermont law regarding 
the characteristics of charitable trusts, an area of law closely connected to 
the inquiry at hand.” Id. 
[I]t is unreasonable to suggest that because modern medical 
institutions no longer operate in precisely the same manner as 
they did many years ago, they should lose their traditional tax-
exempt status. We recognize, as have other jurisdictions, that the 
definition of “charitable organization” need not be locked into 
the past. 
Id. at 1356. “Our case law supports the proposition that not-for-profit 
institutions may generate revenues in excess of their expenses in order to 
maintain the organization, the criteria being only that such revenues not be 
passed through to shareholders as profits but put back into operating 
expenses.” Id. at 1357. “We have found no case, and defendant has directed 
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us to none, requiring employees of not-for-profit institutions to work for 
less than market rate in order for that institution to be deemed ‘charitable’ 
for tax purposes. “ Id. 
—————————————————————————————— 
Virginia 
Constitution & Statute(s) 
VA. CONST. art. X, § 6(a) exempts churches and parsonages, nonprofit 
libraries and educational institutions, and, on or after January 1, 2003, 
“[p]roperty used by its owner for religious, charitable, patriotic, historical, 
benevolent, cultural, or public park and playground purposes, as may be 
provided by classification or designation by an ordinance adopted by the 
local governing body and subject to such restrictions and conditions as 
provided by general law.” Id. § 6(a)(6). However, “the General Assembly 
by general law may restrict or condition, in whole or in part, but not extend, 
any or all of the above exemptions.” Id. § 6(c). Existing exemptions are 
either grandfathered or revocable only by the General Assembly. 
 
VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-3606 (2009) exempts specified classes of property 
(e.g., property occupied and used by the YMCA). 
 
VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-3651(B) sets forth the process for exemption by 
classification or designation by ordinance adopted by a local governing 
body; factors to consider include: (1) I.R.C. § 501(c) status; (3) payment of 
unreasonable compensation; (4) whether a significant portion of the org is 
funded by donations (including volunteer time), or local, state or federal 
grants; (5) “Whether the organization provides services for the common 
good of the public” or (6) is involved in political campaigns or lobbying; 
(7) “The revenue impact to the locality and its taxpayers of exempting the 
property”; and (8) any other relevant criteria. Id.§ 58.1-3651(B)(1), (3)-(8). 
 
Case Holding(s) 
Virginia Baptist Homes, Inc. v. Botetourt County, 668 S.E.2d 119, 125 (Va. 
2008) (recognizing the exemption of “The Glebe,” a continuing-care-
retirement community owned by Virginia Baptist Homes (“VBH”), under 
Virginia Code § 58.1-3650.33, the successor statute to the statute enacted 
by the General Assembly designating VBH exempt for religious or 
benevolent purposes). 
 
Cf. City of Richmond v. Virginia United Methodist Homes, Inc., 509 S.E.2d 
504 (Va. 1999) (involving the effect on exemption of a change in purpose 
in the articles of incorporation). United Methodist Homes had initially 
defined its corporate purpose as providing “a home or homes for the aged 
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and infirm and needy persons.” Id. at 505. A change to the articles of 
incorporation replaced the reference to “the aged and infirm and needy 
persons” with the term “aging persons.” Id. The court held that this new 
language was a “significant change” requiring further examination to 
determine if United Methodist Homes’ property still qualified for tax-
exempt status as an “asylum” under the classification statute it relied on. Id. 
at 509. The Virginia Baptist Homes case observed: “It is significant that the 
Richmond case was a classification case rather than a designation case; 
because we noted that upon the same facts presented, ‘Nothing in this 
opinion should be interpreted as restricting Methodist Homes from 
obtaining a legislative exemption from local taxes by designation under 
Code § 58.1-3607.’” Virginia Baptist Homes, 668 S.E.2d at 124 (quoting 
Virginia United Methodist Homes, 509 S.E.2d at 509 n.5). 
 
The Virginia Baptist Homes court commented: 
While there may have been some changes made to the 
corporate structure of VBH since the designation in order to limit 
tort liability, adjust to changes in federal tax law, and allow for 
greater flexibility when making capital improvements, the 
record . . . reflects that its dominant purposes and that of The 
Glebe have not changed since the General Assembly granted its 
tax-exempt designation. 
Id. at 124. The concluding footnote reads: “The General Assembly may 
revoke VBH’s tax-exempt designation pursuant to Code § 58.1-3605.” Id. 
at 124 n.*. 
—————————————————————————————— 
Washington 
Constitution & Statute(s) 
WASH. CONST. art. VII, § 1 reads, in relevant part: “Such property as the 
legislature may by general laws provide shall be exempt from taxation.” 
 
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 84.36.040(1) (West 2010) exempts nonprofit 
day care centers, libraries, orphanages, homes or hospitals for the sick or 
infirm, and outpatient dialysis facilities as long as “the benefit of the 
exemption inures to the user.” 
 
The general exemption statute seems to be section 84.36.030(1)(a), which 
exempts: “Property owned by nonprofit organizations or associations, 
organized and conducted for nonsectarian purposes, which shall be used for 
character-building, benevolent, protective or rehabilitative social services 
directed at persons of all ages.” WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 84.36.030(1)(a). 
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Case Holding(s) 
The anti-inurement quoted statutory language used to read “when such 
institutions are supported in whole or in part by public donations or private 
charity, and all of the income and profits thereof are devoted, after paying 
the expenses thereof, to the purposes of such institutions. . . .” Yakima First 
Baptist Homes, Inc. v. Gray, 510 P.2d 243, 245 (Wash. 1973). Construing 
the donation language, the state supreme court ruled that federal rent 
subsidies paid under a contract between an institution and the federal 
government do not count as public donations. Id. at 246. 
 
Adult Student Housing, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 705 P.2d 793 
(Wash. App. 1985), ruled that in Washington, “benevolent” and 
“charitable” are interchangeable terms. The court turned to a supreme court 
decision on charitable immunity: “[A] charitable corporation to be such 
must not only engage in works tending to the betterment of mankind, but it 
must do so as a charity. If it renders no services except those for which it 
receives an adequate reward it is a business, not a charitable, concern, and 
cannot claim the immunities of the latter.” Adult Student Housing, 705 P.2d 
at 798 (quoting Susmann v. Young Men’s Christian Ass’n of Seattle, 172 P. 
554, 556 (Wash. 1918)). 
—————————————————————————————— 
West Virginia 
Constitution & Statute(s) 
W. VA. CONST. art. X, § 1: “[P]roperty used for educational, literary, 
scientific, religious or charitable purposes . . . may by law be exempted 
from taxation . . . .” 
 
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 11-3-9 (West 2010) reads, in part: “(12) Property 
used for charitable purposes and not held or leased out for profit.. . . .” 
Compare the sales-tax exemption statute, applicable to a “corporation or 
organization which annually receives more than one half of its support 
from any combination of gifts, grants, direct or indirect charitable 
contributions or membership fees[.]” W. VA. CODE § 11-15-9(a)(6)(C). 
 
Case Holding(s) 
In re Tax Assessment of Foster Foundation’s Woodlands Retirement 
Community, 672 S.E.2d 150, 170-71 (W. Va. 2008) (“[T]he Foundation 
asks that we reduce the assessment further in light of its § 501(c)(3) status, 
but, in order to prevail, the Foundation must present clear and convincing 
evidence that the assessment is erroneous. Upon a review of the record in 
this case, we conclude that the Foundation has not sustained its burden of 
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proof.”). Evidently the retirement facility is taxable because the property is 
leased out for profit. 
 
Cf. Davis Memorial Hospital  v. West Virginia State Commissioner, 671 
S.E.2d 682 (W. Va. 2008) (denying sales tax exemption to a hospital 
earning $64 million in exempt-purpose income, which is to be included in 
support); cf. Apollo Civic Theatre, Inc. v. State Tax Commissioner, 672 
S.E.2d 215 (W. Va. 2008) (construing support—and donations—to include 
contribution of services). 
—————————————————————————————— 
Wisconsin 
Constitution & Statute(s) 
No specific constitutional provision. 
 
WIS. STAT. § 70.11(4) (2010) exempts, among other property: “Property 
owned and used exclusively by educational institutions offering regular 
courses [six] months in the year; or by churches or religious, educational or 
benevolent associations, including benevolent nursing homes and 
retirement homes for the aged but not including . . . a health maintenance 
organization. . . .” Id. The exemption for hospitals in (4)(m)(a) “does not 
apply to property used for commercial purposes, as a health and fitness 
center or as a doctor’s office.” Id. § 70.11(4)(m)(a). 
 
Note extensive debate culminating in 2009 legislation for exemption of 
“Benevolent Low-Income Housing” in Wis. Stat. § 70.11(4a), as described 
in Legislative Fiscal Bureau, Comparative Summary of Recommendations: 
Assembly, Senate, and Conference Committee Changes to Joint Committee 
on Finance, 2009-11 Wisconsin State Budget 125-26 (Property Tax 
Exemption for Certain Types of Housing) (June 25, 2009), at 
http://www.legis.state.wi.us/lfb/2009-11Budget/2009_06_25Conf%20 
Comm.pdf. 
Under the budget bill signed June 29, 2009, “the state compensates the 
taxing jurisdictions in which tax-exempt research property is located for the 
property taxes that the jurisdictions would otherwise have collected.” 
Assem. 75, 2009-2010 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wis. 2009). 
 
Case Holding(s) 
Milwaukee Regional Medical Center, Inc. v. City of Wauwatosa, 735 
N.W.2d 156, 173 (Wis. 2007) (ruling that a daycare center for nonprofit 
hospitals’ employees and the public is not exempt because Milwaukee 
Regional Medical Center (“MRMC”) is not an educational association): 
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[U]nder the five-part statutory test, both the organization 
(MRMC) and the property (day care facility) must qualify for 
exemption under Wis. Stat. § 70.11(4). Hence, (1) the 
organization must qualify as an educational association; and (2) 
the property of the organization must be owned and used 
exclusively for the purposes of the association. If only the 
organization’s activities at the property were relevant in 
determining whether an organization is an educational 
association, the second part of the statutory test would become 
superfluous because the use of the property would already be 
determined. 
Id. at 172 (citations omitted). 
Education of young children is incidental to MRMC’s primary 
goal of “aid[ing] and support[ing] the development and provision 
of health services in the Milwaukee region” and “facilitat[ing] 
the efficient development and functioning of the Medical Center 
campus.” 
 . . . . 
[I]n addition, . . . Campus Day Care is not MRMC’s primary 
business activity, as it is not MRMC’s primary source of 
revenue. 
Id. at 173. 
 
Ridge Side Cooperative v. City of Madison, No. 2006AP1100, 2007 Wis. 
App. LEXIS 172, at *4 (Wis. Ct. App. Mar. 1, 2007) (unreported) (footnote 
omitted) (“We agree with the circuit court that, under the no-profit-to-
members interpretation of WIS. STAT. § 70.11(4) in Milwaukee Protestant 
Home for the Aged [v. City of Milwaukee, 164 N.W.2d 289 (Wis. 1969)], 
Ridge Side is not a ‘benevolent association’ because its members are 
eligible for up to a [five-percent] annual gain on their transfer fees.”). 
—————————————————————————————— 
Wyoming 
Constitution & Statute(s) 
WYO. CONST. art. 15, § 12: “The property of . . . public libraries, lots with 
the buildings thereon used exclusively for religious worship, church 
parsonages, church schools and public cemeteries, shall be exempt from 
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WYO. STAT. ANN. § 39-11-105(a) (2009) exempts, in part: “(xvi) Property 
of a museum or hospital district”; “(xix) Property of charitable trusts”; and 
“(xxv) Property used for schools, orphan asylums or hospitals to the extent 
they are not used for private profit . . . .” 
 
Case Holding(s) 
I could find no cases construing exemption for private nonprofits of any 
sort (except for a case denying exemption for property leased to a 
nonprofit). Several cases construe exemption for government-owned 
property, including Deromedi v. Town of Thermopolis, 45 P.3d 1150, 1154 
(Wyo. 2002) (“[A] public museum serves a governmental purpose similar 
to that served by a library, park, golf course, art gallery or other public 
recreational facility, and we hold that the [County Board of Equalization]’s 
finding that the museum had a governmental purpose is supported by 
substantial evidence.”). 
 
